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INTRODUCTION 
A s the twenty-first century began, lort , contract, constitu-tional, and class-action attorneys throughout the world 
were beginning to dip into the cornucopia of iiligCltion opportuni-
ties against the deep-pocketed gambling interests. Pro-gambling 
interests were saddled with the media image of promoting an ac-
tivity which created new addicted gamblers (Clnd associated sui-
cides), and caused bankruptcies and crime. In this context, 
plaintiffs' attorneys focused on the prospect of sympathetic juries 
and concomitant large damage awards. 
Parallel to the 2001 publication of The Costs of Addicted Gam-
blers: Should rhe Slares fnilitlle Mega-Lawsuits Similar to rhe To-
bacco Cases? ,I more lawsuits were filed in the United States and 
Canada.2 By May 2002, "[llawyers and activists [in Canada 
were] ... predicting a nood of lawsuits against government-run 
gambling facilities. "3 One class-action suit in Quebec sought 
"$62S-million in damages. alleging the provincial gaming corpo-
ration knew or should have known that its video lottery tennina ls 
created dangerolls addictioIlS.'·4 Nancy Langille of Gambling 
Watch commented: "I see it as having national significance, if 
nol global sign ificancc." :O; One news source explained: 
Just as bars and party hosts have been founliliable for drunk-
driving accide nts, opera tors of casinos, racetracks and other 
bett ing venues will soon be forced in to civil court battles to 
answer for the effeCls their products have on addicts. legal ex-
perts predicted. There are already anecdotal reports of indi-
vidual su its being filed in Ontario, then sett led oul of court 
with clauses preventing the release o f details, said Jim Hillyer, 
a Toronto-area civil litigation lawyer ~lUdying the issue.6 
1 Johll Warrell Kindl, TIll: CQSIS of Addicted G(jlllhltr~: SIIould tile Stutes Iniliale 
Megll-Lllwsuits Similar In II/t' Tobacco Cases?, 22 MANAULKIAL.. & D lOc:v:m):.I E CON. 
17 (2001) [hereinafler Mega-I-awsuilsl . 
2 Tom Blackwell. Gambling Case Can Go /0 Triul. COlm Rlilel: FifSl Class -Aclion 
Suit of lIS Ki"d. NAT't I'OSI (Toronlo. Ollt., Call.), May 7. 2002. at AS. a~·ailable at 
2002 WL 19617084 [hereillufter QIlebec Class·Actioll Suitj 
31d. 
4/d. 
S Id. 
6 /d. In August 2003. a similar class-actioll lawsuit wa~ heing prepared against the 
provillce of Nova Scotia ill Callada. Dall Arscllault, lory MLA WunlS SlIIdy Oil 
Price of Cllmblillg. I lm AI I) (ilalifax. ~.S., Can.), Aug. 21, 2003, reprinted III Re-
spollsible Gam hli llg Council, II ttp: /Iwww .rc~pon~ibkgumbling.orglarticlesrr oT)'_ 
MLA_wallts_study_on_price_of.....gamhlillg.pdf. A Uiliversi ty of Manitoba study 
sugge.~ted that "prohlem gamhlcrs cnd up costing government an average of $56,000 
ICalladiallj-to say the COSL~ might ou\wcigh the bcndits .... Self-described palho-
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Thus, the Canadian lawsuits seemed to be setting the common 
law precedents fo r the developing wave of gambling litigation. 
In the Quebec class-action case , Justice Roger Banford of the 
Superior Court summarized his initial findings and asks: 
[EJach and every member of the group is a pathological gam-
bier and therefore touched by this disorder: each member of 
the group suffers from this sickness because of the 
respondant's fa ult: each member o f the group is entitled to the 
payment of a compensation still to be quantified; the extra-
contractual liability of the respondant: Has the respond ant a 
responsibility 10 warn the users? If so, has he fulfilled this 
responsibility?1 
These determinations are significant precedents. 
Lo 2002, U.S. tort lawyers targeled gambling. Scott Harsh-
barger, the former Massachuse tts Attorney General who took on 
the tobacco industry. went after the gambling industry as Presi-
dent of Common Cause. a citizens' group promoting government 
accountability.8 
Public health advocates and their litigators say ... [pathologi-
cal (i.e., "addicted")J gambling is a crisis that has reached epi-
demic proportions and something must be done to stop 
casinos from injuring the many addicts who look to them to 
feed their roughly $50 billion a year habit. 
"It's very similar to the drive to snort coke or smoke crack. 
It's that pressing. that urgent," said lProfcssorJ Henry Lesieur, 
a gambling treatment therapist? 
Apologists for the gambling industry, however, resented the "de-
monizalion" of gambling and argued that gamblers assume the 
risk of engaging in high-risk behavior. Critics countered that 
the re was no assumption of the risk, because the risk was il lusory 
and artificial since the House always wins-eventually (the 
"gambler's ruin" principle).10 Nevertheless , policy experts con-
logical gambtcr Bernie Walsh of Halifax thinks he lost about $50.000 to the [video 
gambling) machines-as well as his family-beforc hc quit playing. However. he's 
sure that he has cost the province milch morc [approximately $200.0001 in treatment 
and hospital costs becau:.e of the addiction."' Jd. 
7 Press Release. Garneau. Verndon . Michaud. Samson. The Class Action Against 
Low·Qucbec Has Been Authorized (May 6. 2(02). 
8 Alisyn Camerota. To r[ Lawyers Targe[ Gambling. Fox News Channel. May 31. 
2002. III http:l{www.foxncws.eomlstory/O.29JJ.54083.00.html [hereinafter Tort Law· 
yers Target GlImblmg]. 
91d. 
10 See id.: ~'ee also Judy DeHu\"cn & Kate Coscarclli. Casinos Draw Talk of Law· 
suib. STAR·LLI)Gl.R (Newark. N.J.). lUllc 23. 2002. at t. available at 2002 WL 
23258317, fcprimed liS Judy DeHav~'n & Kate Cosearclli. Gambling JIlr/II.Slry Likely 
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eluded: "tobacco and gambling are just the beginning of a wave 
of litigation against big industry."ll Harshbarger, who helped 
win $246 billion in damages from the tobacco industry. summa-
rized that if gambling facilities were "going to lure people to 
come, and families to come, you need to deal with the reality that 
this introduces potential addiction problems.'>l2 
In 1997, as the 1999 National Gambling [mpact Study Commis-
sion [hereinafter 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission or NGISC] 
began its work, pro-gambling Commissioner John W. Wilhelm 
sent a three-page memo to associa tes that effectively cautioned 
"that, based on various legal analyses, the industry probably 
[would not] be able to invoke trade secret protections to rebuff 
any requests"13 for documents by the Commission. Political col-
umnist Jon Ralston commented: 
Considering the memo's wide distribution-it was sent to 
nearly two dozen people-Wilhelm knew the risk he was run-
ning in writing words that could become part of the public do-
main, sounding like a warning to the industry and giving fuel 
to anti-garners who have accused him of being an industry 
shill. But Wilhelm ... obviously believed that the commis-
sion's underlying danger was so pernicious for the [gambling) 
industry, his worke rs and ultimately the state. thai he had no 
choice. 
Wilhelm makes the case thai ant i-gaming forces hope to ex-
ploit the co mm ission's subpoena powers "to pl ace the gami ng 
industry in a no-win situation: Either you refuse information 
requests and resists [sic I subpoenas. making it look like you 
have things to hide; or you comply with broad requests flow-
ing from the commission 's broad mandate ... thus permitti ng 
fishing expeditions.,,14 
Familiar with the gambling industry, Commissioner Wilhelm ap-
parentiy recognized that the Achilles' heel of the gambling indus-
try was the process involving the legal discovery of infonnalion. 
On a strategic level , Ka nsas City atto rney Stephen Bradley 
Small, who has sued casinos. predicted in 2000 that there were 
Target fm Nexf Big Silir. HONOLULU STAR-B uLL .. lune 25, 2002. at C6. See mfra 
notcs 80-81 and accompanying tcx!. For formu!ae demonstra ting the gamb!er's ruin 
principle. see Michael O rkin & Richard Kakigi. Wha/ is /he Worrh of Free Casino 
Credi/?, AM. MAT HEMATICAL M ()NTlILY. Jan. 1995. at 3·4 [hereinafter Fn'e Credil]. 
11 TorI Lawyers Target Gambling. supra notc 8. 
12 fd. 
13 Jon Ralslon, Co!umn, Casinos and Smoking GUlIS. L,\s VEGAS REV.-J.. Sept. 2, 
1997 . at 7B. a~'ailable at 1997 WL 4552321. 
14 /d. 
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"Mega· Lawsuits" awaiting action by the attorneys general of va-
rious states. 
Small said .. . [pathological (i.e., "addicted")] gambling might 
present deeper issues such as whether the industry. like th e 
tobacco industry, could someday be charged with creating the 
add iction. 
"If a person considers himself to have a compulsion to gam-
ble, the deeper question is why? Is it extraneous to the gam-
ing ind ustry or did the industry cause it ?"I~ 
During the 1990s, Small ini tiated some of the first well-publi-
cized lawsui ts agai nst gambling facilit ies. alleging violations of 
the Racketeer Infl uenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. 1'" The 
dean of pathological gambling issues, Professor Henry Lesieur, 
chided governmental officials and the gambling industry : "They 
are not aSking the hard questions. How much are we [i.e., the 
government/gambling industry partnership J contributing to the 
problem?"I? 
If the hard questions are asked, the answers may come from , as 
the Introduction notes, the Achilles' heel of legal discovery of 
marketing and other informat ion from the gambling indust ry. 
The inadverte nt destruction of documents fostered by delays in 
the discovery process could also make parties potentially vulner-
able-even to charges of obstruction of justice. In class-action 
cases. certification in gambling cases should be rela tively easy 
compared with other class-action lawsuits. because casinos and 
video gambling machines track players via a variety of computer 
programs, such as "Players Cards" and "Fun Cards." 
Part I of this discussion delimits the problematic areas and cat-
egorizes the potentia l lawsuits faced by the gambling industry 
into: (1) strategic lawsuits brought by state attorneys general or 
federal authorities: (2) class-action lawsuits by those losing at 
gambling; and (3) private lawsuits brought on behalf of ind ividu-
als or groups of individuals . 
As enumerated in Part II , "Clarification of Goals." govern-
ments need to recriminalize electronic gambl ing devices (EG Os) 
15 Slephanie S. Maniscalco, Gambling A ddict Suits n . Casinos Are Foreseen: 
'St>lf-Exclusiou ' Program May Create Dwy , Mo. LAW. WKLY •• Dec. 17. 2()(x), at 15 
[hereinafter Self-Exclusion]. 
16 18 U.S.c. §§ 1961·68 (1994). 
17 Rick Green. Problem-Gambler Swts: Activist foresee~' Damage Clamu. HAI(]· 
FORI) COUIl,Al"T, May 17. 2002. at AI7. available at 2002 WL 4807090 [herdnafter 
Problem Gambler Suits I. 
I 
/ 
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and video gambling machines (VGMs) where those machines are 
convenient to the publ ic. which is practically everywhere. This 
goal was unanimously recommended by the 1999 U.S. Gambling 
Commission. The goal of maintaining the "fairness" of the 
games is also discussed with regard to legal acti ons challenging 
"fairness." The legal actions highligh t two questions: Is it unfair 
for "fairness issues" and regulatory constraints to be determined 
de facto by the owners and designers of the games? In this re-
gard, is U.S. gove rnment-licensed gambling unconstitutional if ils 
net effect is to mislead people into losing. thereby depriving 
them of their Fourteenth Amendment property "without due 
process of law"? The next section. Part III. on the history behind 
these issues, reveals that legalizing ga mbling activities increases 
illegal gambling and associa ted crime. These analyses are fol-
lowed by a discussion in Part IV on .. trends and conditioning fac-
tors" which focus on attempts by the lobbyists for pro-gambling 
interests to cont rol and confuse the information ava il able not 
o nly to the publ ic, but also to the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commis-
sion itself. Part V. "policy alternatives and recommendations:' 
high lights the gambling industry's Achilles' heel-the legal dis-
covery of information-and the industry's need to avoid lit iga-
tion since plaintiffs' atto rneys can piece rogether informatio n 
from individual cases. 
The Conclusion is that the enormous amounts of money that 
pro-gambling in terests have siphoned from various U.S. jurisdic-
tions has created a new class of eli te pro-gambling scofflaws and 
transformed many gambling interests into quaSi-sovereigns chal-
lenging international, as well as U.S .. judicial and governmental 
systems. 
A Mega-Lawsuits alld the Legal Discovery of Illformation: 
The "Achilles' Heel" of the Gambling Industry as the Discovery 
of Marketing Illformation 
In 1994, two separate lawsuits were filed in U.S. District Court 
by Florida residents William Poulos and William Ahern against 
multiple defendants in the gambling industry, and in 1995 these 
cases were consol idated with simi lar cases in the District of Ne-
vada as Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc. 18 The plaintiffs lost money 
playing slot machines during the previous twenty years, and they 
"claimed that the machines induced them to play by misrepre-
18 No. CV·S94-1I26-R LH·RJJ , 2002 WL 1991180 (D. Nev. June 25. 2(02). 
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scnting their actual odds of winning." I,} If plaintiffs prevailed in 
this case, the defendants would be locked into a classic case of 
fraud. However. in 1997 the court granted defendants' mot ion to 
dismiss for failure to plead fraud with particularity bu t denjed the 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.20 The court gener-
ally denied defendants' other motions to dismiss on various 
grounds, such as: (1) lack of personal jurisdiction; (2) lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction; (3) a stay on primary jurisdiction and 
abstention grounds; and (4) the Act of State Doctrine.21 
The approxim.Hely seventy defendants included cruise ship 
casinos. land-based casino operators, and slot manufacturers. 
The press recognized POll los was significant because the plain-
tiffs were "suing virtually every major casino operator and slot 
manufacturer ... tand] asking a federal judge for access to docu-
ments they say will prove a long-term effort was made by indus-
try players to intentionally mislead slot players."n Despite 
obvious attempts by the defendants' representatives to limit the 
public's knowledge of these potential issues, the Nevada press 
outl ined some salient but sensitive industry information, which 
the discovery process could reveal. 
Such documents cQuld include marketing materials. memos, 
presentation materia ls and slot operations manuals. The 
plaintiffs are also seeking access to casino player records. 
which they claim will show that the playing habits of the de-
rendants lire typical among slot players. lbe amount of 
records bei ng sought is considerable: since [the plaintiffs] 
wou ld have to demonstrate a widespread history of such mar-
ket ing, ltheyJ are demanding materials that go back a decade 
or lTlore.23 
The fact that the discovery requests could reveal informat ion 
19 David Strow. Camers Face Witler Frtllill Lawsuit> LAS VF"(',"~ SUN. June 22. 
1':199, available 1/1 IlIlp:flwww.lusvegassun.com [herei nafter Fralin Lawsuilj. 
20 See iii.: PoulVlI. No. CV-S94-1 t26·DAE (RJJ) (D. Nev. Dec. 1'01, 1')97) (grant ing 
in purl and denying in parI defendanls' mOlion to dismiSl. purWllnt to Rule 9(b) tor 
fai lure 10 p lead fraud with panicu[anty and dcn:r ing defendants' motion to d ismiss 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure 10 ~lalC a claim). 
21 See. e.g .. POll/OS. No. f'V-S94-1 t26-DAE (RJJ) (D. Nc\·. Dec. 19. 1997) (Or. 
ders: regarding New Jersey casino defendants' molion 10 dismiss fo r tack of per· 
sonal jurisdiction and defendant Delta Di\cniiolls. Inc .. motion to d ismiss for lack of 
persona l jurisdiction: denying (."-mise ship ddcndl.llllS· mOlion to dism iss for lack of 
suoject mailer jurisdietlOn: dcnying dckndanls' motion for a st:!y on primary juris. 
dict ion and abstent ion grounds: and denying defendam Princess Ilolc!'S motion 10 
dismiss under thc act of ~Iatc doctrine). 
22 Fraud Luwsuil. supra nOle 19. 
Did. 
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for over ten years was quite important. Examples of the plain' 
tiffs' requests for information provided a blueprint for discovery 
requests in other potential cases. 
hWhat the plainti ffs are now seeking are any documents and 
materials that will show slots and video poker machines have al-
ways been marketed in a misleading way. and that slot players 
perceive the machines in the same manner as the defendants,"24 
For example: 
rAJ video poker machine that claims it denb from a 52-card 
deck, when in fact it deals from 10 preselected cards .... ror] a 
slot Iha l repeatedly places winning symbols near the payline, 
giving the player the impression of just missing a big jackpot. 
To achieve class action status, the plaintiff1; [wereJ lryin§ \0 
prove such methods are pervasive among the defendants. S 
In addition to obtaining the discovery of in fo rmation in the 
United States, plaintiffs' attorneys we re we ll advised to note that 
the defendant multinational corporations provided opportunities 
to gathe r relevant information. including public info rmation and 
internal memos from overseas operations owned by United 
States-based companies. 
B. Delays in Discovery: The Five- Yellr HiaTus in The Poulos 
Nevada Case: The D(/nger of inadvertent Destmction of 
Documents and Vulnerabilities to Obstruction of iustice? 
Although Poulos was first filed in 1994. the discovery process 
for industry marketing information was apparently delayed unt il 
1999.26 Interposing fo r delay would technically be an unethical 
legal practice by any party to a suitP Also, in this case, any de-
lays in the discovery of sensitive marketing information would al 
first appear to operate to the benefit of the gambling industry by 
making the litigation process more expensive to plaintjffs without 
;'deep pockets." However, since the suit was filed in 1994 and 
consolidated in 1995. the defendants (i.e., virtually every casino 
operator, slot manufacturer, and cruise line) would tech nically be 
on notice that no potentially relevant discoverable in formation 
could be destroyed. As the Arthur AndersenlEnron scandal of 
2001 highlighted, the destruction of potentially relevant informa-
24 /d. 
251d. 
26 See id. 
27 For eXl'Imples of precedenl, see CODE OF P~OF'L t~"-~I'ONl>l!llLITY DR 7·102 and 
EC 7-38 (1970), uprilllt'd in BU\c,,'s L\w DlCno",,,~y xvii (rcv. 4th ed. 1968). 
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tion in itself-even when part of normal procedures---crosses 
into the area of criminal behavior.28 What would happen in 
POll/OS if it was later determined that relevant or potentially rele -
vant information had been destroyed inadvertently? As a practi-
cal matter, the long relevant rimeframe for the PouloJ discovery 
requests put the defendants at perhaps greater risk because there 
were higher probabilities for the inadvertent loss of discovery 
information. 
C. Class-ActiOIl Certificarion of the "Class" via tile "Players 
Cards" and "Fun Cards" 
In Poulos, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class action status on 
March 18, 1998, which the court initiall y denied because the class 
was not "cohesive" enough, according to Judge Roger L. Hunt.29 
In 2002, this denial was scheduled for appea l by David Barret! of 
the New York City firm of Boies, Schiller & Flexne r LLP, to the 
Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals.30 Furthermore, as casino 
companies began to issue more "Players Cards" (e.g .. Harrah's 
Entertainmenl. Inc.) and "Fun Cards" (e.g., Casino Aztar in In-
diana) during the 19905, it became relatively easier to identify 
those who had lost funds gambling: losses are recorded for virtu-
ally everyone with a gambling-facility issued card.31 All of the 
card owners/holders and their addresses (as well as credit rat-
ings) were consolidated in the computer marketing files of nearly 
28 Kun Eichenwald & Floyd Norris. Early Verdin on Audit: Proudllrd Ignored. 
N.Y. Tl\lES. June 6, 21))2. at C6. al'ai/ablt a/ LEX IS. News & Business. I\ews. News. 
All (Enghsh. Full Text ): Tile Iwlt of Andersen: Cru d Tarnished Goldw Rl!pUWIWn, 
CHI. TII.Ill .. Sept. I. 2002, § I. at 1. availablt: Q/ 2002 WL 26770388. See Kristen 
Hays. Enron Fild Rtorguniuwon Plan. AP Ol'o.Ul'o.E. July 11.2003. uI'ailabll! UI 2003 
WL 59741 154, rtprinlt'd as Plan F,ll!d by Enron Leaves Llflle for Crelillors. NI,."",s, 
GAl:.E.iTE (Chllmpllign. 111.). Ju ly 11.2003. at A l l ( Bankrupt Enron's creditors will 
Tec.:i ... c 14.4 to 18.3 cents on the dollar, while bankrupt WoridCom's cred itors will 
recci\'e 36 cents on the dollnT.). See also Heuring on fl.R. 3763, the Corporate and 
AII(/iling Accountability. Resl,o/lsibility, uml Trallsparency Acr of 2002 IJl!fort' IIII! 
/lOIISI! Comm. 011 Fill. S"rI'S., 107th Cong. (2002). available a/ http://financlalscr-
viccs.house.govlhearings.asp'!formmode=detail&hearing=96. 
29 Vtgas Fedu(J1 COlln Decision on Slot5 Fal'on Gambling Industr)'. A.\S(X'JA nol) 
PRESS NE\\'SW1I1.E~. July 2. 2(X)2. a\'ailablt al Wl. NV-News. rtprinted Q.f VtgQ.f hd-
eral COlIn Dtcu.OII on Slol5 Favors Gambling. RENO GAZE'ITE-J " July 2. 2002: 
POlllos. No. CV-S94·1l26·RLH-RJJ. 2002 Wl l9911BO (D. Nev. June 25, 2(02). 
3O Li:z Benslon. Gamblers To ApJHal Ruling on Murketing of Slol5 , LAS VLc,;AS 
SUN. July 16. 2002. at I. ul'uilublt UI 2002 WL 1520001 4. 
11 £.g .. Fred Faust. 510/ MrIChine:s R/ln Other Games Off lilt Table, ST. loUIS 
P O!t,- DISI'A10'. APT 12. 1993. at BPI. a~'aiIQblt a/ 1993 WlB0140761hereinarier 
510/ Machines Rim). 
230 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82. 2oo3J 
all gambling companies/facilities. Therefore. the class became 
morc identifiable because the cards show "the losers" or "net 
losers" consisting of practically everyone who gambled. 
D. Blueprints for Legal Discovery in Gambling Issue Areas: 
The American Trial Lawyers Association Gets 
Focused on Gambling Facililies 
In discovery proceedings, the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
30(b)(6) depositions in an Indiana case, Williams v. Aztar buJi-
ana Gaming Corp. ,32 blueprint some of the information to be dis-
covered, such as requests for state "License Renewal Reports" 
and, to quote the Discovery Notice, "specifically, the in fo rmation 
which would disclose the following:"3] 
(a) The average amount of gambling losses ~r patron per 
cruise or gam in g session for those who visit [ed] the Casino 
regu larly: 
(b) TIle average amount of gambling losses per year per pa-
tron for those who visil[edJ the Casino regularly: 
(c) The average amount of gambling losses per year per pa-
tron for those who are or were issued "Fun Cards"; and 
(d) The average amount of gambl ing losses per year per pa-
tron for those who are or were designated by the Casino 
as belonging to the "Premium Passenger Club."34 
As leading edge cases, Wiiliams 35 and Poulos provided 
32 Notice of Rule 3O(b)(6) Deposition of Aztar Indiana Gaming Company. LLC. 
Williams v. Aztar Ind. Gaming Corp., No. EV-OI-75-C-Y/ H, 2003 WL ItXl3369 (S. D. 
Ind. filed May 9, 2002). See also Third Amended Complaint For Damages, id. (filed 
Jan. 4. 2002). Summary judgment was entered on behalf of defendents. Id. (Apr. 5. 
2003). The Sevent h Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals heard arguments in Williams' 
appeal on Oct. 22,2003. See gmerally Urief of Appellant, Williams v. Aztar Ind. 
Gaming Corp .. No. 03-1822. 35 1 F.3d 294 (7th Cir. filed July 14.2003). 
JJ Notice of Rule 3O(b)(6) Deposition of Aztar Indiana Gaming Company, LLC. 
Williams v. Aztar Ind. Gaming Corp., No. EV-OJ-75-C-Y/H. 2003 WL 1903369 (S.D. 
Ind. filed May 9, 2002). 
34 /d. 
35 See, e.g., Terry NoffSinger, Presentation to the Casino Gaming Litigation 
Group. Association of Trial Lawyen of America Annual Convention (Ju ly 23, 2002) 
(public information from filed case complaint). See also Laura Parker. Gambler 
Sa}s CasillO Pla}ed Him, USA TODAY. Feb. 21. 2003. at A3. amilable at 2003 WL 
5305672. Three cases similar to Williums. including one involving an addicted gam-
bier's suicide, have placed the casino industry on the defensive. See Rick Aim. Law-
sili/s Allege dWI Harral!'s Casillos E,lcouraged Troubled Camblers, K AI'>. On" STAR, 
May 31. 2002, available at 2002 WL 19852997. In Burdett v. Harr<lh 's Kansas Casino 
Corp .. No. Civ. A. 02-2166-K HV. 2003 WL 124665 (D. Kan. June 12.2003). the 
court decided discovery issues in favor of the plaintiff whose addicted gambler hus-
band committed suidde. In another case, a casino's extension of credit to a debtor 
gambler did not constitute an act in "good faith. " and debtor's trustee in bankruptcy 
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blueprin ts for discovery requests by the attorneys involved. such 
as Williams' attorney. Terry Noffsinger from Evansville. Indiana. 
By 2002, the Casino Gaming Litigation Group of the Association 
of Trial Lawyers of America also was blueprinting the guidelines 
for specialized discovery in lawsuits involving gambling issues.36 
I 
D E LIMITATION OF PROBLEMS 
For organizational purposes, the mega-lawsuits faced by the 
gambling industry during the twenty-first century cou ld be organ-
ized into three major types. First , public-interest "strategic" law-
suits could be brought by state attorneys general or federal 
authorities. Second, class-action lawsuits could be brought on 
behalf of large classes of people. Although individuals' rights are 
involved, these types of mega-lawsuits would be largely strategic 
in their impacts. Third. private lawsuits could be brought on be-
half of individuals or groups of individuals. 
A. POTential Antitrust Cases and Subpoenaed Discovery 
In 2002. Illinois Attorney General Jim Ryan's office "subpoe-
naed top casino executives after they jetted to Chicago ... to 
devise a unified countera ttack to the slate's steep casino tax ill-
crease."J7 The object of these subpoenas was " 10 delermine 
whether the action taken at this mee ting violate[d] state or fed-
prevailed. Meeks v. Red River EnTm'T (In re Armstrong). 285 F.3d 1092. 1098 (81h 
Cir. 2002). The dehtor's casino markers did not have TO be paid by the blmkruptey 
Trustee. Harrah's Tunica Corp. v. Meeks (In re Armstrong), 291 F.3d 517 (8th Cir. 
2002). 
By eomparisn n. in Merrill v, Trump, Ind., fn(.'., 320 F.3d 729 (71h CiT. 2003), the 
U.S. Seventh Circuit could not fin d LInder Indiana law any duty by Trump·~ Indiana 
casino TO pathological gambler Mark Merrill to exclude him from Ihe casino-even 
after his clinic requested the exclusion on Merrill's behalf. However. This eHse WHS 
deeido.:d in 2003. JUSI before indiana enacted a self-exclusion statuTe- despite the 
efforts of indiana Sen. L1rry E. Lut7 (R) (representing Casino Azlar·s disTriCl) 10 
kill the legislH tioll or alternatively grail! de jure immuniTy 10 casinos for most IOrts. 
Sen. Lutz's bilarre "immuniTy provisions·· were slricken from the final bill. See 
Conference CommiTtee Report. Engrossed H.B. 1470. 1st Sess., § 4. eh. 16. ~t 3·4 
(2003) (codified as amended al IND. CODE §§ 4-22·2, 4-33·4). 
36 See. e.g .. Robin Reid Boswell, Obtaining rhe Casino".\' lnformmioll. in ATLA 
AN,,",IlAL Co"lVFNTtO,,", REFE){EJ>.CE MATE){ I ALS: CAM:-IO GAMING 1783 (2002). 
availabie a/ 2 Ann. 2002 ATLA·CLE 1783. See genefllily ATLA A:-INUAL CONVE:-I -
TIO,'-, supra aT 1783. 
37 Douglas Holt. Casino Meeting N()les Subpoenaed. Oil. TRIll .. June 17.2002, 
§ 2. at 1. al'lIilllbie at 2002 WL 2666206 [hereinnfler CllsillO NOles SlIbpoell(({'dj. 
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eral antitrust law." 3S According to Argosy Gaming Chief Execu-
tive Officer James B. Perry, the "gathering was to discuss 
lobbying efforts to rescind the tax increase. ',J<) and it was consid-
ered important as attested by the attendance of Boyd Gaming 
Corp. Chief Executive Officer, William S. Boyd.40 If the state 
legislators did not rescind the tax increase. casino executives re-
portedly " threatened" to cancel construction projects, layoff em-
ployees, slash marketing efforts, and reduce charitable 
donalions.41 This meeting " raised suspicions among state anti-
trust lawyers that the casinos [were] plotting anti-competitive 
agreements to punish the state with reduced casino revenues un-
til the tax [was} lifted.'·42 Paul Slater. an antitrust lawyer and 
adjunct professor at Northwestern University School of Law. 
commented: ··If they were saying, 'We' ll reduce competition be-
tween our lllinois casinos in order to punish the State of Illinois,' 
you could have a violation of the Sherman ACC·43 which bars pri-
vate businesses from acting in restraint of trade.44 
Regardless of any potential antitrust issues in this specific sce-
nario. the trend appeared to be toward attorneys general moni-
toring the gambling industry more closely-particularly in areas 
such as Internet gambling activities. During the 1990s severa l 
state attorneys general filed suit against Internet gambling opera-
tions that were testing the law by violating the Interstate Wire 
Act."5 The attorneys general included Hubert "Skip" Humphrey 
III in Minnesota and Jeremiah "Jay" Nixon in Missouri.4(, Pri-
vate cit izens were also bringing successful lawsuits to retrieve 
their losses (rom Internet gambling."7 
JI! fd. See generally Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 15 U.S.c. ~§ 1-7 (1994): ClaYlun 
Act. 15 U.S.c. §§ 12-27 (1994): Federal Trade Commi~ion Act. t5 U.S.c. §§ 41-58 
(1994). SI'I' al~o Robinson-Patman Act. 15 U.S.c. §§ 13(a)-13(e) (1994). 
19 Ca~i"o NOles SlIbpo/'IIUI'(/. mpra note 37. 
4OJd. 
4t hi.; Jay Krall. CasillO Execwivl'S ThrcnIell CIIlS ill JIlillo;s A{lcr Tax Boosi. 
WALL ST. J .. June 12.2002. at 8 3. available at 2002 WL 3397559. 
42 Cosino NOles Subpoenaed, supra note 37. 
43 15 U.s.c. §§ 1-7 (1994). 
4.1 Casino NOles Sub,wenaed, supra note 37. 
45 18 U.S.c. § 1084 (1994). 
46 See. I'.g .. Beth Bersclii. Gamblers Play Ihe Odds Online. Wi\.~ H. POl>-r .. Aug. 19. 
1997. at AI. amilable al 1997 WL 12882117: Charles Bowen. Whose Flag Flies Over 
Ihe 1IIII'ml'l. STi\.R-LI::DGLR (Newark. N.J.). Aug. 18. 1997, at 51. available at 1997 
WL 12554431. 
47 See. e.g., Onlille Gambler SIll'S Credit Compallies. AP ONLINE. Aug. 17.1998. 
m·ai/able at 1998 WL 6710706. reprimed us On/ille Gambling SlIit Is Filed. BI::LLE_ 
VILLE NEWS-DE~1OCRi\.T. Aug. 18. 1998. at A2 
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B. Legalized Gambling Causes Crime 
By the twenty-first century, the public interests in Canada, the 
United States, and intt!rnalionally were relearning what academ-
ics and police authorities had known and warned about as states 
and communities decriminalized gambling during the 19805 and 
1990s: Legalized gambling activities cause increased crime. The 
trend was obvious in Canada, which se rved as a microcosm. 
"The number of fraud and internal theft cases involving problem 
gamblers .. skyrocketed along with the expansion of casinos, 
slot machines and Lnlcrnet gaming in the last 10 years .. [ac-
cording to] police, lawyers and addiction counselors."48 The 
comparisons between the costs of drug addiction and gambling 
addiction49 were becoming increasingly obvious to the public and 
government officials. 
Sergeant Bud Snow, representing the Hali fax police fraud 
squad. commented: "At one time, most of our large internal 
thefts were drug-related . Now they're more or less gambling re-
lated .... Over the last few years, there are probably more and 
more getting involved in stealing to suppor! their gambling 
habit. "5O 
In Canada, examples of criminal cases not only highlighted the 
types of crimes committed by pathological (addicted) gamblers 
but also revealed some of the underlying principles not com-
monly recognized by the public wisdom. 
These bourgeois crooks lend 10 be Irusted me mbers of thei r 
organizations. with families and nice homes and are jllst liS 
likely to be women as lIlen. They include one female bank em -
ployee in Saskatchewan who took her employer for 5200.000, 
was convicted , then later got caught stealing another $64.000. 
A single video louery terminal sucked up all the money. 
An RCMP officer who tailed organized crime figures 
around Ontario 's casillos siol e from his uni t's expense fund to 
feed his own gambling habit. A stock broker siphoned money 
from his client.,,; to bankroll his wife's wagering:S1 
4l\Tom Blackwetl. Glltllbfi'lg Addictioll Fueling Crimc. NAT'1 PO'IT (ToronlO. 
a ni .. Can.). May 6. 2002. ti l A9. a~'a"able at 2002 WL t961AA41 thereinafter Gam-
bling Adt/iction Flle/illg Crime ). 
.. 9 SUo e.g. , John Warro:n Kindt. Statemcnt to the Nnl ional Gambling Impact 
Study ComlnlSliion. U.S. and International Concerns over the Socio-Economics 
CQlits of Legalized Gambling: Greate r than the Illega l Drug Problem? (May 21. 
1998) (transcript on file with Nat'l Gambling Impact Study Comm·n). 
50 Gambling AddieltOn Fading Crime. )'upra note 48. 
51 Id. (emphasis Hddcd). I 
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As one problem·gambler summarized another truism. ·'[tJhe casi-
nos ... don't care about compulsive fi.e .. pat hological and prob-
lem} gamblers."52 As the negative impacts of gambling on 
consumer businesses were hi ghlighted in the enrly 1990s. by the 
turn o f the cen tury increasing numbers of major businesses. such 
as L.L. Bean and MBNA. were pllblicly opposing gambling ini-
tiatives.53 in part because of problems caused by gambling costs 
such as " Iosl work productivity" costs, criminal costs, and insur-
ance costs. 54 
Elsewhere, there is abundant evidence that gambling is turning 
the middle class to crime. One such community is Windsor, On-
Ulric, which opened one of the first Canadian casinos in 1994. 
Detective Mike Kelly of the Windsor police is working on a 
case involving an employee who stole $4-million from a local 
manu facturer. "He said it's all gone to gaming and there is 
vcry lillie hope of recove ry." 
Windsor recorded 11 dramatic case ... [in 20011. when Car-
men Lauzon. a Bank of Montreal manager. was convicted of 
stealing SI.2-million from Ihe accounts of clients al he r branch. 
Ms. Lauzon got a two-year jail sentence.55 
By comparison. in 2002 the legal profession in Australia sued 
to recover $1.77 mi llion stolen by an allorncy from trust aC-
counts, including $635,940 allegedly spelll al the Crown casino.s!'> 
The plaintiffs took Ihis legal action to recove r money gambled by 
a probable pathological gamble r, lawyer Gabriel Werden. and 
many bel ieved the case was a case primae impre.\,\ionis for Aus-
S21d, See generally, John Warren Kindt. Inereaud Crim, alld Ltgali::,mg Gam· 
blms Oper{///OIIJ: Tile lmpac/ 011 Ihe SQCio-Ecollomict of IJlIsill,n (md GOI·emmenl. 
30 Clm!. L BULL. 538 (1994) [hereinafter Illcreased Cnllle and Legali:lllg 
Gambling ). 
~.1 Compare John Warren Kindt. The Negatiw Impacts of Ll'l(allut/ Gamblillg 011 
Busill('Ss('s.4 U. M IAMI Ill '~. LJ, 93 (1994), with cmuil from OHko.: of PrC5ident. 
L.L. Bean. 10 All L.L. Belin Employees (April 17. 2003) (OJppo~illg casino gambling 
in Maine). reprimed at Cllizcns for u Stronger Pennsylvania. hllp:lIslrongerpa_orgi 
g<lmhlingdamago.:/IIbo.:an.hlm. Gra ~1,; Murphy. Credit Card Giam MONA EmbraCl's 
AllIi-Ca\iIlO Sland. PUIt I I..AJ>,1> PItLSS HLKALD (Me.). June II 20m. at t A. availahlc 
al 2003 WL 58364669, ami Jason Claywonh. Cosillo Would "1ft Ril'en.alk Pledge at 
RiJk. DLS MOINLS R LvlS"ILR, July 8. 2003. at IA. amitahl, at ZtlO3 WL 59168102 
("Principal Financial Group will pulilhe plug on a propo'iCd $25.5 mill ion ri\lcl"walk 
plan if IDes Moines) cil}' leaders allow riverboal gamhhng ncar lhc projecl.~). 
54 John Warren Kindt. TIll! l~cmlOmic Impacts of Legafi:.ed GamblillS Aaivlties. 
43 DRAK I" L. Rr-v. St. 62. K5-XO (19W) [hereinafter teOl/o/llle Impaco· l. 
55 Gambling Addictioll Fueling Crime. :mpru nOIC 48. 
S6 Geoff Wilkmson, Ca.mlO Sueil for LOll Cillh. HLItAU) $GN (Melbourne, Vict .. 
Allst!.), MilY 9. 2002. a t 5, I/vwlilble al LEXIS, News & Business. Ne\\l1;, New~. All 
(I;nglish, Full T(,!xt) . 
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tralia.57 TIle Australian "Supreme Court \\-Tit issued [in April 
2oo2J by the Law J nstitute of Victoria's professional standards 
association [apparently relied] on a section of the Lotteries Gam-
ing and Betting Act. "58 The claim filed with the writ specified 
"10 payments to Crown by Werden between June 1997 and Feb-
ruary 1998"w as wagers, which should be recoverable under sec-
tion 67 of the Lotteries Gaming and Betting Act when stolen 
funds were "paid to any person as ... a wager or bet."(,() 
In Austria, another case was garnering in ternational attention 
when the Austrian Supreme Court in Vienna ruled in 2003 that 
the country's major casino chain had to refund £33,000 to a path-
ological (addicted) gambler. This case was notable because it es-
tablished that "Austrian gamblers who lose large amounts of 
money in casinos may be able to claim back some of their losses 
if they prove they are addicted to gambling."6l 
C. Addicred Gamblers, Criminal Defenses, and Civil Actions 
Against Gambling Facilitie~' 
Like olher addictions. by [he 19905 "pathological gambling" 
was more frequent ly surfac ing in criminal cases as a mitigating 
factor, and even as a defense arguing lack of mens rea (i.e., crimi-
nal inlenl).62 
When addicted gamblers were convicted, civil suits against the 
gambling facilities became an option. For example, in 2000 a 
Florida prisoner filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court against 
"Donald Trump, his floating Trump Casino in Gary[, Indianal 
57 Id. 
~/d. 
59/d. 
60 Lotteries Gaming and Belting Act, 1966. § 67 (Aust!.). 
61 The Supreme COI jrf in Vienna llIls ... , GUARDIAN (London). lan. 25. 2003. at 
P5. available (j{ 2003 WL 9520211: CumplI/sh'e Gambler Reflmdl.'d LOISes. Ana-
nova.com, III hnp:llwww.ananova.com/newslstorylsm_741340.html(Jan. 19.2003). 
62 Cf James H. Juliussen, NOle, ComplIlsive Gambling and Mitigation of Work 
Place Discipline: A Step Too Par? 27 W ILLAM ETTE L. REV. 711 (1991). "Compul-
sive gambling" is the laymen's term for the medical "'pathological gambling." COIl· 
victed for bank robbery, Mark Merrill, for example, explored during his trial the 
defense that pathological (addicted) gambling obviated lhe criminal intent necessary 
for a conviction. See a/so Merrill v. Trump Ind .. Inc .. 320 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2003). 
In an interesting argument, former Arizona Superior Court Judge William L. 
Scholl. who was an addicted gambler, sought to have his convictions for filing false 
lax returns overturned on appeal because of the "distortions in thinking and 'denial,' 
which impact laddicted gamblers'] ability and emotional wherewilhall to keep 
records." U.S. v. ScholL 166 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 19(8). lhe Ninth Circuit U.s, Court 
of Appeals rejected defendant'" argumenls and affirmed his conviction. 
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and its manager for $2.1 million, saying his continued gambling at 
the casino led him to rob two Illinois banks."63 
In the average casino with thousands of surveillance cameras 
and devices combined with casino "cards" which can theoreti-
cally track every casino chip and interface the wagering with the 
casino's computerized credit reports, one issue was the "duty" of 
the casino to exclude an addicted gambler once notice of the ad-
diction was relayed to the casino. 
Mark Merrill, 38, alleges he sought counseling in Oclober 1996 
for his gambling addiction and requested. by certified mail. 
that local casinos evict or arrest him on sight as part of his 
rehabilitation. While at least one casino honored his request, 
the Trump Casino in Buffington Harbor did not, according to 
the lawsuit filed in federal court in Hammond.64 
Regardless of the results in this case and the similar Williams 
case, these issues in other jurisdictions also would interface with 
legislated "self-exclusion" programs such as Missouri's "List of 
Disassociated Persons. ,.65 
D. Gambling Causes Crime: Therefore, File Class-Action Suirs 
Against Governments for Legalized GambLing Facilities: 
Making Governments Pay Jor Gamblers' Crimes 
A prescient March 2002 article, Make Governmellfs Pay for 
Gamblers' Crimes,<-.(' previewed the remarks of criminal lawyer 
Brian Beresh at the University of Alberta's conference on gam-
ing and justice issues:6 7 
The government has knowledge that a certain percentage of 
the popUlation will become seriously addicted to gambling, 
63 Bank Robber SlIes Trump, Gary Casillo for 11.1 Million. ASSOC'A.n::o P,u:ss 
Ncw,>wIllr-s, Feb. 8, 2000, available at WL, IN-News. 
64 'd. In 2003, Merrill's appeal probably failed because he basically appealed pro 
se while incarcerated for robberies allegedly occasioned by his addicted gambling. 
Mcrrill \'. Trump Ind .. Inc .. 320 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2003). Accordingly. this case set 
inappropriate precedents which were cited in a summary judgmcnt rejecting the 
claims of the pathological gambler in Williams. which claimed et alia that Casino 
Aztar owed a dUly to kcep a pathological gambler who was known to the casino 
from gambling therc, Williams II. Aztar Ind. Gaming Corp .. No. EV OI-75·C-TH. 
2003 WL 1903369. at "7·8 (S,D. Lnd. Mar. 5, 2003), Summary judgmcnt was ap-
pealed 10 Sevenlh Circuit in 2003. 
65 Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. II. § 45-17.010 (2003). 
fl6 Charlie Gillis, Make Governments Pay for Gamblers' Crimes, Lawyer Says: 
'They're Responsible', NAT'I. POST (Toronto, Onl., Can.), Mar. 8. 2002. available at 
2002 WL 15263581 [hereinafter Make GovernmentS Pay for Gamblers' Crimes]. 
61 1d. 
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particularly VLT [video lottery terminal] machines .... They 
know the re's go ing to be a social consequence. If the govern-
ment knows it has con tributed to this dilemma, then it ought 
to bear some of the responsibility for the loss that occurs to 
employers and the rest of socie ty.6tl 
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In common law countries , particularly the Uni ted States, a 
type of qui tam 69 legal action should also be considered as an 
alternative form of lawsuit:70 
What's required is some expert evidence to show the direct 
link between the governme nts' actions-in this case, the ac-
quiesce nce to having the gambling machines-and the per-
son's conduct," IBeresh advised]. Garry Smith, a gambling 
research specialist and co-ordinator of the conference, wel-
comed Mr. Bcresh's paper at a time when governments are 
throwing open the doors to increased gambling. " Il 's certainly 
worthwhile bringing it up.n 
In 1999, after only seven years or Illinois casinos, Ill inois pa-
pers began running editorial comments about suing the state it-
61l/(/. 
b'l Enacted in 1863 to curn military procurcmcnt fraud , the False Claims Act al· 
lowed the U.S. government and privllle plaintiffs (called wre lators'") to recover dam· 
age' from any person or organization whIch knowingly presented or caused another 
party to present a false or fraudulent payment claim to tbe government. 31 U.S.C 
§§ 3729-33 (1994); see abo Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment, 28 CF.R. 
§ 85.3 (2003) (im.:n..:asing the civil monetory awards)_ Recovery amounts included 
the costs of the action. fines up to $11.000 per cla im . and trehle the govern ment's 
damages. See 31 U.S.C ~ 3729(a) (7) (t994); 2X C F.\{. * 85.3 (2003). Historically in 
common u~c. "'10 o f the first 14 sta'ute~ enacted by the first United States Congress 
rclicd on qlli lam actions to aid the police enforcemen t role of government agen· 
cies." 11lOmas R . Grande. An Overview of file Ftderal Fillse Claims Acl, In ATLA 
A .... NwA L CoNVI:NTIOf\, REFEREKCE MATFRIAL.o;: PROlltJCI'S LlAOILlTY 1177 (2002), 
Qrailable at t Ann.200Z ATLA·CLE 11 77, 1179 (ciling Uniled States ex rei. New. 
sham v. Lockheed Mis~i les & Space Co .. 722 F. Supp. flJ7, 609 (N.D. Cal. 1989» . 
False Claims Act actions consti tuted a Iype of qm film action, which stood fo r the 
Latin qui tam pro domlllO regt quam pro St ipso in hll( parte seljlliwr alld transla tes 
a" "'who as weI! for the King as for himself ~ ucs in this matter." BI.M '"K'S LAw Ole. 
llONA"'Y 1262 (7th cd. 1(99). The legal defini tion o f a qui 111m action i~ one filed by: 
[Aln informer. under a statute which establishes a penalty (or the commis· 
sion or omission o f II certain act. and provides that the same shall be recov· 
erable in II civil aCllOn, part of tbe penalty to go 10 any person who will 
bring such action and the remainder to the state or some othe r i n~tilU ti on. 
BLAe,,':; LAW DICTIONAR.Y 1414 (rev. 4th ed . 19(8). Between 1986 and 1999. morc 
than 3.(0) suits were fil ed. primarily in the health care industry. Roblll Poncr, Falsf? 
Claim ... Act Liligmio ,j in Employment Ca.us-A View from Plaintlffs'IReialors' 
COlUl)'ei. in ATLA A'<NUI'tJ. CONVJ'Nf[Of\, RcFE ... ENC E MATJ. ... lALS 1207. 1208 
(2002). 
Xl See generally supra nOle 69. 
71 Make Go~erllll/ents "ay for Gamble~ ' Crimes, Slfpra nOle 66. 
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self for the public's gambling losses. One columnist agreed with 
a reader who summarized his feeJings:72 "'Every time I read the 
word "gaming" I'm ready to throw up . ... It is gambling. No 
matter what their spin doctors say, it is NOT a game .. it is 
gambling, pure and simple. Nothing will change that."'73 The 
columnist also agreed with a reader who opined: "When people 
lose the farm, they should do exactly what the states have done 
to cigarette and gun manufacturers[:] Sue the states fo r causing 
pain and suffering."74 The tax revenues, which the states re-
ceived from gambling activities, would be dwarfed by the losses 
which were dropped in casinos and other gambling venues. 
"What a delightful class-action suit that would make. Thousands 
who have lost their food and rent money in the casinos or lottery 
could join."75 By the beginning of the twenty-first century such 
class-action suits were gaining attention and momentum, such as 
a $625 million class-action suit in Quebec, Canada.76 
II 
CLARIFICATION OF GOALS 
A. Recriminalize Convenient Electronic Gambling Devices and 
Video Gamblblg Machines As Recommended by the 
1999 US. Gambling Commission 
As unanimously recommended by the 1999 U.S. Gambling 
Commission. convenience gambling available to the public via 
electronic gambling devices [hereinafter EGDs]. subcategories of 
video gambling machines [hereinafter YGMs], and similar gam-
bling should be recriminalized,77 as South Carolina did in 2000.7!! 
Kansas City attorney Stephen Bradley Small highlighted the 
strategic liability faced by the U.S. gambling industry, particu-
larly regarding electronic gambling devices and concomitant 
72 Jaek Mablcy. Column, Try Suing the State for Gambling Losses. DAILY H LK. 
ALD (Arlington Heights. Ill.). Nov. 3, 1999, at 18, available at LEXIS. Ncw~ & Busi-
ness, News. News, All (English. Fun Text). 
731d. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Quehec Cla~s-AcliOfI Suir. supra nOie 2. 
77 See, e.g., NAT'L GA\fRLlNG iMPACf STUDY CoMM'N, FINAL REPORT para. 3,6. 
at p. 3-18 (1999) [hereinafter NG!SC FINAL REPORT]; NAT'L GAMHLlNG IMI'ACT 
STUDY COMM'N. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY para. 3-6, at 30 (1999) [hereinafter NOISC 
EXEC. SUMMAKY]. 
78 Sllrah O'Donnell, Where 10 Haul 22,000 Poker Machines?, Ht::RALD (Rock Hill. 
S.c.), June 29. 2000, at At available al 2000 WL 6573944. 
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video gambling machi nes, which by 2001 were producing 70 to 90 
percent of the monies lost in casinos.79 
"Small said video poker games are known to be especially ad-
dictive ,"&! an issue highlighted by the 1999 U.S. Gambling Com-
mission.81 They are "the crack cocaine of gambling because they 
are run by software designed by sophisticated people who know 
how to maintain a player's interest in the device by letting them 
think they almost won the jackpot," Small said, defining the prac-
tice as "psychological warfare."82 "There are serious issues in-
volving fraud and fraudulent inducement to contract," he said.83 
During the mid 1990s, a loophole slipped into a South Carolina 
statute by pro-gambling interests, allowing video and electronic 
gambling throughout the state's convenience store industry.84 
The resultant crime and social disruption was so overwhelming 
that convenience gambling via EGDs and VGMs was de facto 
recriminalized via a South Carolina Supreme Court decision ef-
fective July 1, 2000.85 
79 51'1', e.g., Tom Gorman, Casino~' Bet on High-Tech Slots 10 Improve Refilms, 
L.A. TIMES. Feb. 16.2003. at A20. available at 2003 WL 2385550. Nationwide, video 
gambling machines (YGMs) constitute seventy-five percent of total wagers. fd, In 
some Indian casinos (such as the Cherokee casino in North Carolina) and "racinos" 
(combination racetracks and casinos), YGMs constitute 100 percent of the casino 
revcnues because there are 11 0 card games. See id. Card games need employees, so 
the trend ill thc 1990s was toward fewer card games. For example, Las Vegas mar-
keling dict<llCd that then.: be multiple venues for eard gamc~, and therefore only fifty 
perccnt of Las Vegas casino revenues were attrihutahle to VGMs, Id. Of COUTh(:, 
YGMs required relathcly few employees. and as VGM technologies consolidated 
over time, fcw~'r and fewer casino employccs were needcd as the twenty-first cen-
tury began. Set·, e.g., New Slot Machine Technology Means Layoffs (j( Argosy. 
POKERMAG.C01\l, May 2, 2003, at http://www.pokermag.com/managear-
licle.asp?c=150&a=3702. See also Fred Fausl, Increasiflg Play of SIOh M(lkes C(lsino 
Table Gam!' Disappear> ST. loUIS POST DISPATCH. Nov. 16, 1998. at BPZ. available 
at 1998 WL 3362223 (in 1998 Missouri's slots provided 74.8% to 84.4% of casinos' 
re\'enues): Slot MachiJle~ NUll, Jllpra note 31, at Bl'12 (in 1983 for the first time 
casino rcvenues in Ncvada and Atlantic City "from slot machines exceeded the win 
from table games" and by 1993 "Cil,inos deriverd] at least 60 percent of thci r win 
from slots") , In 1996 USA 1{u/ay intimated that the search was heing conducted for 
a slot maehinc with an addictive game. termed "Gambling's Holy Grail," 1. Taylor 
Buckley, Tlte Quest for Gambling 's Holy Grail: U.S.A. TODAY, May 20, 2996 at 
lA, {lvlli/abl/' lit 1996 WL 2055931 [hereinafter Gambling'S 'Holy Grail' Siol Addic-
tive Gllme j, 
00 Selj-Etclusion, ~'lIpm note 15, 
~ l Cf KGISC FINAL RFPORT. slrpra note 77. at p. 5-5. 
1!2 Self-bel/Hioll, sujJm note 15. 
!lJ Id. For an oven'iew of issues involving video gambling (slot) machines, see 
Gambling's 'Iloly Gmil' Sior Addiclive Game, .wjJm notc 79. 
fI.ISee S.c. COilE §§ 12-21-2770 to 12-21-2809 (repealed 1999). 
85 10ylimc Distrib. & Amusemenl Co. v. State, 528 S.E.2d 647 (S.c. 1999) (hold-
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B. Reveal the Marketing Techniques of Gambling Interests 
Pathological gamblers have been deterred from suing casinos 
because of a public stigma greater than the "disgruntled loser" 
tag traditionally applied to those who sue to recover losses.86 
IT]he gambler [often is] skittish about going before a jury. said Professor I. Nelson) Rose. The "embarrassment factor" of 
not wanting to admit 10 massive debt and a mental illness. i.e .. 
a gambling addiction. deters many people from seeking their 
day in courl. But as the public becomes more educated about 
gambling- and more receptive to vict imization defenses in 
ge neral-these ba rriers are coming down, he said.87 
Unlike other basic marketing principles, the marketing of gam-
bling involves an overwhelming majority of patrons who are di s-
satisfied customers. However, gambling patrons do not wish to 
admit they are "losers"; so even as dissatisfied customers they 
remain sil ent because of the social stigma of being "a loser. ·,88 A 
jortiori, a pathological gambler will be in denial of being a loser 
for even longer periods of time than the recreational gambler.89 
Over time. a capitalist will win via ed ucation and expertise. 
Over time, a gambler loses everything.90 A business risk in a 
capitalistic economy is always winnable given education and ex-
pertise. Over time. short-term failure brings the education to 
succeed. 
However, the art ific ial risk which defines gambling results in 
the gambler losing everyth ing (known as "gambler' s ruin").91 
Over time, the House wi ns everything, and the gambler loses 
everythi ng.92 111crcrore, the House's marketing is directed to-
ward keeping the gambler th inking that the gambler is winning 
when in fact, over time the gambler is always 10sing.'H 
ing proposed referendum on video gambling machines was untvnsl ilu tional delega -
tion of legislative powcr). 
M> D iana Digges. Smkt'l Rilt ill 'Cmnpuisil'e Gambling' Suils. LAw. WK\..Y. USA, 
No,', 26. 2001, at 16. 
!l11d. 
!!8 See id. 
~9 See id, 
'Kl Free Credir •. II/pra nOlc 10 (presenting formulae for "gambler's ruin"). 
'11 Id. 
'IZ /d. 
9J /d, 
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C. Utilize the State Statute Shibboleth: The Term 
"Compulsive" Gambler Indicates Inordinate Influence by 
Pro-Gamblillg lmeresrs 
241 
The standard reference book of the American Psychiatric As-
sociation is The Diagnostic and Slalistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders, which delimits "pathological gambJing."'14 lnstead of 
utilizing the proper terminology of "pathological gambling" (and 
the concomitant term "problem gambling"), pro-gambling inter-
ests during the 1990s started insisting that their supporters utilize 
the less-threatening term "compulsive" gambling, which oper-
ated to the public-relations benefit of pro-gambling interests.95 
As the twentieth cen tury ended, however, there was no single 
mention of "compulsive" gambling in the The Dhlgno::"lic and 
Statistical Manual of Mellral Di.forders-the proper terminology 
was " pathological" gambling (and associated "problem" gam-
bling).Y6 When found in state statutes or regulations, references 
to "compulsive" gambling were definitive signs of pro-gambling 
influences' direct impact on the drafted legislation or indirect im-
pact through miNe draftsmanship. Accordingly, litigators should 
be alerted to regulatory legislation and self-exclusion programs 
fo r pathological gamblers which fail the shibboleth by utilizing 
the term "compulsive" gambler instead of the proper te rm "path-
ological" gambler. 
D. Model CallSCJ of Action 011 Cases which Incll/de RICO: 
Johnson v. Collins Entertainment Co. 
In Johnson v. Col/illS Elllertaillment Co., thirty-eight court-de-
scribed "habitual gamblers" brought suit in a South Carolina 
sta te court claiming video poker operators vio lated state law as 
well as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act.97 The case was removed to U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of South Carolina, which granted partial summary judgment 
for the plaintiffs,'111 The video poker operators then appealed to 
the Fourth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals,99 The court of appeals 
!M AM. PsYCIIiATIUL Assoc .. DIAC.NOSTIC ANI) S 'I'ATI,,-nI,;AL MA1'UAL Of 
Ml:.i'I'lAL Dl:;OHO(~ § 312.31. at 615-18 (4th cd. 1994) [hcrcinllficr DSM. IVj, 
\IS For a discussion and supponing materilils analyzing changes in terminology. 
see. fo r example. M~ga-'--aw5I1;I5. supra nuli.: I, al3l. 32·34. 
'If> DS:\1.\V. supra note 94. 
Y7 Johnson Y. Collins Entln'l Co .. 564 S.E.2d 653. 657-58 (S,C, 2002). 
'l8lohmoll.88 F. Supp. 2d 499 (D.S.C. 1999). 
'19 lohmon. t99 F.ld 710 (4th Cir. 1999). I 
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vacated the order o n the basis that the distri ct court ;'improperly 
ruled on unsettled issues of the state law."IOO The d istrict court 
then certifi ed questions to the South Carol ina Supreme Court , 
which held: 
a. The prohibition on offering special inducements to play 
video ga ming machines was conslituliona 1. 101 
b. The prohibi tion of offering the possibility of winn ing morc 
than $125 per day was not unconstitutionally vague and 
did not viola te procedural due process. 102 
c. This pro hibition applied to people who leased machines to 
others who maintained the place the machine was used. IO] 
d. Violating the prohibit ion on special inducements was an 
act subject to prosecution under the stat ute. 104 
e. Violating the prohibition on special inducements meant 
that the violator was "operating an ill egal gambling busi-
ness in viol ati on o f the law of this state," which violated 
RICO. lOS 
f. South Carolina Code §§ 32- 1-10 and 32-1-20106 did not 
provide the excl usive remedy for gambling losses and did 
not limi t the other remedies to the 90-day limitation on 
these two sections. 
g. The Defe ndants' payment of cash above the statutory cap 
and related practices constituted unfair trade practices 
under the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices ACt. I07 
The practical effect of this South Carolina case was that 
"[aJddicted video poker gamblers, whose lawsuit helped topp le a 
$3 billion industry. got a chance . .. to win back up to three t imes 
the money they poured into gaming machines.'l1 OS At gam bling's 
peak in the mid-1990s. South Carol ina "had about 37,000 ma-
100 Johnson, 564 S.E.2d at 658. 
101 iii. at 658 (interpreting S.c. COI)E § 12-21-2804(8) (repealed 1999». The 
Court interpreted an advertising ban as it interfaced with. the First Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution. 
102 /d. at 660-61 (interpret ing S.c. CODE §§ 12-21-2791, 12-21·2804(B) (repo:aled 
1999)). 
lOJ /d. at 661-62 (interpreting S.c. CODE §* 12-21 -2791. 12-21-2804(8) (repealed 
19(9)). 
104 1d. at 663 (interpreting S.c. ConE § 12-21.2804(F) (repealed 1999». 
105 Jd. al 663-64 {interpreting S.c. Como §§ 12-21-2770 to 12-21-2809 (repealed 
1999» . 
106 Johnson. 564 S.E.2d at 663-64 (interpreting S.c. CODE §§ 32-1-10, 32-1-20, 39-
5-10 CI scq. (Law Co-op. t99I)). The relevant sections were originally adopted as 
part of the Statnte of Anne enacted in 1710. An Act for the Better Preventing of 
EJlcessi\'e and Deceitful Gaming. 1710. 9 Ann. c. 14, §§ 1,2,4 (England). See also 
S.c. CeOE §§ 12-21-2770 to 12-21-2809 (repealed 1999). 
107 Johnsoll. 564 S.E.2d at 665-66 (interpreting S.c. CODE §§ 39-5-10 e/ seq. (Law 
Co-op 1991». 
108 Clif LeBlanc. Ruling Says Gamblers CO/lid Recoup Losses, Mort!, STATIO (Co-
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chines that grossed an average of up to $25,(X}() each.''10'1 How-
eve r, the South Carolina Supreme Court de jure "banned video 
poker effect ive July 1, 2000. and stopped a referendum that 
might have allowed the gaming industry to stay alive."110 In 
Johnson, the supreme court held that "video poker operators ran 
their legal gambling operations iliegally."111 The decision con-
cluded that the video gambling "operators offered jackpots that 
far exceeded the state payout cap of Sl25: violated fair trade 
practices[:] and did it in a way that could amount to crimi nal 
racketeering." 112 Plaintiffs' altorney Richard Gergel cautioned 
that .. the ruling takes the gamblers' position so completely that it 
warns anyone who gets into the gambl ing business that they must 
abide by the letter of the law.'>]I) Charleston attorney Larry 
Richter, a 2002 candidate for the state attorney general. indicated 
that plaintiffs would pursue the assets of the video poker compa-
nies as well as the owners' personal wealth- several of whom 
became millionaires. 114 
E. Follow AdminislraTive Judicial Rulings on Expen Teslimony 
Resolving Issues in ParllOlogical Gambling 
Prior to the recriminalization of electronic gambling devices 
and the video gambling machines in South Carolina. a 1998 ad-
ministrat ive judge's ru ling on pathological gambling issues was 
ilJuminating. 1I 5 After evaluating expert testimony on seve ral de-
bated issues, lhe judge ruled: 
I find the following attributes exist concerning gambling in so-
ciety. Pathological gambling, the clinical term used to describe 
compulsive gamblers, is a vcry disruptive illness that occun, in 
some individuals who choose to gamble. The increase or the 
legalization of various forms of gambling increases the occur-
rence of pathological gambling in society. Various direct and 
indirect economic and social co~ls accompany pathological 
ga mbling, including crime, loss of productivity, broken homes. 
lumnla. S.c.). '~ay 29. 2002. at 1. uladableUI 2002 WlI8743l84lherE'inaftE'r GIIIII' 
bltrs Could Recoup]. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
Ili ld. 
112 It/. 
113 It/. 
\14 Ill. 
115 Su. e.g., Publ ic Hearing Report of the Administrative law Judge in re: Pro· 
posed Regulations §§ 12-21·2?20(A)(3), 12-21-2804 S.c. Dep't of Ikvcnuc, Doc. 
No. 97-AU- 17-0589- RH (Apr. 28. I 991l). 
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bankruptcy, e tc. In fact, pathological gam bling affects the en-
tire society, in the work envi ronment and the family envirOIl-
ment. Specifically, there is a strong rc l ali()n~hip between 
compulsive gambling and crime. Money is the substance of 
the pathologica l gambling addiction. Once the compulsive 
gambler exhausts all legal access to money, he routinely com-
mits cri mes to get money. Thus the grealer the preva lence of 
gambling, the greater the prevalence of crime. Consequently_ 
the reduction of gambling reduces the pOlent ial fo r pathologi-
cal gambling, and the resulting amount of social harm. 116 
This administrative judge' s ruling was insightful, and it answered 
many questions contrary to the public relations dogma of pro-
gambling inte rests. TIli s ru ling was also significant since it was 
issued over a year before the 1999 U.S. Gambl ing Commission 's 
Final Report 117 and the Executive Sumnwr)' .11!l which large ly 
confirmed the judge's conclusions. 
F. Question: Whlll COn5liwres a "Fair Game" When the Pro-
Gambling {merests Can Legislate the Definition of 'he 
Term ·'Fair"? 
The main problem with the decriminali zation of gambling in 
the United States during the 1980s and 19905 was that it was 
decriminalized and then supposedly regulated by pro-gambling 
interests-an inherent conflict of interest. During the 1990s. sev-
eral states decriminalized casino gambling I 19 and modeled their 
regulations on legislation drafted by pro-gambling interests in-
cluding what constituted a "fair game."' Kansas City attorney 
Stephen Bradley Small summarized the problems in 2000: 
The fund amental problem with suing a casino is thai Ihe courts 
appear unwill ing to ge l involved- as if by walking into a ca-
si no you (Ire ask ing 10 be robbed .. .. The slale's rules say the 
games mus t be fair . The games are not fair. so this is an area 
ripe for litigation. 12o 
In 2003. Small brought the "fairness" issues into the public spot-
116/d. 
117 NG ISC Fl"'AL Rr:I'ORT. supra note 77. 
118 NGISC EXEC. SUM"ARY, supra note 77. 
111l 0lher than Nevada (1931) and New Jc~ey (in Atlantic City. 1976). the fi~ 1 
state to allow non· lndian casinos was South Dakota (in Deadwood. 1989). In 1989. 
riverboat casinos were aut hori 7.ed first ill Iowa and then in Ill inois. George O. 
Fenich, A Chrollology of (Legol) Gamillg ill the u.s.. 3 OAMlr-G RES. & REV. J. 65. 
70, 72.74 (1996) [hereinafter Chronology of (ugal) Gamins]. 
12() Self-Excl!uion. supra note IS. 
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light in State ex rei. Smllll v. Ameristllr. 121 
As indicated in the previous analysis, practically all, if not all, 
games developed by the gambling industry have a built-in stat is-
tical edge for "the House" (i.e., the House Advantage) which 
means that over time the House will always win the money wa-
gered-a principle known as "gambler's ruin. "122 By definition , 
the games are designed as "zero-sum" games to leave the gam-
bler with "zero" and the house with the "sum" of all the money 
wagered. Over time, this will always occur. Statistically, a gam-
bier thus only can come out ahead if the gambler has a short-
term positive cash "win"-and then never gambles again. Con-
tinued gambling can stat istically only lead to "gambler's ruin." 
These scenarios raised the strategic issues of "fairness": Were 
the states with legalized gambling really giving each of their citi-
zens an equitable or fair chance to have an ultimate gambling 
win? The gambier's ruin principle suggested that the states were 
not. In other words, statistics indicated that anyone who could 
be enticed to play would be a loser. In this context, another issue 
querried whether U.S. government-licensed gambling was consti-
tutional if its net effect was to mislead people into losing their 
property and thereby deprive them of their Fourteenth Amend-
ment property "without due process of law?" A forriori, how 
could state gambling statutes and regulations drafted andlor 
dominated by pro-gambling interests comply with due process of 
law when by definition all legalized gambling (except parimutual 
wagering) is designed to transfer citizens' property to the House 
(in partnership with state governments) as a zero-sum game? 
These scenarios also ra ised individualized issues of "fairness": 
Were the states with legalized gambling really monito ring the 
fairness of individualized games or were the states deferring to 
determinations of "fai rness" as formulated by the Nevada gam-
ing interests? 
Scenarios which exemplified individualized complaints in-
volved the ability of gambling venues to change the "House Ad-
vantage" or odds on various electronic gambling machines, all 
known as sucker machines for sucker bets. 123 The House Advan-
121 Siale ex reI. Small \'. Ameristar Casino Kan. City, Inc .. No. CVI03·319OCC 
(Cir. Ct .. Clay Co., Mo. May 12.2(03). This case blueprints several cau~ or action 
in these issue areas. 
!22 See supra notes 86-93 & accompanying lext. Su generally Fru. Credit. supra 
note 10. 
123 Al though such manipulation generally would be illegal. technologically Ihe 
• 
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tage could range from one to ten percent (or higher) on VGMs. 
By comparison, the House Advantage in blackjack or baccarat 
was one percent-but only if the player played optimum strate-
gies (without any sucker bets). 
The 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission suggested throughout its 
Final Report that states with lega lized gambling relied to their 
detriment. and the detriment of thei r citizens. on the advice and 
regulatory schema of pro-gambling interests, I24 Accordingly, by 
the early twenty-first century, cit izens began bringing lawsuits 
challenging the state regu latory mechanisms themselves, such as 
Small, which plaintiffs brought in part on behal f of the general 
public. 5111a1l raised issues involving fairness and an allegedl y de-
fective slot machine.125 The lawsuit claimed ··the casino and the 
state gaming commission ... knowingly allowed a defect ive slot 
machine to continue to operate."126 The q uestionable machine 
was a double $1 slot produced by International Game 
Technology.127 
For the first time, a judge (not a gambling agent) ordered a 
VGM "pulled off the (Joor" of a casino, and attorney "Small also 
implied that the [casino 's] other 3,000 (VGMs were] at risk.'>l28 
1l1ese VGMs appeared to be particularly vulnerable to such chal-
lenges because by the late 1990s VGMs accounted (or seventy to 
ninety percent of casino revenues t29 and were static play ma-
"owner [of a video gambling machine] can nip an internal switch 10 change the odds 
and make it almost impossible to win." Virginia Young. Kids' Amusement Galll!'s 
R,m Afeml of Gaming Laws, ST. LoUIS POS-I"-DISPAE"I'H. Mar. 2.1999. at 61. m'aila-
bll.' til 1999 Wl3013375. The House Advantage on VGMs interfaces y,ith the adver-
tising of "the loosest slots." For a discussion of slot machine payout percentages. sec 
Fred Faust. Casillos Hal' DIffer on JIIS/ What Makes a Loose Sio/ Muchme Loose . 
ST. LoUIS PoS"r-Dlsl'AT01, Feb. 23. 1998, al BP2, opal/tlbie at 1998 WL 332[726. 
T11e profi t margin on video gambling machines is so largc that they typically pay for 
themselves within two weeks of being installed. Even so, the temptations and appar-
ent case with which the VGMs can be fixed have led fO high-profile cases. See. e.g. 
Peter O·Connell. Pair Senrenced for Roles in Killing of iVitlless ill Slol-Rigging COSI.', 
LAS VIWAS R lOv.-J .. Dcc.22. [999. at l B. available al 1999 WL 9300741. Sce Sllpra 
note 79 and accompanying text. 
124 NO ISC FINAL RU·'ORT. supra notc 77. 
m Plaintiffs Class Action Complaint. Small, No. CVI03-319OCC (filed May 12. 
20(3). 
126Jlldge Orders Sior Machme Pulled From Ameris/ar Casino. KM BC-TV. May 
12,2003. al http://www.thekansascitychannel.comfnewsl2l98782fdetails.hlml [here-
inafter Judge Orders SIOi Machille Pulled]: Smafl. No. CVI03-319OCC (granting 
temporary restraining order). 
t27 Judg~ Orders Slot Machin~ PIIII~d. supra nOle 126. 
121l1d.: s~e Small, No. CV[ 03-3190CC (granting temporary restraining ordcr). 
t29 Sf'e SI4pra notes 71·79. [23 and accompanying text. 
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chines controlled by the gambling ind ustry's various VGM chips, 
allegedly involving no valid ;'sk ills" for general play.l14l 
The Small complaint raised numerous allegations relating to 
individualized "fairness" find even to improprieties. Most of the 
allegations in the complain t were directed to issues involving the 
networking between ccntral ized computer systems. video gam-
bling machines , and th e "ch ips" driving the VGMs: 
One particular ch ip ... [alleged ly] permits cheat in g and steal-
ing through the entry of a seque nce of player activated bullon 
pushes. When this occun.. the machi ne empties its hopper and 
consequently reflects that it has "paid oul" a higher number of 
coins than actually has occurred . 'Ibis chip ha~ existed ill the 
thoui)<lnds of ... slot machines at [various casinos\.lJl 
The allegations were ~llppo fl ed by mu lt iple citations to the "pat-
ents" for chips formulated to perfo rm specialized functions. 112 
FUflhermore. the complaint a lleged: 
TIle slo t machine as all olher ... [various] slot and video poker 
machines are networked through communication link!> to cen-
Iral computer proc!.!s<;ing equipment. 
All game dat a i~ comlTlunicated between a gaming machine 
and the central compuler. Pursuant to the ... Uackpot sys-
tem]. the gaming machine requests and ccntnll eomputerls] 
p!.!riodically communicate packets of game/prize information 
to the slot machinl:~. As these packets of information are de-
picted by wagering activity, addi tional packet:-, of information 
arc requested by the machine and transmitted from the ... 
computer suite. TIle content of the packets are win/lOl>S and 
jackpot prize instructions. \1ost if not potentially all of the 
stacks and sub stacks of packets can be preset by the casino to 
contain no winning progressive jackpot. Through this method-
ology the casino can lI.......,ure that jackpots are not awarded for 
the indefinite future. The ca~i!lo can also dispense a packet 
with a jackpot winning inslruction to a particular machine to 
force a jackpot to be awarded to a particular phtyer at a prede-
termined time. 11le ca~ il1 o can also take the slot machine in 
question off line to prevent it from receiving large prize award 
IlO Id. "Allhough siale laws mandate that winning at slOb be oilscd only on luck 
lind chance. many p1are rs' lfa t~eJ ~n<;c that ~km makes II dirrerenee goes a long way 
toward Cllplaining the phenomenal popularity of video poker. 'The illusion that 
player participation makes a dlfrerencc' III the outcome drh es which ~lot machines 
get players:' accordmg to WhittIer La\\ Profr:ssor 1. :\'"elson Rose. Gamhling's'lioly 
GraW Slot Addictive: Gume:. mprtl not~ 79. The U.S. rule define~ a "game of 
chancc" as a game where clUlIlCC p,.,dulllj/lulcfy controLi the outcome. Se:e:. e.g .. 
Johnson v. Collins Entertainment Co .. 508 S.E.2d 575 (S.c. 1m). 
IJI Plaintiffs Cta~s Action Comptnint at para. 6. Sma/{. No. ('VI03·3l90CC. 
1.32 Ste. e:.g .. U.S. Putelll No. 5.779.545 (issued July 14. 19(8); PlulIItifrs Clas~ Ac-
lion Complaint al pam. 7. SIIIIIII. No. CV103-3J9OCC. 
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inst ruct ions .... (Missouri Gaming Commission] regu lations 
requi re maintenance of all communicat ions with gaming rna· 
chines. Through this communications system, the casi no can 
mllllllgc the tim ing and location of jackpots as well as 10 whom 
the jack pOlS are awarded and maximize its return (as well as 
progressive financial losses 10 playe rs. some of which mayor 
can result ill devastating damage includ ing pe rsona l o r finan-
cial ruin). Through Ih is system Ihe casi no can also systemati-
cally win money (rom any given individ ual or plu rality of 
playe rs. mOSt particularly those it has targeted [particula rly via 
Customer CardsJ. The casino can also awa rd jackpots or ol her 
pri/cs to selected playe rs including po te nt ially its 
confederates. 133 
Whi le nonc of these allegations were proved in court, this case 
highlighted future issue areas. For example, the potent ial inter-
state communicat ions systems between various VGMs also raised 
spect res of poten tial violations of the Interstate Wire Act. 
In addition, Small could claim that several issues were not ad-
dressed and tha t the judge's decision focused only "on testi mony 
about one of several compute r chips" that drove the VGMs. Il-l 
A summary of coun testimony was revealing: 
The Missouri Gaming Commission earlier [in 20031 revoked 
the license for that chip after determining that a programming 
flaw could a llow a playe r- in collusion with an accomplice 
with access to the chip- to cheat the machine by tricking it 
into paying excess amounts of jackpot coins. 
Com mission gaming enforcement manager Clarence 
G reeno test ified that the programming [Jaw "' had not hing to 
do with game outcomes." 
Small. however. argued ... in court that "this chip cheats 
players." and he insisted that it con tinues to do so because the 
commiss ion has allowed the flawed chif to rema in in that lone 
machine unt il its big jackpot is won. 13 
The court's narrow focus and the refusal of the court to address 
all of t he issues raised in th e complaint f ru strated the plaint iff. 
Greeno test ified that the casi no sought a waiver to continue 
using the chip in order not to create a public perception that 
its big jackpot game was being manipulated in any way. 
When Small attempted to cross-examine Greeno. Mike 
Bradley, an assistant attorney general representing the com-
mission, successfully Objected and halted Greeno'S test imony 
IlJ Plamtiffi Oass Action Complaint at paras. 11-12. Small . No. CV I03·319OCC. 
IJ.I Rick Aim. Judge PillS Allleristar Slot Machine Back in Action. KAN. CITY 
STAR. May 16. 2003. at C2. a"ailable at 2003 WL 19781772. 
p~ Ir1. 
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before it could become a malter of public rccord. l36 
The judge ruled that the slot mach ine at issue could be returned 
to the floor of the casino. 137 Although this did not establish pre-
cedent , some of the issues raised in the fifty-page complaint high-
lighted the vulnerability of cas inos' computer networks and 
became a blueprint for future causes of action. 
Accordingly, gambling facilities appear to be vulnerable to 
lawsuits in these issue areas. Even so, plaintiffs' attorneys pu r-
sued other issue areas more aggressively as the twenty-first cen-
tury began. 
III 
H ISTORICAL BA CKGROUND 
A. Legalize It in Nevada and Eventually It Will Be Legal 
Everywhere: Is LWi Vegas the Nation's 
Shadow Capirol? 
As destructive social and economic policy, gambling was not 
only criminalized throughout the United Slates for most o f the 
twe ntieth century, but also "successfully criminalizcd." In 1931, 
casino gambling was decriminalized in Nevada,13S and in 1976, 
casino gambling was voted into At lantic City, New Jersey, after 
fail ing in 1974.13" Beginning in 1988, both tribal and commercial 
casino gambling were not approved by votes in publi c referen-
du m bu t were crea ted by legislative fiat via casino lobbyists until 
thirty states had casinos b}' 2002. Until 2002, the two major ex-
ceptions with statewide public votes on casino gambling were 
1988 in Deadwood. South Dakota. for limited mini-casi nosl40 
and 1996 in Detroit (after three previous rejections by vo ters).141 
With Detroit Mayor Dennis Archer "serving as a sort of crou-
pier ,"142 differen t groups including one headed by former De troi t 
Mayor Coleman Young maneuvered fo r the Detroit liccnses.l4J 
116 fd. 
lJ7 Irl. 
IJ8 O,rollofogy of (l.eglJl) Gammg. Sllpru nOle 119. at 70. 
1)9ld. at 12-
140 Suo t.g .. Ecollomlc Impacl)·. sllpm nOle 54. al 70-75. 
141 George Weeks. Yom.s Eml.'rs RllCf for CasillO. DETItoIT NFW~. Mllr. 21. 1997. 
at AI; New Wheels for Motor City. ECO"OMIST. Apr. II. 1998. at 23. available at 
1998 WL 8884781 [hereinafter New Wlteels fOl" Motor City l. 
142 New Wheels for Motor City. supra nOle 141. 
141 Adam Stein hauer. GaminS·f New """O/ll/(r. LAS VEllA~ Rl;.v.-J .. Aug. 18. t997. 
at ID. available at 1997 WL 4551150. 
250 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82. 20031 
Thus. within a decade there were thirty ncw casino states with 
approximately 800 casinos and bingo fac ilities . both tribal and 
non-triba1. 144 Furthermore, the first U.S. lottery in New Hamp-
shire in 1964 had spread during the 1980s to include thi rty-eight 
states (plus Washington, D.C.) with loueries by 2003,145 
While these trends toward decriminalizing gambling started 
slowly, they gained momentum during the 19905. It also became 
apparent that Nevada legislation and regulations , drafted by the 
gambling industry or heavily influenced by the industry, were be-
ing utilized as models fo r gambling expansions into other states. 
By the end of the 1990s, Nevada legislation was not just the 
model; it set the agenda for U.S. gambling expansion. 
One example included Nevada's legalization of sports gam-
bling, which was at first rubber-stamped by Washington, D.C. , 
via a federal legislative Nevada "exception" in the Professional 
and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992}46 H owever, the ex-
cept ion was soon mani pulated to make the rule nationally.147 
Other examples were gambling via the Internet or other cyber-
space venues, which were ill ega l under the Interstate Wire 
Act. 148 To leverage Washington , D.C., into de facto, if not de 
jure, legalization of Internet gambl ing, Nevada legislators tried to 
legalize their own Internet gambling. 
11 won't come as a surprise ... to learn that Nevada casinos 
usually get what they want from our state lawmake rs. llms. 
when high-powered casino lobbyi st Harvey Whittemore asked 
the 2001 State Legis lature for an Internet gambling bill, our 
elected representatives gave him and his wealthy clients what 
they wamed. 14<l 
14.l D<lve Palermo. Plal'ing the Numbers Game. h'T'L GA"11NO & WAGER1'>;G 
Bu:> .. June 2002, at 22 [hereinafter Playing thf' Numbers Game] (approximately 750 
casillo~!gambling parloh, and 37 stal<::. with lotteries): U.S. Rep. Frank Wolf (R). 
Column. MI)}llndians Slill Mire(1 in Poverty. DAY (Nel'v London. Conn.), Oct. 26. 
2003. at CJ. (approximately 800 casinos/gambling facilities) reponed III Peace Party. 
http://www.bluecorneomics.eom/stype3a.hlm [hen::inafter 11!(/lIlIIS Slil! Mired ill 
PO)"/~rly J. 
1 4~ Playing Ihe Numbers Game . supra note 144. at 22; Indians Sliff Mired i'l Po.-
er/Y. supra note 144. at C3. 
146 28 U.S.c. §§ 3701·04 (1994). 
147 John Warren Kindt & Thomas Asmar. College (lml Amateur SpOYlS Gumbling: 
Gambling Away Ollr YOll/ll? 8 VILL. 51'0/( IS & E:q. L.J. 221. 231·32 (2002) [herein· 
afte r Gamblillg Awny Gw Yom!!]. 
148 18 U.S.c. § 1084 (1994). See also Gambling AII'a) Ollr YOlllh,sufJra note 147. 
at 232·33. 
14~ G uy W. Farmer. Column. Imemet Gllmmg, a Losing Proposition. NEV. Ap· 
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Even members of the Nevada press were out raged. "Following 
last-minute passage of this flawed piece of legisla tion, .. . politi* 
cal columnist Jon Ralston accused lawmakers of acting like 'a 63-
member rubber-stamping board of trustees for the Nevada Re-
sort Association."·lso 
In a parallel scenario, in 1998 federal prosecutors indicted sev-
eral U.S. "business" persons operating six on-line gambling facili-
ties based outside the United StatesYI One high-profile 
provider of Internet gambling services and a San Francisco resi-
dent, Jay Cohen. surrendered to federal authorities for trial In 
New York. 152 
Cohen, co-owner of a popular gaming Web site based on the 
liny island of Ant igua. was convicted [in 2000J in New York 
federal court of violating the 40-year-old Interstate Wire Act, 
which bans companies and individuals from using interstate 
phone lines to take bets. Cohen, who was sentenced to 21 
months in prison and fined $5,000, ... appea led his conviction 
to the U.S. Supreme Court on grounds that his customers' wa-
gers took place in Antigua rather than in the U.s.IS3 
Cohen lost his appeal and began serving his sentence in 2001. 154 
By comparison, several of the twenty-one other indicted individ-
uals did not immediately surrender to U.S. authorities and re-
mained fugitives. ISS 
Just as Nevada interests had spread gambling throughout the 
United States during the 1990s, cri tics noted that the Shadow 
Capitol was politically market-testing the legalization and spread 
PEAL (Carson CiIY. Nev.), Apr. 7. 2002, available at hnp:llwww.nevadaappclll.com 
[hereioafter Losing Proposition I, 
150 ld. 
151 Dean Starxman. U.S. Indict)· U Over Gambling On {he III/emet. WALL 51. 1.. 
Mar. 5. 1998. at A8, available at 1998 WL 3485072. 
152 Id,: Larry Neumeisler. f'BI Charges 14 Indil'idllal.i in Six Comprmie.s with Con· 
spiracy. A<;soc. I>HF~<;S. Mar. 4. 1998. available at 1998 WL 6643890. 
153 Loslllg Proposition. supra note 149. 
I>' United Statc~ v. Cohen. 260 F.3d 80 (2d CiT. 2001): Larry Neumeister. Appeals 
Court Upholds Conviction of Web SportS Gamhling Defelldall/. AS~OCLATE[) 1' l<E.~S 
:-':EWS\.\JRE. July 31. 2001. available (j{ WL. Allnewplus: U.S. lVills Fin't Offshore 
TII/ernel Gambling Case. RlClJn::Rs Lro .. March 9. 2(0). reprllltcd a/ Scarch-
Dice.com. hllp:lfwww.searchdice.comlMagazinc!Bllsiness!Arliclesn8801.html [here. 
inafler Offshore Gambllll/{ I. 
155 Offshore Gambling, supra note 154. See generally, John Warren Kindt & Ste-
phen W. Joy. Internet Gambiillg alld the De~'/{jbili~{j{iO!1 of Natiollal and Interna· 
liollal Economies: Time for a Comprehensive Ball on Gambling Over the World 
Wide Web. 80 Dt::NV. U. L REV. 111 (2002) [hereinafter Gambling's DWabilizatioll 
of Economies J. 
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of drugs and prostitution as the new saviors for state budgets.156 
However. critics opined that the most blatant example of the in-
fluence of the Las Vegas Shadow Capitol was its direct influence 
on the U.S. Congress in the $100 billion Economic Stimulus Bi ll 
of 2002.157 While few tax credits were allowed to consumer or 
product-oriented companies, the gambling companies received a 
tax write-off slipped into the bill by the House Gaming Caucus 
and worth a reported $40 billion in write-offs for "s lot machines" 
and associated technical equipment. I S8 
B. Legalizing More Gambling Activities Increases /lJegal 
Gambling lind Associated Crime: Exisfing Gambling 
Facilities Attract Criminals 
Illegal sports wagers in the United States totaled an estimated 
$8 billion in 1983 and grew to $29 billion in 1990. 159 In another 
estimate. U.S. illegal sports betting was placed at $100 billion in 
1992 and exceeded the $80 billion narcotics business. l60 In 1996. 
a trade magazine for the gambling industry referenced the Coun-
156 See. e.g.. Charlie LeOuff. Ncvadll Turns 10 BrOlhels as a Budget Fix. N.Y. 
Tl,">lU>. June 28. 2003. at A7. available at LEXIS. News & Business. News. News. All 
(English. Full Text). 
157 Job Creallon and Worker Assislance Act of 2002. Pub. L No. 107-147. 116 
Stat. 21 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.c.) (commonly 
referred to as the 2002 Economic Stimulus Bill). Su also John Warren Kindt & 
Anne E.C. Brynn. Oestruclil"e Economic Policie5 in the Age of Terrorism: Govtrn· 
lI1em-Sal1ctiol1ed Gambling as Encouraging Transbotmaary Economic Raiding ana 
Destabili<.ing National and Internatiol1al Economies. 16 TEMPLE INT·to & CO>,.fP. L.l. 
243 (2002) [hereinafter Gambling Oestabilbng Economies]. 
158 Su: Job Crealion and Worker AssiSlance Act. supra note 157: Tony Batt. Ta.{ 
Break for Slots OK·d: Measure Will Let Compal1les Deduct Technological Exp€llSts. 
LAs VLOGAS REv.-J .. Oct. 16. 2001. at 100. available at 2001 WL 9541525. See gener-
ally. John Warren Kindt. Woufd Re·C",ninali~ing U.S. Gambling P/jmp-Prime the 
Economy lind Coult/ U.S. Gambling Facilities Be Transformed into Educational amI 
High- Tecll Facilities? Will the Legal Discovery of Gambling Compaflies' Secrets 
Confirm Research Isslles.? 8 $TANTORl) J.L. Bus. & FIN. 169 (2003) [hereinafter 
Gambling Facilities TrUlu!ormed imo Educational Facilities}: John Warren Kindt . /11-
ternationally. The 21st Cellntry IJ No 17me [or the United S,ates to Be Gambling with 
tile Ecol1omy: Taxpayers Subsidizing the Gambling Industry alld tile De Facto Elimi-
nation of All CasillO Tax Revenues via the 2002 Ecollomic Stimulus Ac/. 29 01-110 N. 
UNIV. L. RE V. 363 (2003) [hereinafter Gambling with rhe £wnomy and the Elimina-
tion of All Casino Tax Revemles]. 
l59 Paul Doocey. The Cose for Legaf Sports Belling. I NT'L GA,">11NG & WAGERI'G 
Bus .. Apr. 1996. at I. 42 (citing to estimales from OiristiansenlCum-mings Associ-
ates. Inc.) [hereinafter Case for Sports Betting]. 
160Jamcs Cook. ""ff Ro.tboToligh Says the Spread Is 7, It"s T·. FOlt13ES, Sept. 14. 
1992. at 350. 351. aI·ailable al 1992 WL 3066694 [hereinafter The Spread]. 
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cil on Compulsive Gambling, IUI estimating that the U.s. illegal 
sports gambling was $88 billion of a lotal $125 billion in illegal 
U.S. wagers.162 In 1995, legalized sports belting was merely $2.6 
billion in the only state where it was legalized, i.e., Nevada. 163 
These numbers were within acceptable ranges for the Nevada 
Attorney General's Office, which posited in 1997 that there was 
a problem with illegal U.S. gambling. l64 While the gambling in~ 
dustry frequently argued that legalizing gambling activities de~ 
creased illegal gambling, the opposite Irend was occurring-the 
legalization of U.S. gambling activities was increasing illegal 
gambling and associated crime, and according to the FBI's fugi· 
tive apprehension program, existing gambling facilities attract 
criminals (with Las Vegas at number one).165 
Furthermore, organized crime controlled much of the illegal 
bookmaking activities. 166 A national system of layoff belting was 
controlled and maintained by such crime families as the Chicago 
crime syndicate, the New England crime syndicate, and the Gam· 
bino and Genovese crime syndicates in New York.161 
Both legal and iHegal sports gambling has ensnared and trans-
formed substantial numbers of the U.S. public, including teenag-
ers and collegiates. into pathological and problem gamblers. 
According to one estimate, 4% of all adults and 7% of all 
teenagers lin 1992 were pathological] gamblers-<iegenerales, 
as the gambling fraternity ca lls them-and the numbers are 
growing rapidly. There are some prominent victims among 
them, ranging from baseball's Pete Rose and football's Art 
Schlichter (both suspended for life from their sports leagues) 
to ABC Sports' former director Chet Forte (who lost his job 
161 The article did nOi indicate whether it meant the national OT Ncvada council. 
162 Case for Spons Bellil18, slipra nme 159, at 40. 
1631d. 
164 Nev. AlI'y Generals Off.. Analysis (1997) (on file with Nev. Alt'y General's 
OfL). 
165 John M. Glionna, Fugitll'CI' Roll Dice on Vega,l, LA. TIMES, Nov. 11.1999. at 
AI, available arl999 WL 26194263, reprinted as John M. Gtionna, Vegas: Where 
Crooks Gamble 011 Escape, ROA"OK L: TIMES. Dcc 5. 1999. at AI) [hereinafter 
Vegas: Where Crooks Gamble on Escape1: U:X Vania, Column. Thcy're All of (I 
Killd. OReGONI AN (Portland. a re.), Apr. 25, 1997, al 0 11, (lVIIi/able (It 1991 WL 
4166854 [hereinafter They 're All of a Kim!]. See 8{'fwrally. Robert Don, Ex-Mob 
Imide, Says Bellillg Docs !-1MI/!. OMAIlA WORI.D-HERAl..D, Dec. 10, 1996, at 13. 
available at 1996 WL 6041759: Bill O'Brien, Gambling Foes Demillu/ Voters' Voices 
Be Heard, D AILY H ERALD (Arlington Heights, l1l.), Mar. 17, 1991. at AI, available 
at hnp:llarchives,dailyherald.com. 
1M ld. 
167 See, e.g . . The Spread. supra note 160, at 350. 
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and his career) (0 the degenerate don himself. John Gotti. who 
used to plunder his own sports books with his profligate 
betting. 1(;8 
These numbers were still within the estimated ranges of the per-
centages of pathological and problem gamblers in the U.S. public 
in 2003, and they paralleled numbers in the Filla! ReporI of the 
1999 U.S. Gambling Comlll.issionY;.<) Highlighting the problem o f 
gambling among collegiates, NCAA Executive Director Cedric 
Dempsey complained: "We know every instit ution in this coun-
try has studen t bookies, tied directly or indirectly to organized 
crime ."170 By 1998 more of the news media out lets were report-
ing that the costs to taxpayers associated with legalized gambling 
activities outweighed any benefits.!7! 
Pro-gambling interests claimed that legalizing gambl ing activi-
ties, such as sports gambl ing and cas ino gambl ing, would de-
crease illegal gambling activities via regulati ng gamb li ng. Ergo, 
pro-gambling interests also argued, for example. that legalizing 
illegal gambling machines wou ld decrease illegal gambling be-
cause that illegal gambling would no longer be a crime. How-
ever, trends throughout the 1980s and 19905 clea rly indi cate that 
legalizing gambling activities increased illegal gambli ng activities 
and associated crime. News stories featured headlines such as 
Ex-Mobster Says Legalized Gambling BringJ ill fhe Mob, 172 
based on congressional testimony from nationally recognized ex-
!68 ld. at 354. 
169 NG lSC FINAL RLI'ORr. sllpra note n. at p. 4-6 tblA-2. For summari(."S of the 
numbers of pathological gamblers and the associated costs from gamblers' addicli~e 
behaviors. bankruptcies. and crime, sec Mega-Ulli'sw/S, supro note I. al 44-63 
Ibls.A 1-14. See also Gamblillg Away Ollr Yowll. supra nOlC 147; John Warren Kindt 
& John K. Palchak , Legali~l'(1 Gamblil/g's Deslablizalioll of u.s. Fintmcia! Ins/III/· 
rio/IS and Ihe Banking Ind/lttry. 19 RANKR.. Dcv. 1. 21. 26-29 (2002); John Warrcn 
Kind t. Diminishing or Negaring rhe MII/lip/ier Effecr. TIll' Trallsfa of Consumer 
Dol/an 10 /.I'ga/ized Gambling. 2003 MICH. ST. Del L. R,.,v . 281. 312-13 [hereinaf. 
ter GumMing's Crime Multiplier Effect]; Gamhlil1g wilillhl' EC(Jnomy and lile Elimi-
rlOtion oj All Casino Tax Hel'ellueJ. supra note 158, at 367-69, 3&-:-R9. 
170 Robyn Norwood, NCAA Knows This 15 Tough To Fix. LA. TIMES, Mar. 27. 
1998. al CI. (lvuilable at 1998 WL 2412360. 
171 See. e.g. Editorial. COl/lilies Losillg Dill: Despite ReceIVing Few Bel/e/iu, 
Coulllies with '1I(Ii(ll1 CtUitlOS Experience Higher Soci." Costs, TUl'IOKA CAl'.-J.. Apr. 
28. 1998. Q)'ailablc at l EX IS, News & BusineS!.. News. News. All (English, Full 
Text). See also John Wllrren Kindt. Legalized Gambftllg Ac/illi/il's as SubSidized by 
Taxpayers. 48 ARK. L RFv. RBI,! ( 1995) [hereinarter Gambling SlIbsidizeli by Tax· 
payers]. See gellfrally, Case for Sports Bcrring. sllpra nOle 151,1. at I. Conlra Gam· 
bling Away Our Youth, mpra note 147. at 221. 
1720lfistinc A. VCrs\rHctc. Ex-Mobster Say\ Legalized Gamblillg Brings ill the 
Mob. KEN{)sHA NeWS, Oct. 2. 1998. at A6. 
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mobster William lahoda.173 
As U.S. gambling activities were decriminalized during the 
1980s and 1990s, regulations at fi rst curbed overt abuses, but the 
regulatory schemes were largely ineffective in removing inappro-
priate activities and all organized crime influences. 174 In 1995 
17J See , e.g .. Nat" Gambling Impact & Policy Comm'n Act of 1995: Heuring on 
HR. 497 before Ihe House Comm. ol1lheJudiciary. 104th Congo 60·61 (1995) (state-
ment of William Jahoda) [hereinafter Congres.liOfwl Gambling Hearing 1995]. 
174 See John Warren Kindt. The Faillm! 10 Regulate Ihe Gambliflg bulllslr), Effec-
tively: Incentives for Perperual Non-Compliance. 27 S. II.1_. U. LJ. 219 (2003). See 
also Increased Crime and Legalizing Gambling, supra note 52. In California. for 
example, the head of the Al10rncy General's Division of Gambling Control and 
olher superiors were even accused by four former employees of "rourinely 
quash[ing] investigations into sllspecled corruption. embezzlement. and theft at In-
dian casinos. . with the resull being lhat millions of dollars of taxpayer money 
Iwa~J ba~i(ally 'looted' by corruption in the casinos." Oneil R. Soto. Agentl .lay 
Imljlll! cluino probl's J·tymied. SA:'>! Du;ao U"lo:-;-TI-(ll.!., Oct. 10. 2003 [hereinafter 
Indian CasillO ProbeI StymiellJ. Ilmi/able at http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/ 
uniontriblfrifnews/news_ln26indians.html. The head of the California Division of 
Gambling Control, Harlan Goodson. relinquished his post during the summer of 
2003 and went 10 work for a L"l$ Vegas law firm. which critics cited as another exam-
ple of the '"revolving door" of regulators going to work for the regulated. bulian 
Casino Probes Stymied, supra (Goodson did not reTUrn calls from the press.) By 
comparison, when Philip C. Parenti the administrator to the Illinois Gaming Board 
resigned to take a joh 'With Harrah's casino company. Illinois Governor Rod 
Blagojevich promptly "'(ired'- him- rather than allow him to collect several weeks 
salary as a de facto job transition bvnus. Assoc. Press. Gaming Board may change 
conduCI code. N!;:W~-GAZl:TrE (Champaign. IL). July 19, 2003. at B4. 
A pattern of "revolving door" incidents in Illinois exemplified the continuing reg-
ulatory problems throughout the United States. After only a few weeks as a regula-
tOf beginning in 2001. "'Thomas F. Swoik quit his job at the Illinois Gaming Board 
[and) began a part-lime job representing gambling interests as executiw director of 
the Illinois Casino Gaming Association. Swoik's current move has enraged gam-
bling opponents and government watchdogs. who want the Gaming Board to bar 
such moves." Assoc. Press, Former Casino Reglliator Gels New Job: More To Gam-
bling Associmioll Angers Oppollems, Watchdogs, ST.l.-REG. (Springfield. II1.). Apr. 
~. 2002. Ht 11. The facl lhat Swoik took over lhe Illinois casino "association so 
quickly after leaving the Gaming Board raiscld) suspicions about cozy relationships 
between casinos and hoard staff.·· Id. at 11. There had bcen multiple prior incidents 
of the Illinois "revolving door'" 
S"'oik isn't the fir.;t pcr~on to leavc the Gaming Board to work in the in-
dustry. Its (irst administrator. attorney William Kunk.le. hU5 rcprescnted 
several casino groups. including Emerald Casino Inc .. which is fighting to 
open a casino in Rosemont. Former acting administrator Joseph McQuaid 
is Emerald's vice president. And Donna More. a former board legal coun -
scI. is a regular al board meetings. representing multiple casinos. 
Irl. at II. 
For a classic art icle on the problem of the "revolving door" in the regulation of 
gambling. see Breit Pulley From Gambling's RegulalOrs 10 CasillaS' Ml'fl. N.Y. 
TrMF~. OCI. 28. 1998. at A I. To solve the prohlem of the regulatory revolving door. 
the 1999 National Gambling Impact Study Commission recommended a one-year 
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congressional hearings. gambling opponents argued persuasively 
that the spread of legalized gambling activities would increase 
the opportunities for organized crime.175 Throughout the 1980s 
and 19905, organized crime's infiltration into tribal gambling in-
creased as tribal gambling facili ties spread.176 In commercial 
gambling facilities. state regulation was not effective. For exam-
hiatus before a gambling regulator could become a gambling industry employee. 
which was a COlllmon standard in other industries such as the defense industry, but 
slate~ basically ignored this ethical standard. giving a free pass 10 gambling compa-
nies. NGlSC FINAL REPORT. suprn note 77. Tee. 3.17. at p. 3-19. '!be federal gov-
ernment also ignored the one-year safeguard. FUTlhermore, top government ta lent 
was migrating 10 employment in the gambling industry. For example, after just three 
months on the job. the ""FB I's top counterterrorism official announced his retire-
ment [in 2003] ... to take a wp security job for a large casino firm in Las Vegas .. 
controlled by casino magnate Steve Wynn."' Dan Eggen, Top FBI Counterterror Of-
ficio/ Anno/mas Retiremenl. WASil. POST. Oct. 9. 2003. at All. For a review of 
issues involving the interface between gambling and terrorism. see Gambling Dest· 
IIbfizing Economies, SI<prll note 157; Gumb/ing's Des/(ibiliWliQn 0/ Economies, 
supra note 155. 
Political contributions from the gambling industry to elected officials also drew 
fire from the 1999 National Gambling Impact Study Commission which called for 
'"tight restrictions" and a gambling "industry-specific contribution restriction in par-
ticular." NOISe FINAl.- R~PORT. sllpra nOte 77. rec. 3.5. al p. 3-18. For specific 
examples of issues involving campaign contributions and its interface with the gam· 
bling industry. see lohn W. Kindt, Follow the Money: Gambling. Ethics, and Sub· 
poenas, 556 ANNALS AM. ACAD .• POL & Soc. SCI. 85 (1998) [hereinafter Follow the 
MOlley]: Chris Fusco & Graham Buck, Gambling Industry Rewards SlephellS wilh 
596,000, DAILY HERALD (Arlington Heights. 111.), Feb. 3. 2000. at .5 (1.."Titicizing 
Mayor Donald E. Stephens. of Rosemont. Illinois): James Webb, New Gambling 
RegulalOrs Listed as GOP Fund-Raisers. ST. J. REO. (Springfield, Ill.). July 29. 1999. 
at 3. 
In one well-known case in Louisiana. U.S. Senator Mary Landrieu was elected by 
pro·gambling interests allegcdly campaigning with inappropriate methods. 
As midafternoon exit polls on [Nov. 5. 1996J showed a clear advantage for 
Woody Jenkins to become Louisiana's first Republican senalQr in [the 
twentiethJ century. Democrats advised [that] ... [gJambling interests would 
save Democratic candidate Mary Landrieu with a late burst of activity 
bringing out African-American voters. . Allegations that this frantic 
surge included non-voters and dead voters led to a Republican legal 
challenge .. 
There was also a fraud complaint 10 the U.S. Senate. both of which were later 
dropped due to e\'identiary time constraints. Robert Novak, Column, In Louisiana 
Gamblers Gol Their Woman. ST. J.·REG. (Springfield.IIl.). Nov. 19, 1996, at 6. 
115 See. e.g .• Congressional Gambling Hraring 1995, supra note 173, at 60-61. See 
a/so. IndiallS Still Mired if I Poverty, Sllpra note 144: Vegas: Where Crooks Gamble 
on Escape. Sllpra note 165. 
176 See, e.g .. James Popkin. Gambling wilh Ihe Mob1.· Wise GIlYs Have Sel Their 
Sights 0/1 the Booming Indian Casino BusineSI. U.S. N(.ws & WORlD Ro> .. Aug. 23. 
I Q93. at 30. available or 1993 WL 6870574. See also Gambling Facilities Trallsformed 
into Educoriollai Focililies. supra nOle 158. at 172·76: Indians Stili Mired in Po~·erly. 
supra note 144. 
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pie, in Illinois. the second state to legalize riverboat casinos in 
1992 and to allow them to become land-based in 2000, headlines 
were self-explanatory: Experl: Chicago Mob Would Tailll Ally 
Nearby Casillo. 117 While the Illinois Gaming Board's regulations 
appeared to work in one instance. they we re only effective ly en-
forced after scandals and exposure in multiple media outlets.118 
In a stinging blow to what once seemed an unstoppable deal, 
the lIlinois Gaming Board on [January 30, 2001 1 rejected a 
planned Rosemont casin o, concluding that top officials of the 
would-be riverboat had misled the board and that some inves-
tors had links to mob figures. 
"The investigative record establishes the insidious presence 
of organiled crime elements associated with this proposed 
project that cannot be ignored," Gaming Board Administrator 
Sergio Acosta said in a statement to the board: 79 
In 1999, Law Professor I. Nelson Rose complained that in Cali-
fo rnia 's Tribal-State Gaming Compact, "[tJhere can be no do ubt 
[hat the Compact provision [sec. 6.4.4.(c)J was designed to license 
felons and members of organized crime."ISO The implications 
were not only that tribal gambling interests "wanted" this provi-
sion in the compact but that they also had the power to place it 
there. These scenarios exemplify the lack of de facto regulation 
of lega li zed gambling activities, particularly when the sophisti. 
cated legal communities in various states cannot restrain or even 
influence the draftsmanship of pro-gambling regulations with im· 
pacts allegedly assisting and protect ing organized crime figures. 
In 2002. Loca l 69 of the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Em-
ployees International Union was placed under a court-ordered 
monitor "after prosecutors filed a civil complain t accusing union 
officia ls of racketcering."181 The complaint stated: "For over 
15 years, members and associa tes of the Genovese crime fami ly 
In Shamus Toomey & Ames Boykin. Expert: Chicago Mob WOII/(! T(Jim At.y 
N~llrby Clllino, DA'LY HI;RAU) (Arlington Heights, ilL). Feb. I. 2001. al 12, (J1'ai/(J' 
b{e (JI hllp:llarchives.dailyherald.com. Su also Michael Higgins & Douglas Iioit. 
G(Jmiflg Board Rl'jl'cts Rost'mofll Cosino 8id. CHI. TRill .. Jan. 31. 2001. § t. at I. 
avai/aMt! at 2001 WL 4036200 (heremafter Rt!jects RO.!"emom]. 
178Su . I'g .. Rtj~cts ROSt'nlOIll, supra note 177. 
119 Id. 
180 I. Nelson Rose, W,II Cail/omia license Mobsters'! . GAJ,IBI..INO AND THl. LAw 
(No. 57) (1999). 
181 Amy Wcst[eldt. Fc-d Judg~ AppOlnfS Union Monitor. AP 0:-'1..1"'10. Apr. 17, 
2002. a~'allabfe 01 2002 WL 19258018. rl'pr",,~d as Amy Westfe1dt. Feds Se.;;.r GIIi-
nary Local In NJ, LA:. Vl.OM! SI. "I, Apr. 18, 2(X)2. 
• 
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of La Cosa Nostra have exercised influence over Local 69."182 
According to Union General President John W. Wilhelm. how-
ever, "[t]he international union and all of its locals have left these 
kinds of problems behind .... We're not going to permit anyone 
to go back to those kinds of practices."U!.3 U.S. Representative 
Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.) appointed Wilhelm, while union 
president. to serve on the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission. 
These problems were ~xacerbated by the chameleon changes 
in organized crime during the 19905 as "investigators continue[d] 
to find mob influence on Wall Street. in the penny stock trade 
and in the expansion of legalized gaming. "184 
C The "Direcl Link" Berween Increased Legalized Gambling 
Activities and Increased Crime 
Throughout the 1990s, in particular as U.S. legalized gambling 
spread, prosecutors were indicating that there was a "direct link" 
between increased legalized gambling and increased crime.'Ii'; 
Evidence of the direct link between increased crime and gam~ 
bling was available at the 10cal,l86 state. IS? and national levels. l&! 
and Kay C. James, the Chair of the 1999 National Gambling Im~ 
pact Study Commission, confirmed this conclusion. l~ During 
congressional hearings in 1995, Massachusetts Attorney General 
Scott Harshbarger summarized the opinion of the U.S. legal com-
munity regarding legalizing gambling activities: 
As president-elect of the National Associalion of Auomeys 
182ld. 
liB/d. 
184 John L. Smith. Column , Here Come New Mobs. Not Quitt' fire Same as Old 
Mobs. L,,,s VEGAS REV. L Jan. 4. 1998. at lB. available Of 1998 WL 7206767. 
IllS See. e.g .. Marilyn Lewis. Prosewtor Says Crime Rale Lil1kf!(/ to Gamblillg. h ' · 
LAND VALLEY D AILY BL'LL. (Ontario. Ca1.). Feb. 18. 1995. rl'prillled in PO~IO""A 
CARD CLUB REP. I (April 1995). 
t86See . e.g .. id.: Press Release. City of San Jose. Cal.. Police Chief Confinns 
Councilmembers' Concerns: Card Clubs Foster Crime Throughout the City. Mar. 5. 
1996 (on file with City of San Jose. CaL). 
167 See, e.g .. J. JOSEPH CURRAN, JR. , OFFICE Mo. ATf'y GEN., THE HOLSE 
NEVER LoSES AND MARYLA .... O CANI'OT WIN: WHY CASINO GAMULll'O Is A BAD 
IDEA (1995). available Of http://www.oag.statc.md.uslRcportslcasinogambling. pdf; 
Frank San1iago. ACtlhorities Link Gambling to Cases of Theft. DES MOI1'-'ES REO .. 
Nov. 2\. 1997. See olsQ Increased CrimI" olld ugalizing Gambling, supra nOle 52. 
188 See, t_g .. Congressional Gambling Hearillg 1995. supra nOle 173, al -156·59 
(statement of Mass. Att'y Gen. Scott Harshbarger). 
189See. e.g .• Kay C. James. Chair. 1999 Nan Gambling Impact Study Comm'n. 
Speech before the Annual Conf. of the Nat'l Coalition Against Legali7ed Gambling. 
Jackson . Miss .. Sept. 26,1999. 
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General, I have had the opportunity to consult with many 
other members of the law enforcement community on the ef-
fccts of gambling on a city or slate. Overwhelmingly, the re-
sponse has been "Don't do it. " Almost every Attorney 
General who has faced the issue of casino gambling in their 
slate has cautioned me that there are a range of public safety, 
regulatory, and social issues that are never addressed before 
the introduction of gambling. l90 
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Ha rshbarger noted the link between increased crime and the 
spread of legalized gambling activities: 
One of the most nOled consequences of casino gambling has 
been the marked rise in street crime. Across this nalion. po-
lice departments in cities that have casino gambling have re-
corded surges in arrests due to casino-related crime. In many 
cases, towns that had a decreasing crime rate or a low crime 
rate have seen a sharR and steady growth of crime once gam-
bl ing has taken root. 91 
The Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the state's 
law enforcement community summarized the problems in a 1994 
report: 
As this report reflects. it has becn clearly demonstrated in 
other jurisdictions that a significant increase in crime and its 
consequences accompanies casino gambling. Therefore, the 
Florida Sheriffs Association, Florida Police Chiefs Associat ion 
and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement are strongly 
opposed to any form of legalized gambling in Florida. IY2 
In support ing its conclusions. the Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement noted the "before and after" crime problems that 
surfaced after casino gambling was legalized in Atlantic City. 
"The well-documented explosion of crime which has been expe r-
ienced in the gambling city of At lantic City, New Jersey is also 
lelling."193 Within three years of the advent of casino gambling 
in A tlant ic City, the city "went from 50th in the nation in per 
capita crime to first."19..\ Furthermore, "from 1977 to 1990, the 
crime rate in that city rose by an incredible 230%."195 
These conclusions st ill were va lid in 2001, and evidence contin-
1£lO Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995, supra note 173. at 456 (statement of 
Mass. Alt'y Gen. Soon Harshbarger). 
1911d. 
192 FLA. DEP'T L. E"FORC'E\IE .... T ET AI. .. INCREASED CRI\IE: Is IT WORTH THE 
GAMBLE? (1m) (emphasis in original). 
193M. 
19..\ Id. 
l~ Id. 
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ues to accumulate that legalizing gambling activities causes more 
illegal gambling and associated crime. 
It is well established that crime rates risc substantiall y when 
gambling is legalized. Sin ce some comm unities ill Mississippi 
legalized casino gambling, their crime rate has increased at 
least 800 percent, with rapes increasing 200 percent and rob-
beries 218 percent. And in 1994. one study showed lhat com-
munities with gambli ng had nearly twice the national crime 
rate. l96 
The definitive study on the link between increased crime and le-
galizing casinos was a study by Professors Earl Orinols, David 
Mustard, and Cynthia Dilley. which analyzed virtually every ca-
sino community before and after the advent of casinosyn The 
st udy showed crime increased on average nine percent in the 
third year afler a casino opened and trended upward 
thereafter. lw, 
IV 
TRENOS AND CONDITIONING F ACTORS 
A. A uempts to Gel the u.s. Gambling industry to 
A cknowledge the Obvious 
In 2002, the main trade magazine for the gambling industry, 
international Gaming and Wagering Business (IGWB), cited the 
1997 H arvard Addictions Meta-Analysis. 199 The analysis,2°O al -
though funded by the gambling interests themselves,2°1 showed 
the "pathological gambling" rate increased more than SO percent 
in a three-year period- from a base of 0.84 percen t in 1977-93 to 
1.29 percent in 1994-97.202 
I%Tyler J . Jarvis & Heidi Baumann Jarvi~. What are the Odds? BY U MAGAZINE. 
Spring 2001. at 49. aI'ai/able at hnp:llmagazine.byu.cdufarticic.tpJ? num=48·SprOl. 
]97 Earl L. Grinols et a1.. Casinos And Crime (June 1999) (unpub1i~hcd draft. on 
file with author), forthcomitlg as Earl L Grinols & Da\id B. Mustard. The Curious 
Case of Casinos alld Crime. _ R EV. EcoN. & STAT. _ (20(») [hereinafte r Casi-
11m and Crime]. 
198/d. 
]99 Playillg the Numbers Game. supra note 144, at 22. 
200 HOWAII. D J. SHAFFER ET A L., HAIW. MED. SCH .. EsTIMATING THE PREVA. 
lENCE OF DISORDERED G,\MBLlNG BEHAVIOR IN 11fE UNITED STATES ANI) CA. 
NADA: A M b"TA·ANALYSIS (1997). 
20] David Ferrell & Matea Gold. Cllsino Industry Fights an Emerging Backlash. 
L.A. T IM ES. Dec. 14. 1998. at AI. IInlilllble a/ 1998 WL 18903648. 
202 Press Re lease. Harvard Medical SchooL Harvard Medical School Researchers 
Map Prevalence of Gambling Disorders in North America (Dec. 4. 1997), available 
at h np:ffwww.hms.harvard.edu/news/releasesi I297gambling.htmL 
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Even IGWE noted that the meta·analysis supported "the con· 
tention by gambling critics that the proliferation of legal casinos, 
lotteries and racetracks not only increases the number of prob· 
lem and pathological gamblers, but it rajses the prevalence rate, 
or the percentage of the ad ult population with gambling 
problems. "203 The IGW B trade magazine then queried rhetori-
cally: "What happened in the 1990s to increase the prevalence 
rate of gambling add icts? Legal casino and lottery gambling 
spread like wildfire throughout the country.,,:aJ<l Then, signifj . 
cantly, the gambling industry's own trade magazine castigated 
the U.S. gambling industry's long-held public re lations dogma. 
But the induslry remains in denial. 
It defies any study linking ga mbl ing with bankruptcy, sui-
cide a nd othe r social problems. And it steadfast ly refules any 
claim by crilics thaI the spread of legal casino gambli ng in this 
country increases the preva le nce o f problem a nd pat hological 
gam bling. 
That pos ition defies logic. In fact. it's insu lt ing. 
The ease lond for specialis ts in addiction treatment has 
skyrockete d wben commercial and tribal govern m e nt casinos 
o pen for business?OS 
203 Pluying IIIe NImrbtrl Game. lllp ra note 144. at 22. 
204/d. 
:2oo !tl. In 1994. American Medical AssOCiation Resolution 430 estimated the 
socio-medical COStS of gambling OI l $40 billion per year. Am. Medical Assoc .. Hou:.c 
of Delegates Resolution 430 (A-94) (1994). Adjusted to 2003 dolla~, the AMA', 
estimate would he approximately 570 billion in costs which i~ more than the entire 
reven ues derived from U.s. gambling of approximately $65 hillion. 
In 2003. the Maine Medical ASliociation publicly opposed the ~Illng of a casino 
anywhere in the sta te. Maine Medical A.ssoc... Public Health Comm .. R OO/II/lUll 
Agoll1$1 u}calmg u CUl'iIlQ ill Maim! (2003). 
In 1997. Professor David P. Phill ips published a study, Elevaled Silicide url'iJ 
A...socUlled wI/It Leglllizt'd Gambling, which noted that suicide rales in gambling 
communities were two to fou r times higher than in non-gambling areas wi th compa-
rable populations. David P. Phill ips, Ward It. Welty. & Marisa Smith. E/evared Slli-
ci(le Levels Associated willt Legalized Gambling, 27 SUlCrl)C & Lrrf".-TllREATFNINO 
BEIIAV. 373 ( 1997); St!l' Sandra Olakcsh.:e. SIlicide Rail' Is /ligl ler {,I 3 GambllllK 
Cities. N.Y. TI \1F_'i , Dec. 16, 1997. at AIO. In 2003 in Ollawa. Canad a. "statistic:, 
indicate(dJ 126 gambling addicts ha .. e killed themselves since 1999, an alanning in-
crease from 27 sueh suicides in the [previous] five ye.a~," which Canadian expertS 
attributed to video !ottl'ry te rminals in ba~ which were legalized III 1994. Gum· 
blillg-Related SllIcldes Soar. LAS VEO","S SUN, Oct. 3.2003. Furthermore. a 2003 
'" investigatiun by The Cunadian Press found more than 10 pcrel'nt or suicides in 
Alberta and more than six percent in Nova Scotia were linked to gambling in 2001." 
which prompted Canadian officials " to standardize the collection of [CalJadianj ~ui­
ddc data re lated to gambling. " Louisc Elholl. Former Copps Cu/isell/ll Efec Sill' 
Onturio, Aug. 24, 2003, m'ailablt at http://cncws.eanoc.ellfCNE WS/Canada/2003108J 
191164161-cp.html. For examples o r how U.S. storie:; linking leg.1 ti7.ed gambling to 
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It was significant that in 2002 the gambling indust ry's own 
trade magazine. IGWB. was complaining about the industry's 
obfuscation and denial of the academic findings as we ll as those 
of the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission. 
B. Ewmples of the Auempls by Pro-Gambling IntereSIS to 
Contro/and Confuse lhe In/ormlllioll Available to the Public: 
The Forma/ioll of the 1999 u.s. Gambling Commissioll 
The 19% National Gambling Impact Study Commission Act 
provided that the appointment of its nine commiss ioners be 
made by October 2. 1996. before the November 1996 elections; 
however. by March 1997 Pres ident Clinton had not yet an-
nounced his three se lect ions.206 Concerns of political posturing 
linked 10 campaign donations and pro-gambling lobbyist activi-
ties were rai sed by the national press207 and echoed by charit ies 
and public interest groups such as the National Coalition Against 
Legalized Gambling (an organization similar 10 Mothe rs Against 
Drunk Driving). 
The Washington Post highlighted the politica l interface \\;th 
potent ial Presidentia l appointments to the Commission: 
Start wilh the guess-who's-coming-to-coffee list at the While 
House. Last March. for example. one White House coffee 
guest was the chairwoman of the Oneida lation. an Indian 
Iribe with gambling interests. On that same day. according to 
Ihe Wall Street Jou rnal. the Oneida Nation donated $30.000 to 
the Democratic National Committee. Coffee guest lists show 
at least 10 representatives of Indian gambli ng inte res ts si nce 
mid-1995.2Of! 
Furthermore. the POSt was alarmed by other Commission ap-
pointments linked to pro-gambling interests: 
One of Speaker Gingrich's choices is the chairman and CEO 
of a Las Vegas casino compan y [1 . Terrence Lanni of MGM 
Grand , Inc.). House Minority Leader Gephard1. who gets one 
increased SU lcidc~ havc becn supressed. see Stephen Braun. LII't!J Lost 1/1 Q RII'~r Q 
D~bt. L.A. TIJo'ES. June 22.1997. at AI. 
206 Stt Don Fedcr. Column. Clln/on Rolls Dice on Gaming Study. BosTo ... HER 
ALD. May 7. 1997. at3L Q\'allable at 1997 WL 5399872: see also James Bennet. Clin· 
ton Finally PUIS 3 on a Panel to Examine GambUng. N.Y. TIMES. Apr. 30. 1997. at 
A14. al'oilable al LEXIS. News & Business. Nello"S. News. All (English. Full Text). 
207 Editorial. Gambling Payoff!. W ASH. P OST. Feb to. 1997, at A IS. mailable at 
1997 WL 93340S9lhereinafte r Gambling Payoff'J: Warren Richey. Ami·Gambling 
Actil'islS Warn 0/ Stacked Commission Deck. CHRISTIA"I SrI. Mo ... rrmt. Mar. 21. 
1997. at 3. alai/able al 1997 WL 28IXXXl61hereinafter Slacked Commission DeckJ. 
208 Gambli"g Pa~ off!. supra note 207. 
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select ion -and whose political committees received at least 
$46.500 from gambling interests along with another $4,500 
from three \vomen listed as homemakers from Las Vegas-
reportedly favors the head of a union representing casino 
cmployces.209 
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As anticipated. U.S. Rep. Richard Gephardl CD-Mo.) later ap-
pointed John W. Wilhelm, general president of the Hotel Em-
ployees and Restaurant Employees International Union. 
Established in 1995 under CEO Frank Fahrenkopf. the Ameri-
can Gaming Association fhere inafter AGAj and its lobbying ac-
tivities were scrutinized by the press. 
According to lobby reg.istration statements on file in Congress. 
Fahrenkopf"s AGA spl.! nt $460.000 on lobbying between July 
and December 1996. The forms say one of the two issues the 
group worked 011 was "Establishmem of the National 0,1111-
hling Impact Study Commission." Of the $460,000. lobby re-
gistration forms ~how that $232,000 went to nine outside 
lobbyists.2 l o 
In 19%. the nine outside lobbyists employed by the AGA in -
cluded: (1) former U.S. Rep. Dennis Eckart (D-Ohio): (2) Judy 
Kern Fazio, wife of U.S. Rep. Vic Fazio CD-Calif.) and former 
finance director of the Democratic Congressional ClIllpaign 
Committee; (3) Steven Champlin, the former director for the 
I-louse Democratic Caucus: (4) Kenneth Duberstei n, the former 
assistant for legislative affairs for President Reagan: and (5) 
Donald Fierce. a former aide to Haley Barbour, chair of the Re-
publican National Cornminee and an initial supporter of the Mis-
sissippi casinos.211 
While the selections to the Commission were being made, the 
monetary influences of the AGA became a concern voiced by 
various charities and public interest groups. such as the 
NCALG.2J2 
lTJhe $1.9 million in soft-money donations the gambling in-
dustry made to the Democratic Party may be playing a role in 
the president's appoi ntments. They also cite $232.000 in lob-
bying fees paid to well-connected Washington insiders wOTk-
ing, they say. to influence who is named to the commission. 
"'If they can stop an objective study it is well worth it to 
209 /d. 
2lQSwcked Commission {)uk, ~upra note 207. 
211 /d. 
212 M 
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them:' says Bernie Horn, NCALG's poli tical director.213 
Toe AGA rebutted these public concerns: "These kinds of alle-
gations ... are disgraceful," stated Frank Fahrcnkopf, a former 
chair of the Republican National Committee. "For the amount 
of money that is involved here do you believe you are going to 
buy the president of the United States?"214 However, the ap-
pointees to the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission reflected a sig-
nificant influe nce by pro-gambling interests. 
The legislation which established the ni ne-member Commis-
sion indicated the followi ng legislators (accompanied by their 
eventual choices) would choose the commissioners:215 
a. Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Newt Ging-
rich (R-Ga.), two choices: Kay C. James, dean of Regent 
University's School of Government, and J. Terrence 
Lann i, chief executive officer of MGM Grand, Inc., a ca-
sino and entertainment company; 
b. U.S. House of Representatives Minority Leader Richard 
Gephardt (D-Mo.), one choice: John W. Wilhelm, general 
pres iden t of the gambling industry's union. the Hotel Em-
ployees and Restaurant Employees International Union; 
c. U.S. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.), two 
choices: Paul H. Moore, a Mississip~i doctor, and (as cho-
sen by U.s. Sen. Dan CoalS (R-Ind.) 16) James C. Dobson, 
Ph.D., president of Focus on the Family; 
d. U,S. Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschlc (D-S.D.), one 
choice: Leo T. McOlrthy, former California lieutenant 
governor for 12 years; and, 
e. President William J. Clinton (D), three choices: William 
A. Bible, chair of the Nevada Gaming Control Board; 
Robert W. Luescher representing Nat ive American inter-
ests; and Rich ard C. Leone, former chair of the Port Au-
thority of New York and New Jersey.217 
In May 1997, James was appointed Commission chair.m: 
James described herseU as from a minority background,219 and 
although she was highly qualified- a fanner Virginia govern-
ment official, former corporate director, and dean of the Regent 
213 Id. 
2141d. 
215 See NOISC FINAL REPORT, wpra nOle 77, at app. [I. 
216 Dave Berns & Tony Batt, Nevadans Up for Gaming Pallel, LAS VEGAS REV.-
L Sept. 7, 1996, at IA. available al 1996 W L 2348635. 
217 Sec NGLSC FINAL REPORT, S!lpra note 77. at app. II. 
218 Rick. Aim. Swdy Le(Uler Appoil1led, KAt-.. Crry STAR. May 21, 1997, at BI, 
Ilvailable UI 1997 WL 3014098lhcreinaftcr Leader Appoil1ledj. 
219 Tammie Smith, Kay Cole james. TJME~-DISI'ATCIl (Richmolld. Va.), Fcb. 6. 
2002, al El. available UI 2002 WL 7191281. 
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University School of Govcrnment22Q-she was immedia tely criti-
cized by Fahrenkopf.:22! Fahrenkapf cont inued his criticisms un-
abated throughout the yea rs the Commission was in operation.Z22 
and James did not respond to those criticisms until after the 
Commjssion was completed and issued its Final Report. 223 
v 
P OLICY A LTERNATIVES AND R ECOMME:"'DATIONS 
A. Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP 
Sui'S alld SLAPP-Back Suits) 
In the 1970s and 19805. indust ries engaging in initiatives which 
generated public debates involving policy were often losing those 
debates, such as in the areas of economic deve lopment vis-a.-vis 
environmental protection. As a consequence. some indust ries 
began fi ling what became known as "strategic lawsuits against 
public panicipation"(SLAPP suitS),224 lawsuits purportedl y de-
signed to stifle, limit, or intimidate public debate on public issues. 
After some initial industry successes, Fi rst Amendment issues be-
gan to prevail , and many of these sui ts were dismissed. Other-
wise, defendants began to countersue in what became known as 
SLAPP-Back suits. These SLAPP-Back suits against the deep 
pockets of certain industries soon began enjoying increased suc-
cess with large damage awards for harassment and other dam-
ages awarded to the individuals targeted by the initial SLAPP 
suits.22.5 The result was a chilling effect on 1110S1 industries con-
sidering bringing SLAPP suits,226 and th is chi ll ing effect was 
compounded by a trend toward enacting state statutes to assist 
individuals fighting SLAPP suitS.227 Pe rhaps an even greater 
chi lli ng effec t on some ind ustries init iating SLAPP sui ts was the 
220 NOise FI,"AL Rt:I'<)KI. mpra note 77, at app. II at p. 11-1. 
211 Leader App""IIt'd. Sllpra note 218. 
222 Set', e.g .. Laurence Arnold. Gambling-Addictioll Repon Slm: Debate, Auva-
CA rt: (Baton Rouge. La.). \-1M 19.1 999. at 2A, al'OI/ab/t 01 1999 WL 6098726. 
223 See. e.g .. Jennirer Peter, Chain-'onUlII Hp/ptd Unilt Gamblillg Pane{. V IRGIN' 
I",,,,-PU_OT & L EDGER STAR (i'orrolk. Va.). June 19. 1999, at AI. alai/able al 1999 
WL 7168361. 
Z24 Suo t.g .. George W. i'rmg. SLAPPs: Slrategic La'Hlliu Agaillst Public Panici-
porion. 7 PACE E'IVrI_ L. Rl:.v. 3 (1989). 
2Z5Su . e.g .. John C. Barker. CommOIl-Law and SlUtlltnry Solminns 10 flip Prob-
//'m SLAPPS. 26 Lo'. L.A. L. RLv. 395 (1993). 
226SU generally Gl:Q}l.t;L \Y. PRING & PE:-' ELOI'E CANA". SLAPP~: GE"IT","\j 
SUED FON. SI'l:AKI 1"<oG OUT (1996). 
217 See. e.8 .. MASS. GEN. LAW~ ch. 23 1. § 59H (2003). 
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discovery process, which necessarily accompanied such suits and 
subjected the companies involved to the public disclosure of sen~ 
sitive andlor embarrassing information. 
The classic example of far. reaching impacts caused by unantic-
ipated revela tions genera ted by the legal discovery process in -
volved the Pau la C. Jones lawsuit filed in 1994 against President 
William J. Clinton. The sexual harassment suit22!l demonstrated 
t hat even a sitting president could be made vul nerable to the dis-
covery process of information pursuant "to a civil suit ... [which 
led] to the Monica Lewinsky scandal and ultimately the impeach-
ment hearings."229 
B. SLAPP Suits Against Public Citizens Grollps 
A classic example of what should be termed a SLAPP suit to 
deter anti-gambling citizens groups occurred in 2001 after the 
Greenbrier resort in West Virginia lost a Nov. 7. 2000 refe ren-
du m to bring casino gambling to the Greenbrier by a vote of 
7.065 to 5,109. 2.30 The Greenbrier Hotel filed a $36-mil1ion defa-
mat ion case aga inst a leader of the citizens group, attorney Barry 
Bruce of Lewisburg, West Virginia.23I Bruce refused to be 
cowed, but before he could file a countersuit, Greenbrier Presi-
de nt Ted Kleisner quickly dropped the hotel's case. Thereafte r. 
both sides agreed in the future to comply with the West Virginia 
Code of Fair Campaign Practices.232 Allhough the Greenbrier 
had the option of pursuing a second referendum in 2002, the 
numbe r of anti-casino voters purportedly increased between 
2000 and 2002, and the Greenbrier decided to forgo a second 
referendum. 
Another example of a SLAPP suit involving gambling issues 
occurred before the elect ion o n November 7. 2000. Massachu-
setts ballot "Question 3" conta ined an initiat ive by a citizens' 
228 See Clinton v. Jones. 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (holding that sitting president not 
immune from lawsuits). 
229I311rbara P~lmer et aL, Low.Life·Sleazy Big-H(lireti. Tmiler Pllrk Girl v. The 
President: The Pallia Jones Case alld the Law of Se.wal HllrtlSsml'fll. 9 AM. U. J. 
GE.""DEK Soc. POL' y & L. 283. 284 (2001). For the U.s House of Repres..,n ta tin:s 
report on the impeachment of President William J . Clinlon (D). see H.R. Rep. No. 
105·830 (1998). 
no Grt'cnbricr Resort Drop~' Lllw.wi/. RO,'''O t-;: 6 TI\l E~, June 23. 2001. <l1 134 
[hereinafter Grccnbrier Rc)orl Drops LaWSUIt). 
1)1 M Com plllini. Greenbrier Resort Mgt. Co. v. Bruce. No. Ql"().&J(J) (eir. Ct.. 
Greenhrier County. W. Va. filed Apr. 20. 2001). 
232 Greenbrier Resort Drops Lllw.mil. supra note 230. 
SIIbpoefluing /lIjvrmallon jrom (he Gambling Indus/ry 
group, Grey2K, and community leaders, such as Carey l nei l, to 
ban dog racing in Massachusetts.233 Charles Sarkis, owner of 
Wonderland Greyhound Park in Revere, Massachusetts, filed a 
$lO-million defamat ion action against Grey2K just five days 
befo re the election.2:l4 Andrew Upton, the attorney fo r Grey2K, 
summarized: ' 'This is a Nixonian pattern of intimida tion and har-
assment by the track owners .... The track owners have millions 
of doll ars at stake in this industry."z..15 
The day before the e lect ion , Superior Court Judge Margot 
Botsford refused to grant Wonderland Greyhound Park an in-
junction blocking Grey2K's ads,2J6 and the attorneys for Grey2K 
filed a special mot ion wi th the S(l me judge seeking " to dismiss the 
defamat ion lawsuit Sarkis fil ed against the group."237 Grey2K's 
attorneys "argued that the suit should be dismissed under the 
state's ant i-SLA PP Slll tllt c, which prohibits the use of fr ivolous 
litigat ion or in timidat ion tactics against people trying to exercise 
their constitu tional righ ts: '238 Although Grey2K lost the eJec-
tion, they won the in it ial legal decisions involving the SLAPP 
suit.2.l9 By Apri l 13,200 1. the defendant's special motion for dis-
missa l had been granted240 pursuan t to the Massachusells anti-
SLAPP statute.24t 
By comparison, in 1992 the lobacco industry began a series of 
legal maneuvers that de racto, if not de jure, harassed the authors 
233 RICk Klein. Track Owner SUIS 8ackt!r! oj Dog QIli!stions, BO!rroN GI.Ollr . 
~o\'. 4. 2000, at 81. a~'a/lable Of 2(J(KI WL 3349358 [hereinafter Track SlIesj. For 
another example. sec W,chita Racetrack Warns Critics of Suil: Tt!5rimonv lJejort 
LcglS/ll/il't: Pllllr/ Is Cal/d S/a(u/erotO'. KAN. CITY STAJ<., Apr. 17, 1997. at C4, QI'aila, 
b{e at hllp: llwww.kansa).city.colll (the truck guickty withdrew its obJcc tion). 
1)4 Track SrltlS. sllpra notc 233. Compare Verified Complaint. Sarkis v, Grey2K. 
No. 00-4891-E (Supt:r. 0 .. Suffolk, Ma~s. filed Nov. 2, 2000). with Amwer 10 Pillin _ 
tiff's Verificd Complaint. id. (filed Dec. 4, 2000). 
235 Tmck Srjes. supra note 233. 
236 See S(lrkis, No. ()()-4891-E (filed Nov. 6, 2(00); SHcha l>feiffcr, Judge Re/lIst'S /0 
Bluck Creyhuwul Arb, Bu:.ru;-.l GLOBE. Nov. 7. 2(XXl. at 86, al'oi/abie ut 2{xx) WL 
3349595 [hereinafter Jlldge R(·fll~'(!~]. 
237 Judge Rejuses, .wpro note 236. 
Z31! 'd. See 1113'0 Scott Van Voorhis. Gf/'yhOllml Dogfight BU/er (0 End, BOS'ION 
HCRA I n. No .... 7, 2000. at 10, 1lVllill/ble ar 2000 WL 4340030. 
239 Compare Defendant's Special MOlion For DIsmissal Under G.L. c.231 , § 59 11 
and Rcque~ 1 Fur Hearing, Sarkis. No. 00-4!!91-E (filed Nov. 15,2(00). willi I'la in-
tiff's McmOTlindum of La ... in Opposition 10 the Defendants' Emergency SpeCIal 
Motion 10 Dismi~s uncler G. L. c.231. § 59H. id. (filed Dec. 5. 2000). 
2-\0 Plamuffs \1cmorandum of Decision and Order on Defendant's Special 10.10-
lion for D1Smls,..,al, id. (filed Apr. 13. 2001). 
1-11 M,\ ... ~. GI' .... I AWS ell 231. § 59H (2003). 
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of a study embarrassing to the industry.242 The "study ... 
showed that 'Old Joe' [Carnell was nearly universally recognized 
by six·year·old children, a level of awareness that matched the 
logo for the Disney channel. "243 The prestigious Journal of the 
American Medical Association published the study.244 The har-
assment of the study's authors eventually led legal scholars and 
academics to call for changes in Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure to restrict the ability of an industry to abuse the 
discovery process.245 However, in this "Old Joe" scenario, the 
scientists involved were admittedly unsophisticated regarding the 
legal process24'" and probably unaware of their multiple legal 
counteractions including discovery of sensitive industry informa-
tion as well as countersuits. In fact, some groups could be pre-
pared to engage the issues for the public welfare, rega rdless of an 
industry's "deep pockets." 
CONCLUSION 
This analysis has focused on the great leverage that gambling's 
opponents can find in the legal discovery process. This conclu-
sion will focus on the sigmficant need for this power of discovery 
as pro-gambling interests exert substantial power in acting as soy-
242 See generally. Paul M. Fischer, Science and Subpoenas: When Do the Courts 
Become IlIStruments of Manipulation?, 59 LAW & Cm'"I\::\IP. PftOBS. 159 (1996) 
[hercinaf!er Science alld Subpoenas]. 
2431d. at 159. For Ihe published study, see Paul M. Ascher ct a1.. Brand Logo 
Recogninon f,y Children Aged 3 to 6 Years: Mickey Mouse and Old Joe the Camel . 
266 J . AM. Mm. Ass'N 3145 (1991). 
24-1 Science and Subpoenas. supra note 242. 
245 For a summary of this scenario in the tobacco industry, sec Wendy E. Wagner. 
RouSh JUI/ice and the Anomey General Litigation, 33 GA. L. REV. 935, 946-48 
(1999). TIle academics could have reversed the de faCIO impact of the discovery 
process via countersuits. which would have perhaps embarrassed the tobacco indus-
try by requesting andlor reveal ing sensitive industry information including indu~try 
marketing surveys and the interface with the use of nicotine. Id. See also FED. R. 
e i V. P. 45: Bert Black, Research and its Revelation: When Should Courts Compel 
Disclosure?, 59 LAW & O.lNT£MP. PaoBs. 169, 180-83 (1996) (calling for specific 
changcs to Ru\c 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to address abuses in the 
discovery process re lating to third party research). For an entire law publication 
dedicated to these iss lies, sec Symposium, Courl-Orderell Disclosure of Acaliemic 
Research: A Clash of Values of Science and Law. 59 LAW & CONTEMP. P ROUS. 2 
(1996). Accused by the tobacco industry of improprieties. the acadcmks involved 
were eventually exonerated by their colleagues. Wagner. supra at 947-48 nn.52-54. 
Set' gem'wlly Anna Burdeshaw Fretwell. Note. Clearing tile Air: An Argrmwnt jor a 
Ft'dcral Carue of Actioll to Provide all AdeqlJate Remedy for Smokers Inj/lred by 
Tobacco Companies. 31 GA . L. REV. 929 (1997). 
2#i Science and SubpoentlI. supra note 242, at 166-67. 
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ere igns, as possible scoWaws, as taking it all, and as above the 
law. 
A. Gambling Interests as Sovereigns 
After five years of legal actions, in 1998 Mike Strain was 
awarded $5.2 million in a case against the City of Hammond, In-
diana, and the Empress Casino riverboat.247 Strain, who owned 
the Great Lakes Inland Marina, claimed de facto that the local 
government in concert with gambling interests utilized the sover-
eign powers of eminent domain to take his land.248 He alleged 
"he was not offered a fair market value and was denied due pro-
cess to recoup a half-acre of land condemned by the city to build 
a highway overpass at the marina. "249 The Empress Casino, 
"which built the overpass as part of its agreement with the city, 
[was] responsible for the damages."L'iO The Indiana Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the judgment.251 
B. Gambling Inrerests as Scofflaws? 
On November 6, 1985, the City of Las Vegas formed the Las 
Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency,252 which "is actually 
the City Council of Las Vegas [because] there are no public 
members of the Agency."253 To begin the eminent domain pro-
cess to obtain property for a redevelopment project later known 
as the Fremont Street Experience, the Agency filed a "Complaint 
in Eminent Domain and a Motion for Order Permitting Immedi-
ate Occupancy Pending Entry of Judgment" on November 19, 
1993. against defendant landowners, the Carol Pappas family.2S4 
247 Jury Award$$5.2 M"f,Ofl m CasinQ Case. CIIi. SU;'oI·TIMIOS. Oct. t. 1998. at 10. 
(lliailabir a/ 1998 WL 5600435/hereinafter Jury Awards 55.2 Million I. 
2~ SrI' id. -The right of eminent domain is the right of the state. through its 
regular organization. to reassert. either temporarily or permanently. its dominion 
O\'er any portion of the soil of the state on account of public e~igency and for the 
public good." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 616 (re .... 4th ed. 1968). Go ... ernmemal 
units exercising emlllent domain must give ~just compcnsation- to Ihe owner of the 
realty equating to a ··fair return on the value of the property:' which is a concept 
deemed synonymous w1\h ··due proces.~ of law.'· 'd. at 1001·02. 
249/tlry Awards 55.2 Million, supra note 247. 
250M 
2$1 City of Hammond v. Marina Entm't Complex. Inc .. 733 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2000). 
252 Respondents' Answering Brief at 3. City of Las Vegas DownlOwn Redevelop· 
ment Agency v. Pappas. 76 P.3d I (Nev. filed Feb. 2. 2000) (No. 33812). 
253 ld. 
254/d. at 4. 7. 
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Delayed service of process was made upon Mrs. Pappas, an eld -
erly widow, on December 8,1993.255 The Pappas land was alleg-
ed ly "stripped from them in less than 50 seconds in a summary 
proceeding on December 15, 1993 at which they were not even 
present. ·,256 
It took another three years before the Agency's exe rcise o f 
eminent domain resulted in a judicial decision.257 In the interim. 
a parking garage concomitant to the Fremont Street Experience 
was built on the Pappas's land because city fathers were con-
vinced that the Fremont Street Experience and adjacent parking 
were essential to revitalize downtown casinos bordering Fremont 
Street.258 in City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment 
Agency v. Pappas, Judge Don P. Chai rez granted the Pappas's 
motion to dismiss the Agency's eminen t dom ai n action and 
ruled: 
TIIC Agcncy has actcd contrary to law and in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner as to the adoption of its initial plan in 1986. 
in its failure to amend the plan fo r the various projects that it 
engages in to mee t the specificity requirements, in its fa ilure to 
hold the requisite publ ic hearings, in its failure to allow owner 
participation in its projects, in its failure to show the inabilit y 
of its private partners to purchase property without the use of 
em in ent domain and in its failu re to negot iate in good faith 
with curren t landowners.259 
As part of his decision, Judge Chairez reviewed and analyzed 
"whether the City had adeq uate info rmat ion to make a finding of 
bl ight as to t he redevelopme nt area or if the designation of the 
area was arbitrary and capricious." 260 He ruled: 
[T]he Agency me rely took the statutes and constructed them 
in to a plan .... The Agency simply designaled an area of the 
City as subject to redevelopment and then wrote a report that 
would satisfy the statutes by incorporating the language of the 
stat ut e as evide nce. The Agency, th e Planning Comm ission 
an d the City Counci l must all pass upon this Plan yet not one 
of these entit ies inquired as to the factual findings for their 
resolutions. It is important to note that the Agency and the 
City Council are one and the same. It is obvious the refore 
that they were aware of the lack of empirical evidence to con-
2~5fd. at 7. 
256 Id. at 8. 
257 M., No. A327519 (N<! .... 13th Dist. Ct. Juty 3.1996). 
2~8 Rcspond<!llls' Answering Brief at 3-11. Pappas. 76 PJd I. 
259ft!. . No. A327519 al 64. 
260 Id. al 42-43. 
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firm th eir actions. The failure to obtain evidence prior to the 
confirmation of the redevelopment area, which was known to 
all three entities at the time of the approval of the plan, led to 
the area having been designated in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner and as such the municipality's actions are violative of 
the statutes. The Court finds that there was not substantial 
evidence to support the findings of the Agency, the Commis-
sion and the City Council.2bl 
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Even with this decision, it took another six years, until August 
2002, before the Nevada Supreme Court granted the Pappas fam-
ily's " Motion to Expedite the Briefing and Resolution of the Ap-
peal. "262 Among legal watchdog groups, this case was included 
among "The Top 10 Abuses of Eminent Domain" by the Insti-
tute for Justice's Castle Coalition,263 and Pappas was highlighted 
by one national magazine in deciding to designate Las Vegas as 
one of the lOp ten most corrupt cities in America.264 The coali-
tion summarized the history of the Pappas case: 
Unbeknownst to Mrs. Pappas, however, [in 1993] there was a 
hearing in only seve n days 10 decide whether the agency 
would get immediate possession of the properly. Mrs. Pappas 
did not know about the hearing and did not attend. The Judge 
granted title to the agency, and the build ings were promptly 
demolish ed. Later, the Judge recused himself because he had 
invested in one of the casinos th at was to acquire the property. 
The case has been in litigation ever since. In 1996, [Judge 
Chairez] ruled that the condemnations were unconstitutional 
and illegal. In a harshly worded 65-page opinion. the judge 
found that the agency had "se l itself up as an enti ty only unlo 
ilself." The court found th ai the agency ignored many statutes 
and procedures. For example, the supposed j'lIstification for 
the condemnation was that the area was blighted. However, 
the surveys of the area revea led no blight , and in fact, no one 
had even surveyed Mrs. Pappas' block. 
2~1 hi. at 43, 
2~2Id., No. 39255 (Nev. Aug. 21. 2002) (granting motion. motion to expedite the 
briefing. and resolution of appeal). 
21d DA"A i1r:Rl. INGER. CASTLE COALITION. GOVERNMENT TllErr: TIlE T op 10 
AFllISE~ OF E\J1NENT DOMAIN: 1998-2002, at 8 (2002), Il~'ailable at hnp:l/www. 
casllccoalilion.orgilOp_ 10_abw;cs/top_1 O_rcport.pdf l hereinafter GOVERNMENT 
THEFI]. See QI.IO Yin SllprynowiCl., Cotllmn, The Most Valuable Corner in the 
World . ELKO DAILY FREE PRESS. Mar. 6, 1996. reprinted in L1HERTARIAN ENTER. 
P]{!~E . Mar. 1996, hltp:llwww.wcblcyweb.com/tlcllc96030I.htm!. 
264 Craig OHman. The 10 Most Corrupi Cities ill Americtl. G EORGE, Mar. 1998. at 
90, (IVai/able (1/ 1998 WL 3 t007411. For adwrtisements attacking the casino interests 
of Stevo;: Wynn. Bill Boyd, and Jackie Gaughan as wdl a~ Becky. Ted, and Jack Bin-
ion as those interest interfaced with the Pappus case. see EminCfu DUI/win or Emi· 
nem Thievery. LAS Y E(;AS REV.,J., May 20. 2003. at B3: Eminent Domain Cuse 
Draws Natiollal Ourrage, L AS V I:GAS REV. -J., Apr. 1. 2003, at B3. 
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On March 29, 2000. Ihe Nevada Supreme Cou rt threw out 
the city's second loo-early appeal and warned the city's attor-
neys against providing fur ther "misleading" information. Af-
ter a series of judges recused themselves for accepting 
campaign contribu tions from casino interests, the Nevada Su-
preme Court fuled that campa ign contri butions did not dis-
qualify judgcS.26$ 
On September 8, 2003, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that 
the taking of the Pappas's property in 1993 by the Las Vegas 
Downtown Redevelopment Authority (which was actually the 
Las Vegas City Council) did not violate the eminent domain pro· 
visionsl66 of eit her the U.S. ConstitutionU>1 or the Nevada Con-
st itution.268 This textbook example of eminent domain being 
manipulated to the monetary benefit of casino interests 
prompted the Execlltive Director of the National Coalition 
Against Legal ized Gambli ng to opine: "Does the public expect 
the 'elected' Nevada justices to ru le against Nevada's political 
powerhouses?"269 
This type of case highlighted the larger issues of whether pro· 
gambling interests reflected so much financial and political influ· 
ence that a scofflaw atti[Ude was becoming endemic among those 
interests. In 1994, Professor Robert Goodman 's leading-edge 
book, Legalized Gambling as a Strategy for Economic Develop-
mem, caut ioned the decriminalization of gambling would lead to 
such problems,27o and his conclusions and concerns were echoed 
thereafter in forums such as 1994 and 1995 congressional 
hearings.271 
2t6 GOVERNMEVT THPFr, supra note 263. For morc on the cily's failure to surlley 
the Pappas properly, sec Pappas. No. A327518. For morc on the Nevada Supreme 
Court's dismissal of the city's second appeal. see Mike Zapler, Sell/I'ml'nt Ta/ks 8/" 
Iween City, Family Smiled. LAS VL(;AS REV.·J., Apr. 11. 2000. at lB, available at 
2000 WL 8203861; Ed itorial. Mil'lclIding (he COlr~l. LA~ Vrr;A~ REV.·J., Apr. 11. 
2000, al 68. (l~lIiftrbh' II/ 2000 WL 8203868. The ~lIr reme cml rt"~ ruling on judicial 
recusals is City of La.s Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Eighlh Judicial 
District Court,S P.3d 1059 (Nev. 2.(0). See also Ed Vogel. Slate's High Ct)!lrl Rilles 
frulsr Can Stay 011 Red"I'f'/opmcllt Case, LAS VEGAS I~FV,·J., Aug. 19,2000 al 18: 
alai/able at 2000 WL R21O\9Q. 
"l66 City of Las Vega~ Downtown Redevelopment Agency \'. PIlPpas. 76 P.3d 1 
(Nev. 2003). 
UJ7 U.S. Co"lSTlTlnlON. amend. V. 
268 NEV. COo,;~"T. art. 1 § 8(6). 
269 Tom G rey, Comments lit the National Coalition Against Lega1i7.ed Gambling 
Annual Conference (Sept. 25-27, 2(03). 
2'0 R OUERT GOODMAN, LH;AL1ZED GAMDLI"IG A~ A STRATE(lY FOR E(,ONO,"l1C 
DLVLLOI'MENT 16·19 (1994). 
2" See gef/erlllly, Tilt' NII/knlll/lmpaCI ofCasilw Climb/illS I'roliferalioll: I-learing 
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C. Gambling I flferesls As "Taking It All" 
In 1974, New Jersey voters rejected a sta te constitutional 
amendment tha t would have permitted casino gambling in Atlan-
tic City.2n On November 2, 1976, the voters accep ted a similar 
amendment273 "afte r a long history of a constitutional prohibi-
tion on legalized gCl lll bli ng."274 In this contex t, "the primary dif-
fe rence between the [1974 and 19761 amendments was the fact 
that the Casino Amendment specifically dedicated revenues de-
rived by the State (rom privately owned casino gambling estab-
lishments to projects des igned to aid sen ior citizens and disabled 
residents."27!i 1lle Casino Amendment stated: 
Any law authorizi ng the establishment and operation of such 
gambling estllhlishmcnts shall provide for the State revenues 
derived therefrom to be applied solely for the purpose of pro-
vid ing ... red uctions in property taxes. rental , telephone. gas. 
electric. and municipal uti li ties charges of eligible senior citi-
zens and disabled residents of the State, ... in accordance with 
such formu lae as the Legislature shall by law provide.Z76 
Once the voters had been prompted by the public relations cam-
paign of "benefits to senior citizens" to approve the casino gam-
bling. there was a legislative maneuver designed to redi rect the 
funds for senior citizens back to the benefit of gambling 
interesls,277 
[n 1984, the New Jersey legislature created the Casino Re in~ 
vestment D eve lopment Autho rity.27s 
In this act, casinos are presented with a choice between pllyi ng 
an additiona l tax of 2,5% of gross revenues to the Casino Rev· 
enue Fund for the benefit of scnior citizens and the disabled. 
or making "investments" of one· half of tha t amount (Le .. 
1.25% of gross revenues) in eRDA bonds or other projects 
before the HmlIe Comm. Of/ Small BIU., 103<1 Congo 77·81 (1994) (hereinafter Con-
gres~'ionai Gumbling H'.'lIrillg 1994]; Congr(!tJiOllal Gamblillg Nearing 1995. suprll 
nOle 173. 
272 See U .S. COMM'fo, 0:- TilE Rrv, 01" A NAT'L I'OL'y TOWAItI) GAMHLlt-G. GAM_ 
ilLI:o.C; 11'<1 AMERILA (1976) Ihereinafter U.S. Cml\1'''! GAMHLI,uj. 
2i3 N.J. Cor.s!. IIrt. IV. § 7, para. 2 ("Casino Amendment"). 
27-1 Press Relcusc. Curella. Byrne. Bain, Gilfillan. Cecchi. Stewart & Obtein, 
Carella, Byrne, Buill, Gilfillan. Cecchi. Stewart & Oislein: Senior Groups Join To-
gether in Suit to Protel.:l Their Share of Ca~ino Revenues (June 20, (997), avuililble 
ut WL. Allnewsplus [hc:reiuafter Grou~ J()in Togcthcr]. 
27S Id. 
276 NJ. Co;o.S'!. un. IV, § 7, para. 2. 
2n Set GroUI)!; Join Together. supra nOle 274. 
278 NJ . STAT. AI'o;o./. § 5:12-153 (Wesl 1996). 
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approved by e RDA .... Given this "choice," casinos have ob-
\'iously made the eRDA investments, thereby re laining 1.25% 
of their gross reve nues and depriving the Casi no Revenue 
Fund of an addition al 2.5% of the casino's gross reve nues. 
Upon information and belief, ove r $400 mi lli on has been so 
'-invested" by the casinos.279 
To reclaim these funds. large groups of New Jersey senior citizens 
filed suit in 1997 against New Jersey. the state treasurer, and the 
Casino Reinvestment Development Authori ty for the unconstitu-
tiona l use of hundreds of millions of dollars of reve nue de rived 
fro m casino gambling.2llo 
D. Gam bling I n lereJ/s As "Above the Law": Stare Examples 
I. New York 
Even after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Cente r, pro-gambl ing lobbyists callously pushed through previ-
ously stalled legislation authorizing new casinos in New York 
State .1S1 Although an arguable violat ion of the New York Con-
st itution (which req uired two successive legislatures to app rove a 
constitutional change regarding gambling),282 Gov. George 
V'J Groups Join Together. ~upru note 274 (citation ommed). For statutory lan-
guage regard ing taxes and i n \"esI Illcnt~. see NJ. Sr,\I". Ar-"I. § 5:12-144.1 (West 
1996). 
280 Groups Join '!Ogether. supra note 274. 
281 New York leaders put ongoing discussions about gambling on hold after the W 
11 attacks. Tom Precious, Tl'rroris/ AI/acks Dela}' Key II/Itlali~·es. BI. F FALO r-.:EW~. 
Sept. 20. 2001, at BI. available (If 200t WL 6358040. Discussions eventually re-
turned to the casino legIslation because of its potential for economic development 
lind increased state revenues, especially in the face of economic losses suffered by 
the 9/11 attacks. Marc Humbert. POSf-Terrori.51 Attacks, Patak; lind Legis{tlilire Eye 
Gambling Expamion. A~S0<"1A nm P~ESS NEW~WI RES. Oc!. 24. 2001. Ilvuilable lit 
WL Allnewsplus. Sec also Tom Precious & Jerry Zremski, Challengers Prepure 
Lawsuil. BUFTALO Nf!w~. Oct. 28, 2OCH. a t At, al'ai/ahle at 2001 WL 6362624 ("'I 
find it immoral that our Legislature would use the tragedy of the attack on the 
World Trade Center as (l. rationale for victimizing the most vulnerable in our com-
munities on the altar of casinos and slot machines.' said the Rev, G. Stanford 
Brallon. "). 
282 Generally, legislative approval of a casino would require a consti tutional 
change, ~hich would have to he approved by two successive legislut ive sessions. Joel 
Stashenko, Bruno, Si/I'er Say Gambling Tlllks Drivel! by POl·I -Sep f. 11 Revemlc Lon, 
ASSOCIATED PKES!> NbW~WIKf"..s. Oct. 2~ 2001. {lvailable (II WL. Allnewsplus. The 
two-session rcquiro.:mcnt was not applied to the legislation that approved Indian 
casinos. leading to II luwsuit challenging the lcgal ity of the casinos. !d.; James M. 
Odato. UWSfjil ChuffcnXCl' Gamillg LIIW, TJME~ UNION (Alh~ny. N.Y.). Jan. 30. 
2002. at B4. availllble UI 2002 WL 8887949. 
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Pataki (R) signed the bill into law in 2001.283 The constitutional-
ity of this legislation was immediately challenged by state Sen. 
Frank Padavan (R), Assemblyman Will iam L. Parment (D), the 
Saratoga Chamber of Commerce, and other plaintiffs via attor-
ney Cornelius D. Murray.2!W 
If the socio-economic cost/benefit analysis of the New York ca-
sino proposals were negative and unconvincing to economists 
and legislators before the 9/11 attacks, then the costlbenefits 
were not changed by the 9/11 attacks. The only change was the 
new atmosphere of ill-advised and panicked decisionmaking 
which allowed the 200 I New York casino proposal to move for-
ward and be legalized. 
On June 12,2003, Murray won a parallel New York case, Sara-
loga County Chamber of Commerce v. Patak; in a 4-3 decision of 
the New York Court of Appeals,285 which held that the gove rnor 
could not bypass the sLate legislature when authorizing tribal 
casinos. 2!:!6 The net effect was to invalidate a ten-year-old com-
pact between Gov. Mario Cuomo and the Akwesasne Mohawks 
for a casino in Hoganburg, New York. 287 The U.S. Supreme 
Court declined to hear the case, thereby affirming Murray's win 
in Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce.288 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt conquered the Great Depres-
sion without legalizing casinos. because decriminalized gambling 
would catalyze destructive economic policies. However. in 2001. 
New York's legislators ignored the fundamental economic princi-
ples of legalized gambling, as well as (he New York Constitution, 
and licensed more casinos. 
2. I"diana 
The fast-shuffle tactics of pro-gambling interests and their fail-
ure to comply with state constitutional provisions was exempli-
fied by their unconstitutional legislative gambling mandates in 
28J Carolyn Thompson, Pataki Signs Gambling BilIlnlO Law, TIMES UNION (Al-
bany. N.Y.), Nov. 1. 2001. at 82. a~'ailab{e at 2001 WL 24817715. 
284 Shaila K. Dewan, Fighting Gambling, While Keeping His Hand In. N.Y. TI"'ES, 
May 14. 2002, at 82, available at LEXIS. News & Business. News, Ne .... 'S, All (En-
glish, full Text). 
28!'i Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce. Inc. v. I'atald. 798 N.E.2d 1047 (N.Y. 
2003). cerr. denied. 124 S. Ct. 570 (2003) (mem.). 
286 lei. 
mid. 
2118 /d.: SupfI'me Co,lIt Refuses 10 !lear II/dion Gombling Case. AsSOCIATED 
PRESS NFWSWI RFS. Nov. 17.2003. available al WL. Allnewsplus. 
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New York after t he 9/11 tragedy.2K'I Yet even without a national 
tragedy as a PR impetus, pro·gambling interests evidence little 
regard fo r pre-existing legislat ive and constitutional safeguards, 
as was exempl ified in Indiana in 1993. During a 1993 special ses-
sion of the lndiana General Assembly, convened by Gov. Evan 
Bayh (D) to pass the 1994·95 biennial budget, a separate bill that 
authorized casino gambling on riverboats but failed during the 
regular session "was attached as an amendment to the budget bi ll 
during a conference committee."290 This logrolled bill was 
quarterbacked by state Sen. Earline Rogers (Df91 and passed by 
both houses of the General Assembly; although it was vetoed by 
Gov. Bayh, the General Assembly repassed the budget bill into 
law.Z>l2 Thus, the gambling riverboat language was codified.29'\ 
A group of Indiana citizens filed suit against the state in 
SchuLz. Phillips & Becker v. Indiana .2'101 The suit claimed the 
gambling riverboat legislat ion violated the foUowing state const i-
tutional provisions: 
1. "'111e General As~crnbly shall not grant to any citizen ... 
pr ivileges or immunit ies, whiC\ upon the same terms, 
shall not belong to all citizens"? ~ 
2. all legislative acts should be limited " to one subject lind 
matters properly connected therewith·,;296 and 
3. "[iJn all the cases ... and in all other cases where a ge neral 
law ca n be made applicable, all laws shall be tencral, and 
of uniform operation throughout the Stale.,,2 
As in other states, the net effect of the Indiana gambling 
riverboat legislation was arguably to establish a special class of 
gambling owners with de facto gambling monopolies within their 
geographic markets (which also crossed state lines into non-ca-
sino states).298 
2!1'l See ~'upru notes 2f:H!4 & accompanying text. 
2'K1 Amended Complain t paras. 7-8, al 2-3. Schull. No. 31C01·96W·CI'·214 (CiL 
Ct .. Harrison County. Ind. fi led June 30,1998). 
29t Cam Simpson, Legisll1lh" Willers Were Choppy [or (l LOllg TIme, EV,,"'''-VILLE 
COl}IIIH!. Oct. 24,1993. al 15A. a~ailabll' al 1993 WL 6174583. 
292 Amended Complaint paras. 8-10. al 2-3, Schulz, ;-'0. 3IQU·9610-CP-214. 
2'13 1"'1). Com:: § 4·33·3·1 (2001). 
294 Amended Complaint. ScJl/Ilz. No. 3JCOI-96IO·CP·214. 
29~ I ND. CoNST. art. I, § 23. 
296M art. [V. § 19. 
zw /d. art. IV. § 23. 
2'lgSu generally Gamblillg Subsidizl'd by Taxpayers, supra note 171. See also 
John Warren Kindt, Legaliling Gambling Acril'ilies. The /smes Inl'0/1'1II8 Markel 
Sall/raltOn. 15 N. ILL. U. L. R"v. 271 (\995). 
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The Indiana case was appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court 
via a petition to transfer,299 but it was not heard on its merits due 
to an ironic procedural twist which virtually prohibited a major-
ity vole o f the justices. 
Only Chief Justice Shepa rd voted to deny the petition on the 
merits. Justices Dickson and Rucker voted to grant the peti-
tion. Justice Boehm voted to deny the petition. but only be-
cause Justice Sull ivan could not part icipate. Remember, 
Justice Sullivan had a con fli ct because he was the state Budget 
Director when the Gambling Statute was logrolled in with the 
budget bill. Justice Boehm specifically noted that he thought 
the issue was of great public importance.300 
The vote was two justices in favor of granting the petition to 
transfer , two aga inst, and one abstention due to a potential con-
tlict of interest.301 Thus, the case of unconstitutionality was 
never decided on its merits. 
3. Sowh Carolina 
During the 19905 South Carolina served as the pre-eminent ex-
ample of a state dominated by pro-gambling interests.3D2 Ln 1985 
a gambling provision slipped unnoticed into South Carolina legis-
lat ion,303 and this provision, coupled with a 1991 South Carolina 
Supreme Court decision allowing de facto payo uts, precipitated a 
massive influx of video gambling machines into the state.304 At 
the cost of his own politica l career, as both a governor and a 
potent ial vice-preside nti al candidate, Soulh Caro lina Gov. David 
Beasley (R) courageously legislated the VGMs out of the state, 
299 See Brief in Opposition \0 Transfer, Schulz. 741 N.E.2d 1259 (Ind. filed Sept. 
5.2(00). 
JOO Letter from Richard A. Waples. plaintifrs attorney. 10 Waller Schulz el al.. 
plainliffs (Dec. 12,2000) (on fi le with Richard A. Waples). 
301 Schuh, 741 N.E.2d 1259 (Ind. 2000) (table). 
302 See. e.g. , NGISC FI'IAI. REPORT. yupra nOle 77. al cbs. 2·J. 
303 S.c. CoilE ANN. § 16·19-60 (1985). The words "money or property" were 
struck from the Slatutory ban against distributions from gambling machines via state 
Sen. Jack Lindsay (D). See. e.g .. Margaret N. O'Shea, Video·Poker Ban Pre.UflIS 
Obstacles. AUG\J~TA CHHONICLE. June II. 2000. <II AI. avmlable at WL. SC-News. 
For the most comprehensive analysis of court cases related to pathological gamhling 
and gambling's interface with the political. social and economic environments. sec 
R. Randall Bridwell & Frank L. Quinn. From Mad Joy To Misfortune: The Merger 
of Law and Politics in the World of Gambling. 72 MISS. L.J. 565 (2002) [hereinaflcr 
Ti,e Merger of Law and Politics in Gamblingj. Sec also NGISC FINAl. R£POR1. 
supra nOle 77. at 2-5. 
304 Slate v. Blackmon. 403 S.E.2d 660 (S.c. 1991). 
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and they were gone by 2000.305 At its height in the mid-1990s. 
the South Carolina gambling interests were estimated to be 
grossing an amount nearly half the size of the en tire state 
budge(J06 and keeping almost thirty percent of the gr055.301 Mul-
tiple cases involving pathological gamblers resulted in multi-mil-
lion-dollar judgments against the owners of VGMS.308 However, 
collecting those judgments from elusive, corrupt, and sometimes 
criminal VGM owners was difficult and time-consuming.309 
4. West Virginia 
The West Virginia scenario exemplifies the gambling principle 
of "migration of illegality." Once the South Carolina VGMs 
were de {acto recriminalized in 2000, many of the VGMs moved 
into other states. such as Georgia and West Virginia. and the 
VGMs began operating illegally. In 2002. in Georgia. the legisla-
ture refused to legalize the VGMs,31O which was the scenario in 
practically every other state. However, in West Virginia the ille-
gal machines were progressively legalized in specialized legisla-
tion, particularly in 2001 with specific legislative strong-arming 
by Gov. Bob Wise (D).311 By 2003, West Virginia had legalized 
9,049 VGMs, specifically video lottery terminals (VLTs). at the 
four racetracks in Charles Town, Chester, Nitro, and Wheel-
305 The Merger of Law ollli Politics in Gambling. supra note 303. at 590-98: Jim 
Drinkard & William M. Welch. Gambling Induslry Ups Ihe Anlt' in Polilics. USA 
TODAY. Jan. 8. 1999. at A8. a~'ailablt' at 1m WL 6831072 [hereinafter Gambling 
1m/1m')' Ups AniI' in Politics]; see Rick Bragg. End Videa Poker Gambling, Sowh 
Carolina Cilief Urgl!s. N.Y. TIMES. Jan 22. 1998, at A14, available at LEXIS. News & 
Business. News. News. All (English, Full Text) [hereinafter End Video Gambling]. 
J06 ld. 
307 'd. South Carolina gambling interests grossed $1.5 billion. according 10 state 
figures in 1999. the same year the South Carolina's state budget was $5.3 billion. Set 
NOISC F INAL REPORT. supra note 77. at 2-5 (leiter from D. John Taylor. Manager. 
South Carolina Department of Revenue. 10 the National Gambling Impact Study 
Commis5ion (Apr. 26. 1999)); LIJwmakers Rewrn to Finish Budget, Other Business. 
H ERALD (Rock Hill. S.C.).lune 23. 1m. at 9A. a~(Jilable at 1999 WL 9648271. SI't' 
also End Vidl'o Poker Gambling. sllpra nOle 305: Gambling Industry Ups the AliiI' ill 
Palilics. supra note 305. 
JOg See generally The Merger of Law and Politics in GIJl1Iblillg. sUI"a note 303. 
J09 See generally id. 
31Q Rhonda Cool:. u.s. iudge Halts Use of Poker Machillts. ATLAJ<,"TA J.-Co'JST .. 
Jun. 26. 2002. at Bl. al'ai/abll! 0/2002 WL 3n7664: Bill Rankin & Rhonda Cool:. 
Vuieo Poker Loses Bel an Georgia High CO/In. ATLAVTA J.-CONST .. May 29. 2002. 
at AI. available tu 2002 WL 3n4236. 
311 Randy Coleman. Wise Signs Video Poker Legislalian. AsSOCIATED PRESS 
NEWSWIRES. May 8, 2001, available ill WL Allnewsplus. reprlflled as W. Va. Gover-
nor MO~'es Ahead with Videa-Poker Strtuegy. ROANOK!: TI.\l!:S. May 9. 2001. at A5. 
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ing. 1l2 Another 5.275 machines were located in ba rs and restau-
rants.:m Apparently in contravent ion of the West Virginia 
Constitution, the state'S '·take·' from its VGMs was li ed to spe-
cialized legislative programs.Jl4 Represented by Jackson County 
attorney Larry Harless, citizens groups filed a lawsuit 0 11 June 11. 
2003. claiming that Ihe West Virginia Lottery was not enforcing 
existing laws and VLT regulations. and that the VGMs consti-
tuted an "economic threat. ' -]15 Summarized in 1994 and recon-
fi rmed throughout the next decade. the socia-economic costs of 
new legalized gambling activities were $3 for eve ry $1 in bene-
fits.1\(, Lewisburg attorney Barry Bruce and Paula McLaugh lin . 
treasurer of the Greenbrier Count y Coalit ion Against Gambling 
Expansion, noted that not one sta le with widespread ga mbling, 
including Nevada,Jl7 was "really well off financially." J18 
Appealed directly and quick ly to the West Virginia Supreme 
Coun, the petition filed by Harless claimed thc video poker ma-
chine payouts were --rigged ... to ensure that ovcr time, almost 
all players lose their money."UY Tn the context of marketing. the 
112 Palll 1. Nyden. Groups Fi/j' S,d, to Siwi 00\\11 Video Gllmblillg. CHi\flLl'.:>fOl'> 
GALLTfL, JUI1, 12. 2003. at 12A. al ai/ahle 1112003 WL 546X822 [hcrcmuftcr Slut fo 
ShU! Do"'" Video Gambling I. 
113ld . 
• 114 Sfe. e.g .• id . 
. ~IS lri 
11/\ CQlIsreniollll1 Gambhllg lIeuring 1994. ~Ilpra nOlc 271, 71-81 & nn.9. 12 
(statement of Johll Warrell Kindt, Professor. Li ll l\-ersi ly of 11!imllS li t Urbunu-Chaln-
paign). &1' II/SO John Warrell Krndt. /I!I' tJlIsll1l'Sy-Economic fmpu('ls of LH;l'fIll'd 
CtI.J;I/O Gllmbling ill Wesl Virginia; Short-Term Gllill Hili Lung- Term Pllil!. 13 W. 
VA. U. 1'l'1l AF'F. REI'. 22 (1996), a~mlabfe at http://www.polsei w ... u.ed ulfacultyl 
dilger/I'S321IrcpoTt t3.22.htm Ihcrcinaftcr Hllslfle~y-ECOIIQmk ImptlCIS of GIIIII-
bling]: Earl L. Grinols & David 8. MU5tllrd. Bllsilless PrufilllbililY Versuy Social 
I'ro/illlbilUy: Evailiuling Imlllsif/('~ wilh £rlerrllllilh'l, Ihe Case of CllsillOS. 22 .\1,\",,,, 
m·II.lAL & D~Xl~IU." ECON. 143. 153 (2001). IIH/illlble ar http://www. terry.uga.cdul 
~d!lluslun.l!profitability.pdf Ihereinufter The Cas~ 0/ Casil1o.~ J: Ca~ino~ and Crime, 
supru nole 197: Earl L Grinols & Dilvid 11. Mustard, A/llnagement and Informariof1 
lS~II~~ for If!(lrntr;~s with Extemillitil'~: The ellSt ofCasirJO GumbltllK. 22 MAl'>At.L-
N.IAL & D EC1S10'< Eco'·. I (2001). (/I'lli/oble at http://w\\w. busincs~.uiuc.edulgri nolsl 
pdf/Paper82-300(.T02.pdf. See tupra note 205 and accompanying text. 
min 2003. ;.Ie ... ada GOY Kenny Guinn (R) slaled In his. Stale of the State address 
lhal luxCS from gambling sources were unrehable and poor .heal pohey. Nevada 
Gov. Kenny Guinn. State of the Slale Address to the Nc\'ada Lcgi~laturc (1l1n. 20. 
2003). uvoilllb/e at hnp:lfgov.state.M'.usJsos2003.hlm. 
ll~ See Suit 10 Shul Do .... n Video Gambling. supra note 312. Set. t.R .. John War-
ren Kindt. Column. Time 10 Clfl Bl'llfr 01'111 '~irJr Casillos. or Take Them Over. Cm. 
SI,;N-TIMLS. June 4. 2003. al 51. aL'ailahlt at 2003 WL 9554955. 
~1'1 Sun 10 511111 Down Video GamMing. wlJrIl nOle 312, Compare M .. Willi l"ree 
Credil. )'lIpru note 10. (providing formulae fo r "gambler's rum"), 
. 
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petition also claimed the West Virginia Lottery was "violating 
state law by engaging in iUegaJ 'advertising and promotional ac-
tivities to ent ice and induce persons to gamble, or gamble 
more.' "320 
On Oct. 17,2003, three justices of the West Virginia Supreme 
Court issued their opinion that had the net effect of Jeaving in 
place the state's VGMS?21 However, concurring Justice 
Starcher's "lament instead of a dissent" was illustrative of the 
dilemmas faced by the judicial community:322 
Professionally, I think that the Legislature, which has over-
whelmingly [actually a procedural one-vote margin in 2001] 
and repeatedly voted to establish a massive, statew ide, govern-
ment-operated gClmbling system in West Virginia-and to fi-
nance a significant pieee of our public budget from that 
system- has the legal right to do so under our Constitution. 
Personally, I question whether it is right or wise for my gov-
ernment to set up and operate this massive, statewide, govern-
ment-operated gambling system-and to use, in managing this 
system, thousands of privately-man<lged sites that are impossi-
ble to supervise and monitor; and to also use thousands of 
gambling devices that are known to be especially dangerous 
and addictive; and then to make il next to impossible for fu-
lure generations to Qlocel, revamp, or restrict this system, be-
cause of the legal obli¥ation to payoff bonds that are based on 
gambling revenues?2 
Evidently, the justices had the opportunity to dist inguish the 
court and reinforce the rule of law by restraining the West Vir-
ginia gambling bureaucracy via writs of mandamus. The oxymo-
ron of this case was that the court declined to restrain the 
gambling bureaucracy based on apparent political considerations 
rather than adhere to a strict interpretation of the West Virginia 
Constitution as supported by the practical facts. 
5. Nebraska 
Unlike the West Virginia Supreme Court in 2003, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court adhered to a strict interpretation of the 
state const itutional safeguards and rebuffed attempts by pro-
gambling interests to circumvent those safeguards. Loonrjer v. 
Robinson highlights the necessity for the judicial system to incor-
3Z(l Suir 10 Shul Down Video Gambling, supm note 312. 
321 State ex reI. City of Charleston v. W.V. Econ. Dev. Auth., 588 S.E.2d 655 
(W.V. 2003). 
322/d. at 614 (Starcher. J., "concurring and lamenting"). 
323/d. See W.V. CONST. art . VI § 36. 
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porate and apply the public policy safeguards inherent in state 
constitutions.J24 This case exemplifies the confrontation between 
public policy safeguards in a state constitution and the over-
whelming monetary power of the gambling industry. 
Throughout the twentieth century, more than two-thirds of the 
state constitutions had total prohibitions andlor other provisions 
against gambling because of the overwhelming socia-economic 
negatives. 325 In their attempts to expand various types of gam-
bling during the 1980s and 1990s, the enormous PR dollars of 
pro-gambling interests positioned lotteries as being able to gen-
erate revenues for social programs-if voters would amend their 
state constitutions to allow gambling. Misleading terminology in 
these constitutional referenda often removed all prohibitions 
against gambling instead of merely permiuing lotteries. The ex-
plosion of various gambling proposals during the 1990s for casi-
nos, off-track betting parlors, electronic (slots) gambling venues, 
and other gambling facilities was driven by state legislative lob-
bying absent the constitutional standards, erased by lottery 
"legalization. " 
As a result, public votes on any gambling proposals became 
rare. Where pro-gambling interests were forced into scenarios 
requiring public votes, there were frequent allegations of pro-
gambling interests' utilizing "fronts,"326 bogus "citizen 
324 Loomjer v, Robinson. 670 N.W.2d 301 (Ncb. 2003). 
J25 Business-Economic Impacts of Gambling, ,'upra note 316. al 21. 22. 
J2~ In one well ·known example, two supposedly "objective" public officials wrote 
opinion-editorials on behalf of two casinos. One officia l was James Treffinger, the 
executive for Essex County. New Jersey, whose column was pnblisbed in New 
Jersey's largest newspaper, Tlte Slar Ledger, 
Little did Treffinger and The Star-Ledger know that the Ocean Coumy Oh-
scn'er published an identical column IWO days earlier. That column ap-
pc.1.red under the byline of Ii, George Buckwald, chairman of Ihe Ocean 
County Planning Board. Both columns were copied nearly verbatim from 
a "s~mple opinion-editorial" wrinen by M\VW/Straiegic Communications 
of East Rutherford. 'Ihe company sent Ihe column along with a four-page 
"fact-sheet" 10 stale politician\ in an effort to defeat the tunne l project 
[Ihat would benefit another casino competitor]. 
Ami- Tramel TUClic Buck/ires. Jrn'L GAMING & WAGERING Bus .. July 1996. at 12 
TIle press should h~l\'e asked if either or both of these "objective" public officials 
were offered honoraria for their writings- a question recommended by the Coltun-
hia JOllmarism Review when gambling issues are covered by the press. SwpheTi J. 
Simurda. When Gambling Comes to TowlI. COLU M. JOURNAUSM R.. Jan.fFeb, 1994. 
at 36-38. available at 1994 WL 12802626 /hereinafter Wh~1l Gambling Com"s to 
Hllvn ]. 
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groups,"327 and even intimidation tactics against local busi-
nesses.328 When petit ions were required, pro-gambling in terests 
had millions of dollars to back petition drives, paying those circu-
lat ing the pe titions $2 to $3 for each signat ure obtained from a 
registered vorCr.329 Critics frequen tly attacked these petition 
drives as be ing misleading and includ ing fraudulent signatures-
as typified by pro-gambling petition drives in Florida (1994),J30 
Arka nsas (1996).33] and Missouri (1998),332 Furtbermore, wh~n 
pro-gambling interests fail in the ir votes to expand gambling. 
they have huge financial coffers to support multiple rcvotes.J]) 
321 See. e.g .. John Carlson, Only 1»'0 Members: Ciri~ens' Group flaid by Argosy. 
DES MOINES REG .• O(\. 20. 1994. at Al (a $100.000 adllertising budget to promote a 
gambling proposition was paid by a (usino wmpuny \'ia a "citizens group" wnsisting 
of 1\>,0 people). See generul/y When Gambling Comes 10 Town . supra note 326. at 
36. 37 ("follow the money"). 
328 See, e.g.. Tim Buckwalter. East Towne Store /:.\'ic/ed. Nr:w ERA (Lancaster. 
Pa.), Oct. 16.1995. at A1 (eviction notice arrived just days aft er a business owner 
expressed concerns in a news article about the off-track belling parlor proposed for 
a nearby section of the mall ). For instances involving the intimidation of u(udcmics. 
sec CongressiOfWI G(IInbling Hearing 1994. supra nOie 271. at 4. 12. 
In another example. during the Nov. 4. 2003, election. pro-gambling interests were 
accused of pressuring citizens and businesses to suppOrt a c.1sino in Fren(h Lick:. 
Indiana: 
Some Orange County residents say they have been threatened for refusing 
to suppOrt a pro~ed casino in the French Lick area. They charge that 
casino backers- including state Rep Jerry Denbo. who led the legislati\e 
push to bring gambling 10 Orange County- have u~d the ir clout to 
threaten loss of county contracts and 10 otherwise apply pressure. 
,2~ Grace Schneider. Some Hoosiers Fceling Pressllfe 10 Buck Casino. COlJRIER-J. 
(Lou isville. Ky.), Oct. 20. 2003. at IA. (H'ai/abfe (1/ 2003 WL 65380910. Orange 
County Sheriff Doyle Cornwell chaired the pro-gambling group, Citizens for the 
Future of Orange County. and carried "a box of signs in the trunk of his squad car 
and ~aid he delivers them-while on duty-to supporters" after being assured he 
COUld. M 
John Warren Kindt. US. Nutionu/ SemrifY and rhe Srrategic Economic 8ase.· The 
Business/Economic Impuc/s of the Leg(lii;:(l/ion o/Cumb/mg A ail·ities. 39 ST. Lol·lS. 
U, LJ, 567. 571 n.24 (1995) [hercillaftcr Slfmcgic Economic Basel. 
JJO /d. Martin Dyckman. Column, Misleuding rhe Public. ST. PFTr.RsnURG TIMES. 
Nov. 1. 1994. Ht 13A. ovailable at 1m WL 54329601. 
131 Michelle Hillier. Man) Signu/ure~ Forged Oil Petition Expert Says. ARK. DnJo.. 
CRAT-GAZETTE (Little Rock, Ark.) , Oct. 4, 19%. at IB, (lvai/ubfe (1/ http://li-
h rary.a rdemgaz.com: Michelle Hillier. bUllliry COllsidere(1 mlO Forgcry Cluims on 
Amenrimel1l Pelitiom. ARK. DE"10CR.AT-GAZETIE (Liule Rock. Ark.). Oct. 5. 1996. 
at IA. available at http://library,ardemgaz.com. 
332 Paul Sloca. Scores of Signature:., SIWp08cdly 0/. "' ASSOClUted Press flo/. Ser-
~Ice. July 17, 1998. (Il'ui/uble (1/ 1998 WL 7430312, repriflled in Fah'c Sigllature.~ Are 
FOImd 011 Gamblillg Amendmem Peli/lon~. ST. LOL: JS Pos'I-DISPATCH, July 18. 1998. 
at A3. 
333 Follow tire Money. supra note 174, at 94. 
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In Missouri, there were two statewide votes rejecting or re-
stricting casinos within a period of only one and a half years 
before the third vote permitted them?34 In Parkville, Missouri. 
casino interests lost three votes before winning the fourth refer-
endum in two years by seventy-five votes?3S In Detroit, casinos 
were rejected three times by voters during the 1980s and 1990s 
before the casinos won the fourt h referendum. 330 Ethicists 
pondered whether there ever could be another referendum that 
might oust any of these casinos, or was there a de jure or de facto 
proh ibition against the voters ever having such a vote.:m Would 
these scenarios destroying the electoral process be patently 
unconstitutional? 
In this historical context, Loonljer held that there could be no 
finess ing of the Nebraska constitutional safeguards338 requiri ng a 
sworn statement of t he names of the individual sponsors and 
mone tary contributors339 to the petition init iative . .340 Writi ng fo r 
the court, Justice Connolly sanguinely concluded that "knowing 
the petition's sponsor could affect the public's view about an ini-
tiative petition .... [A) petition sponsored by a large casino 
might have less appeal to some mem bers of the publi c than a 
petition sponsored by local citizens.,,341 Philosophical support to 
Ms. Pat Loontjer, tile p laintiff, was suppli ed by Gambling with 
the Good Li fe, a remarkably successful anti-gambling group, rep-
resented by Dan Hazuka, Lyle Japp, and Jon Krutz. who gave 
national recognit ion to tile Nebras ka Supreme Court's strong 
stand in reaffi rm ing policy provisions safeguarding the public 
welfare .342 
334 /(f .• Terry Ganey & Mark Schlinkmann. GOP's Tidal Wave CmslzeI Demo· 
crlllS: Hancock II Oul: 510/ Gam,'S Ill. ST_ LOUIS PosT-D IsPATCH. Nov. 9.1994. at 
AI. available at 1994 WL 8208472. 
:H5 Follow Jhe MOlley. supra note 174. 
336 See S!ipra notes 141-43 and accompanying text. 
)37 See generally Follow tlte MOlley. supra note 174. 
338 NEB. CONST. arl. III §§ 2. 4. 
339 1939 Ncb. Laws. ch. 34. sec. 13. at 184-85. 
J4(l Loont]cr v. Robinson. 670 N.W.2d 301. 307-308 (Neb. 2003). 
341 Id. at 309. 
342 Comments of Dan HalUka. Lyle lapp. lon Krutz. and Pat Loontjer, National 
Coalition Against Legalized Gambling Annual Conference (Sept. 25-27. 2003). 
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E. Gambling Interests as Saviors or /:'xpfoiters of Native 
American Sovereignty? 
Under the 1988 Indian Gambling Regulatory Ace43 [hereinaf-
ter IGRA), the pursuit of expanded Native American gambling 
resulted in a plethora of cases during the 1990s. Driven by the 
enormous profits in Native American gambling and by sovereign 
hubris, numerous test cases were filed by Native American gam-
bling interests after the enactment of lORA. The most signifi-
cant test cases were developed with the goals of: (1) expanding 
the scope of Native American sovereignty in multiple legal issue 
areas, (2) acquiring new lands and assets either adjacent, or even 
non-adjacent to tribal lands (collectively known as "after-ac-
quired property" issues), (3) expanding or even forcing, gambling 
into new geographic feeder markets,344 and (4) expanding, or 
even forcing, new types of gambling into pre-existing feeder mar-
kets (e.g., illegal Internet gambling).345 
In this context , the Time cover story on December 16, 2002, 
was a scathing expose on rampant abuses perpetrated by gam-
bling interests on Ihe overall welfare of U.S. Native American 
populalions.346 IGRA is "so riddled with loopholes, so poorly 
written, so discriminatory and subject 10 such conflicting inter-
pretation that 14 years [after IGRA's enactment], armies of high-
priced lawyers are still debating the definition of a slot ma-
343 25 u.s.c. §§ 2701-21 (1994). TIle IGRA was enacted to regulate tribal gam-
bling after gambling interests won their test case which opened the door to wide-
spread tribal gambling. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.4&) U.S. 202 
(1987). 
344 Although there were no Indian reservations or recognized tribes in the state of 
Illinois, in 2000 the Miami tribe filed test cases in Illinois claiming much of the land 
in fifteen lllinois counties. Flynn McRoberts, TTi".: S/ak('s Claim /0 fl/inoiI Lalld. 
011. TRII3, June 14.2000, § I. at I. available at 2000 WL 3675 191. Eventually. it was 
revealed thM a New England developer was funding the test cases being filed by the 
Miami- apparently in hope of settling the test cases for one or more casinos. Devel-
oper FI/llds Case, PANTAf;RAPH (Bloomington, 11 1.). Jan. 10, 2001. at A 1, available ar 
2001 WL 6497374. The Miamis desired 10 locatc the initial casino on lands to be 
(lcljuired near Paxton, Illinois, whieh was in the center of a thirty-five-milc feeder 
market encompassing several large Illinois population base~. A Paxton citizens 
group. largely coordinated by Richard and Donae Porter. was influential in defeat-
ing the Miami tribc 's proposals by exposing embarrassing clements of those propos-
als. The Miamis eventually dropped their test cases. 
>45 See, e.g .. Bill Lambrecht. Missouri Fight~· /0 PI/II P/rjg 011 Illterne/ LOlrery, ST. 
loUI S PosT-DI5I'ATCH, June 8. 1997. at AI. available a/ 1997 WL 3346723. 
346Donald L Barlett & Jamcs B. Steele. Wheel of Mis/ortune, TIM!:. Dec. 16. 
2002. at 44. available at 2002 WL 102387053 [hereinafter Wheel of Mis/or/un" j. 
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chine."347 Instead of regula ting Native American gambling, 
IGRA established an abusive and chaotic system which "dis-
persed oversight responsibilities among a hopelessly conflicting 
hierarchy of locaL state and federal agencies. " 348 
One of IGRA's statutory mandates was to promote triba l eco-
nomic development.349 However, since lORA's enactment in 
1988 there was no evidence of widespread sustainable economic 
benefit. In fact , the '"[r]evenue from gaming [was] so lopsided 
that Indian casinos in five states with almost half the Native 
American population-Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma and South Dakota-account[ed] for less than 3% of 
all casino proceeds."J50 Furthermore, an Associated Press study 
in 2000 concluded that " [d]espite an explosion of Indian gam-
bling revenues-from $100 mi llion in 1988 to $8.26 bi llion a dec-
ade later-an Associa[ed Press computer analysis of federal 
unemployment, . and public-assistance reco rds indica tes the 
majority of American Indians have benefited liule."JSl Although 
there were "new gambling jobs, unemployment on reservat ions 
with established casinos held steady around 54 pe rcent between 
1991 and 1997 as many of the casino jobs were filled wit h non-
Indians, according to data the tribes reported to the Bureau of 
Indian Affai rs. d52 
The evidence demonstrated that Indian gambling did not even 
comply with the relatively weak regulatory scheme of IGRA. As 
early as 1993. a report by the auditor general for the U.S. Depart-
ment of Interior discovered numerous legal violations and regu-
latory problems:353 
[TheJ review identified 37 [of 117 Indian] gaming operations 
that ... were operating in apparent violation of the Act. Also, 
18 management contracts required ... excessive fees total ing 
$62.2 million .... In addition. 13 leasing conlracts existed for 
video gaming equipment thaI cou ld have been purchased for 
$3.2 million but which instead was leased for $40.3 million. 
[MoreoverJ .. . from 1988 through 1992 the U.S. Attorney . .. 
identi fied several instances whe re tribes involved in gam in g 
3471d. 
348ld. 
349 25 u.s.c. § 2702(1) (1994). 
3.50 Wheel of MisfoffUne. Sll.pra note 346. at 47. 
351 Da\·id Pace. Casino Boom Bypasses Indians. AP 0:-1\.11'<1:. Aug. 31. 2000. avaIl· 
llble a/ 2()1)) WL 25992632. reprlllied liS CasillO Boom II BIISI for Most M{"fnber~ of 
jm/ilm T,ibe~. NCWS·GAZElTE (Champaign. TIL). Sept. 2, 2()1)), at At. 
3521d 
353 Follow the Malley. supra note 174. at 85, 92. 
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operations losl approximately $500,000 through theft and 
cmbe721ement.354 
By 1996, the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC), 
which was charged with overseeing Indian gambling was report-
ing that 84 percent of Indian gambling activit ies were in 'non-
compliance;' that is, 84 percent of the tribal gambling activities 
were operating illegally or violating federal regulations.355 
As the twenty-first century began, however, it appeared that 
Native American gambling interests had achieved significant ad-
vances in reaching their sovereignty goals by filing test cases and 
the trends were toward continued political and legal efforts in 
pursuit of these goals. One setback to these goals was the 2003 
case of Lac COllrte OreilLes Band of Lake Superior Chippewa In-
dians v. United States .356 lne case developed on May 11, 2001, 
when Wisconsin Gov. ScOtl McCallum (R) filed a notice of non-
concurrence with U.S. Secretary of the Interior Gail Norton's de-
termination on February 20, 2001. that Chippewa tribes could 
"conduct gaming on lands to be acquired in trust [i.e .. after-ac-
quired property]. . and [that the gaming] would not be detri-
mental to the surrounding community.,,35? The tribal interests 
filed a lawsuit challenging the IGRA requ irement of gubernato-
rial concurrence as unconstitutional.358 
This case highlighted the Interior Department 's negligent dis-
regard, or even ignorance. of the basic socio-economic principles 
of gambling: Gambling activities are almost invariably "detri-
mental to the surrounding community" (which gambling market-
ers designate the "feeder market" J59).360 More importantly, the 
Interior Department apparently did not even reference the na-
tionally authoritative and relevant study on precisely this issue, 
The Economic Impact of Native American Gaming In 
3S4 O~FIC£ [NSPEcrOR GEN .. U.S. DEP'T II'.'Tl::RIOR. AUJ)] r R£J'ORT: ISSUES IM_ 
PACTltoJG I.\IPLEMENTATlO:-l OF Till: I NDIAN GAMI:'<G REGUlJo,TORY ACT. REPORT 
No. 94-1-113. at 4 (1993). 
355 NAT'L l:-oIDIAN GAMING CO).IM·N. RI:I'OR'J To TIlE SJ:CRETARY or TIlE I NTE. 
RIOR ON COMPLIANCE; WITH TilE INDIAN GA.'>lING REGUI, ATORY ACT (1'::196). 
356 259 F. Supp. 2d 783 (W.O. Wis. 2003). 
m'd. at 787. See IGRA. 25 U.S.c. § 2719(b)(l)(A) (1994). 
358 Lac Courte Oreilles Band, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 786. 
359 See GambUng's Crime Multiplier Effecl, supra note 169. See also The Cast' of 
Casillos. supra note 316: Casinos and Crime. supra note 197; SUillo SllJIl 00"'11 
Video Gambling, supra note 3 12. 
Jffl Lac Courte OreWes Band. 259 F. Supp. 2d at 787. 
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Wisconsin .361 
Furthermore, the Final Report of the 1999 U.S. Gambling 
Commission recommended that "comprehensive gambling im-
pact statements" be required before legalizing or authorizing any 
proposals to expand gambling.:'llz Accordingly, it could be con-
vincingly argued that a comprehensive gambling impact state-
mcnt is required before any tribai gambling activities are allowed 
and that those tribal gambling activities that did not perform this 
requirement are in violation of IGRA. Even non tribal gambling 
operations could be required to file a comprehensive gambling 
impact statement. 
In a similar context, the National Environmenta l Policy Act of 
1969.363 requires an "environmental impact statement" for any 
major federal action which cou ld significantly affect the quality 
of the human environmenet>4-which obviously includes gam-
bling facilities on tribal lands under Interior Department aus-
pices or gambling riverboats under the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers. To determine if the environmental impact statement 
can be waived via a "finding of no significant impact ,"~!'i an ini-
tial "environmental assessment" is prepared.306 
For example, in the environmental assessment prepared in 
February 2002 for the proposed Huron Band-Potawatomi casino 
in Calhoun CounlY, Michigan,367 there was no single mention of 
the academic literature relating to the socio-economic cost/bene-
fit ratio of 3:1 in the gambling facilities' feeder markets."'68 Ac-
cord ingly, the finding of no significant impact issued July 31, 
2002. by the Interior Department should not have been issued 
J() I William Thompson el al.. Tire Economic Impact of Nath'c AmuiClln Gaming in 
Wi.fconsilr. WIS. POl:V RE~. I"'ST. R[p .. Apr. 1995 [hereinafler WIS. POl.'y RES. 
INH.]. 
)62 NO iSe FINAl. Rr-PORT, mpra nOle 77, ree. lIS. at p. 3·19; Luurcncc Arnold, 
Pant'i Favors Camblillg Regulations. AP ONLINE. May 18, 1999. aWlllable til 1999 
WL 17804745, reprinted as Pom-' Favors Mandalory 'Camb/iIlS ['1I1)(It'( Reporb' , 
DAIl.Y H F. I!.ALD (Artington !leights, 111.). May 19. 1999, al A9 [hereinafter 
Manllalory 'Camblmg Impact' Rt'poru] . 
.363 42 U.S.c. §§4321-4347 (I~) 
3&1 1d. § 4332(2)(c) (1994): 4() C. F.R . § 1501.4 (2001). See also /I1all(iurory 'Gam-
bling l"'l,act' Reports. stlprl/ nOle 362. 
Jta5 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4. 1508.27 (2001). 
1".., See 4() C.F.R. § 1508.9(a) (200 1). 
"'1 EDAW. I :"IL.. EN I,'II(01'o.\U"'TAI A~SF_"S "'lF.Nr. NOTrAWASI:I'l'l Il uRON BAND 
01 PO"lAWATO:"U INDIANS: CALHOIIN COl I'>"I'V GAMJI'r. F A"I ITY (Fen . 20(2). 
'WI Fm u ~ummary of studies, see The Case of CGIilW.i. Slipra note 316. at 153 
1\»).2, Se:e (li5'0 WIS. 1'01: " RK~. INST .. supra note 361. 
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for both procedural and substantive reasons.369 Primarily on 
other grounds, the Citizens Exposing Truth About Casinos, a 
Michigan nonprofit corporation, filed a lawsuit challenging the 
Interior Department's decision-making processes.370 
In an example involving Caesars Riverboat Casino in Harrison 
County, Indiana, the Corps of Engineers issued a finding of no 
significant impact that was similarly remiss, both procedurally 
and substantively, in not addressing the academic literature/stud-
ies quantifying the 3:1 cost/benefit ratio in the gambl ing facilities' 
self-iden tified feeder markets.37I Skeptics could note that pro-
gambling interests would not want to address the 3:1 cost/benefit 
issue because almost all gambling proposals would fai l this 
shibboleth. 
Finally in 2003, in TOMAC v. Norton, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia overruled a U.S. Bureau of Indian 
Affa irs environmental assessment and finding of no significant 
impact.372 Significantly, the court held that " [t]here is a certain 
common sense appeal to TOMAC's argument that a 24-hour-a-
day casino attracting 12,500 visitors per day to a community of 
4,600 residen ts cannot help but have a signi ficant impact on that 
community.,,]73 llle U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs was ordered 
to analyze "secondary [feeder market?] growth issues"374 be-
cause the court cou ld not decide "whether BIA's decisionmaking 
process was rat ional based on the conclusory statements in the 
record about extensive growth-inducing effects of the casino.'>37S 
F. The Gambling Industry 's PR Legerdemain: Laying Faise 
Predicates for the u.s. Judiciary? 
On December 5, 2003, the U.s. Seventh Circuit issued its deci-
sion on the appeal in Williams v. Aztar.J76 The court indicated 
369 U.S. OI,..'T I NTE KIOR. FINDINO OF No SIUNIFICAN' I IMPACT : PROPOSED NOT. 
TAWASEPPI H URON BAND OF I'OTAWATOMi IN DIA/'S GAMINO FACILITY IN EMM ETI' 
TOWN1>HIP, MICHIGAN (July 31. 2002). 
37() Verified Complaint. CETAC v. Norton. No. 1:02CV01754-TPJ (O.D.c. filed 
Aug. 30. 2002). 
371 See U.s. ARMY COltl':> or ENGINEE RS. ENVIRON)"lENTAL ASSESS'l.I ENT: 
STATEMENT 01" FINDINGS ID No. 199600554-PMR (1998): Press Release. U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers. Corps of Engineers J s~ues Gaming iloat Permit (Feb. 10. 1998). 
J72 TOMAC v. Norton. 240 F . Supp. 2d 4 5. 52-53 (O.O.c. 2(03). 
373 Id. at 52. 
374 /rI. 
375/d. at 52-53 
.l7t Wi lliams Y. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corp, 35 1 F.3d 294 (7 tll Cir. 2003). 
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that during oral argument the plaintiff's counsel did "not point to 
one RICO case on which he relied , ... (much less an analogous 
case). ,,]n However, the court ignored the thirty-seven related 
cases listed in plaintiff-appellant 's brief,m, as we ll as the fact that 
the RICO civil issues in Williams were obviously de 1I0VO for the 
Seventh Circuit, but were being pursued in multiple venues 
throughout the United States . .l79 Furthermore, the court ex-
panded its purview beyond the Seventh Circuifs jurisdiction with 
such a statement but then overlooked the well-known federal 
case JOhllSOIl v. Collins Entertainment Co.3I!O involving RICO, as 
well as similar filings.l81 including the leading-edge POll/OS case in 
Nevada federal district court.:>82 The industry's arguable delaying 
tactics involving cases such as Poulos, which was almost a decade 
old when Williams was argued, appeared to be working in keep-
ing precedent (rom the U.S. Courts of Appea\. 
In addition, the court grouped the casino's sales promotions as 
"nothing more than sales puffery" which demonstrated the 
court's fundamentally flawed assumptions involving the market-
ing of gambling products383 as well as the medical parameters 
delimiting pathological and problem gambling via the American 
Psychiatric Association's Diagnoslic llIuJ Sialistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders.llW 
Once the casino receives actual or constructive notice of the 
plaintiff's pathological gambling, would not further enticements 
from the casino be more than "puffing"-indeed designed to 
take the plaintiff's property unfairly via the re-entrapment of the 
"hooked" gambler (i.e. fraud)? Thereby, such allurements and 
371 lel. at 300. 
3711 Brief of Appellant al iii-v, Williams v. Azlar Indiana G:lrning Corp .. 351 F.3d 
294 (7th Cir. 2(03) (No. 03·1822) Ihercinnfter Williams Appellnnt Brief]. 
~7\1 For a summ:lry of multiple issues and cases involving federal civil RICO ac· 
tions, see for eXRmple, The Mergero[ Law anti Politics in Gambling, supra note 303. 
Su also R. Randall 13ridwcll, Comment VII 101111 Kinch. The Com of Addicted Gam· 
blus: Should tile Slates Initiate Mrga·u/ .... slI;ls Similar 10lhe Tobtlcco Qua?, forth-
coming in MANA(j~II.IAL & D£oSlor. £CON. (2OCl3). 
380 Johnson v Collins Emm't Co .. 199 1-3d 710 (41h Cir. 1999). rrllg. del/it'd. 204 
F.3d 573 (4th CiT. 2000); Johnson v. Collins Entm' t Co .. 564 S.E.ld 653 (S.C 2(02). 
JIll Genlry v. YOlll'C, 522 S.E.2d 137 (S.c. 1999); see also Poulos v. Caesars World, 
Inc" No. CV·5·94·1126·oAE (RJJ) (D. Nev. order cntef..:d Dcc, 19, 1997). 
382 For just one aSj:X:cl of the complicated Pmllos CII'ie (i.e .. certification uf lhe 
c111~ S), see Poulo~ v. Caesars World, Inc .. 2002 WL 1991180 (D. Nev. Juue 25, 2002). 
383 For markelmg fliers, sec Williams Appellanl Brief. SIII"(1 note 378. at Apdx B. 
J84 A.M. PSYOIIATRW As.'ro(" .• DIA(,r.OSrlC AJ'>,l) ST An:;m:;AL l\lAJ.,;UAL OF 
MLI''TAL DISORPI'RS § 312,31. a l 615·18 (4th cd. 1994). 
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the "taking intent" behind these allurements should satisfy 
RICO and the policies behind its draftsmanship, because the 
pathological gambler, by definition and diagnosis. is helpless to 
resist as in drug add ict ion (and expert testimony should so 
demonst rate). 
Most importantly. the court made the fundamenta l mistake of 
effectively discounting the civil remedies and concomitant poli-
cies behind rueo as enumerated by one of RICO's primary au-
thors, Notre Dame Law Professor G. Roben Blakey: 
[W]hen elemen ts opposed to RI CO suggest that ils subject 
matter be relurned to the states, they really mean that it be 
enforced inadequtllcly or not at all, as most state and local 
agencies lack the interest or expertise to do sophisticated or-
ganized or white-colla r crime investigations ur prosecutions. 
and state legal systcms were primarily designed to deal with 
ninetcenth ce ntury type crimes and torts. Sim ilarly, when ele-
ments opposed to RICO suggest that its subjec t maller be en-
forced only or mainly crimi na lly_ they really mcan that it be 
enforced inadequately or nor at all. If our markets are free. it 
is not because of the work of public agencies enforcing the 
antitrust statutes. as important as they arc. Private enforce-
ment is, in facl, Ihe linchpi n of the antitrust statutes. When 
civil rights legislation was under consideration in the 1960s, 
many critics emphasized states' rights, which were then, al 
least for some , only a smoke screen behi nd which to hide a 
rollen sys tem of segregation. Criticism of RICO based on fed-
eralism also looks like a smoke screen behind which the swin-
dlers and others seek to hide.385 
The RICO nonenforcement policy pervades the tenor of the Sev-
e nth Circuit's killing and chilling-effect decision in Williams. Ac-
cordingly, the Sevenlh Circuit'S decision Tan counter to the 
trends in other U,S. circuits,31lt. and the court appeared to have 
been misdirected by the mythical assumptions 1.'17 promulgated by 
the gambling indu!llry's PR campaigns.l~ 
Also in December of 2003, the Pappas case was appealed via 
the firm of Jenner and Block to the U.S. Supreme Cour1.389 The 
385 G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry. An Analysis of lhe MYlhs fhm Boisfer 
EffOrf$ to Rewrife RICO and fhe Various Proposals for Reform. 43 VA"O. L REV. 
851. 921-24 (1990) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Mytlis to Rewrite RICO]. 
386 See , e.g .. The Merger of Law and Politics !fI Gambling. supra note 303, at 660-
92. 
3S7 Compare id .. witll MytlLi fO Rewrite RICO. supra note 385, at 85 1-924. 
3f18 Compare Tire Merger of Law (lnd Poliries in Gambling, supra note 303. at 660-
92. with Williams v. A7tar Indiana Gaming Corp .. 351 F.3J 294 (7th Cif. 2003). 
3lN Letter from Hurry Pappas to lhm Grey, Exec. Oir .. Nat'l Coalition Against 
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pivotal issue was "whether casillos and topless clubs will be con· 
side red 'public use' as defined by the Fifth Amendment390 to the 
United States Constitution."3!) ' As in Poulos ,3'12 which was filed 
in 1994, the 1993 Pappas case had been delayed for over a dec-
ade,'w3 which made gambling industry litigators vulnerable to al-
legations of utilizing litigation patterns interposing for delay. 
Under the Fifth Amendment the power of eminent domain is 
limited by the ··takings clause" which states: "nor shall private 
property be taken for public use without just compensation. "3<J4 
Until the Pappas case "public use" included such facilities as 
highways. public schools, and government buildings.3 '>Js 
Harry Pappas summarized his family's case from its 1993 in-
ception as follows: 
111e Pappas fami ly filed suit in Las Vegas District Court claim-
ing that casinos and topless clubs are /lot a "public use:' and 
therefore this constituted an unconstitutional taking. The 
court agreed and o rdered the property returned. The city of 
La~ Vegas and the casi nos filed an appeal to the Nevada Su-
preme Court. Ruling the taking was a "constitutional use of 
eminent domain." the court sided with Las Vegas and the casi-
nos and overturned the district court. It should be noted that 
enormous amounts of "campaign donations" are given to Ne-
vada Supreme Court jus lices from the c<lsino industry.3,!6 
'lllC Ncvada Supreme Court decision was appealed to the U.S. 
Sup reme Court in December 20(H and the stakes were large. 
Pappas noted the significance of the issues at bar:3<n 
If the city of Las Vegas. casinos, and topless clubs should pre· 
vail al the United States Supreme Court. these vice industries, 
which are now considered privi leged and regu lated , will be el-
evated to a constitutional standard and level of power they 
could only have dreamed of in the past. The ramifications for 
American society will be devastating and long-Iasting.wx 
The practical impact of the gambling industry winning the Pap-
Legalized Gambling (Dec. 9. 2003) (on file with author) (detailing reasons Pappas 
was appealed) (hereinafter Pappas Summaryl. 
190 U.s. CO:"lST .. amend. V. 
391 Pappas Summary, supra note 389 (cmphll!'iis in originol). 
392 See footnotes 18·31. 382 supra and accompanying lext. 
393 See footnotes 252·70 supra and accompanying text. 
J\/o4 U.S. Co:"lST .. amend. V. 
395 See Pappas Summary. supra nOTe 389. 
~<,J6ld. (empbasis in original). 
,'n hI. 
;WJ Ill. 
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pas case would be to allow "eminent domain to be used to seize 
small business, mom & pop businesses, homes and property for 
casinos and topless club expansions land] would finally give casi-
nos and topless clubs a constitutional standing that they have 
never enjoyed before.")~9 Combined with virtually unlimited 
monetary resources the use of eminent domain by pro-gambling 
interests would enthrone those interests as sovereign entities at 
odds with the public health, safety, and welfare. 
The predictions and historical observations regard ing 
decriminalized organized gambling made a decade earlier were 
becoming truisms by 2003. 'Ibese points were summarized dur-
ing the 1995 U.S. Congressional hearings: 
[L]egalized gambling interests are utilizing millions of dollars 
to misdirect the debate and cause government decision makers 
and the public to reach invalid conclusions. First, there is the 
incorrect assumption that legalized gambling activities are like 
other business activities. Instead, legalized gambling activities 
have large industry-specific negatives, resulting in a cumula-
tive negative economic impact. Second, the industry's ten-
dency to focus attention on specialized factors provides a 
diSlorled view of the localized economic positives, while ignor-
ing the large business-economic costs to different regions of 
the United States. Third, the extraordinary amount of money 
which is legally used to ovenvhelm any opposition leads to Im-
balanced decisionmaking proce:ises by elected officials, regula-
tory agencies, and even the court system. Almost by definition, 
there can be litt le compromise, that is. either the national 
economy is a non-gambling one, or it is a legalized gambling 
economy which will eventually ··busl.,,400 
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the U.S. judiciary 
appeared to be increasingly vulnerable to the PR myths promul-
gated by pro-gambling interests. 
G. Gambling Interests as Dogmatists: Reinventing the Wheel 
of Misforlllne 
The historical record ind icates that decriminalized organized 
gambling activities invariably lead to new addicted gamblers, 
new bankruptcies, and new crime and corruption. Despite the 
dogma of pro-gambling lobbyists to the contrary, decriminalized 
organized gambl ing cannibalizes pre-existing local, regional, and 
399ld. 
400 Congressional Gamblin.g Hearing 1995, supra note 173, at 519-20 (statement of 
Univ. of III. Prof. John Warren Kindt) (emphasis added). 
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national economies and continues to increase the socio-economic 
negatives that necessarily accompany the expansion of gambling. 
The inordinate monies associated with decriminalized organ-
ized gambling activities have historically corrupted not only lo-
cal, state, and national administrative and legislative 
decision making, but also judicial decisionmaking. 
In the United States, gambling activities were criminalized dur-
ing most of the twentieth century- and the prohibition of gam-
bling was successfu l. Even during the most desperate economic 
period of the twent ieth century, the Great Depression, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and his economic advisors did not con-
sider decriminalizing organized gambling activities because its 
dogmat ists would invariably catalyze destructive economic 
policies. 
During the 19905 and early twenty-first century, the social. eco-
nomic, legislative, and judicial trends created by the U.S. flirta-
t ion with decriminalized organized gambling act ivities 
continually contributed to destructive results outweighing any 
benefits. History dictates that gambling activities are recriminal-
ized in cycles as the negative consequences of decriminalized or-
ganized gambling activities eventually manifest themselves in 
sufficient magnitudes to demand political backlash. 
Looking to the impacts of decriminalized organized gambling 
on future generations while the governor of Texas, Presiden t 
George W. Bush (R) summarized the negative conclusions of the 
Texas Task Force on Illegal Gambling: 
To allow casino style gambling to continue and spread in 
places where children play nol only offends [thosel who have 
not approved casino style gambli ng .. " but it also sends a 
terrible message to our chi ldren that gambling is okay. Casino 
gambling is not okay, It has ruined the lives of too many 
adults and it can do the same thing to our children ,401 
In 1999, the U.S. Gambling Commission unanimously called for a 
moratorium on the expansion of any type of gambling anywhere 
in the United States.402 The recriminalization of U,S, gambling 
will eventually occur in its historical socia-economic cycle, The 
sooner that recriminalization occurs, the sooner U,S, society and 
401 GOVERNOR'» TASK FOII.CE ON ILLEGAL GAMHLlNG IN TEX., REPORT 01' Till. 
GOVERNOR'S TA!>K FO Re t;; ON ILLEGAL GAMHUNG IN TEXAS CQ\cr ( 1999). 
402 NO I Se FINAL R EPORT. Sllpra note 77, at introduction by Kay C. Jame~. 
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the economy will be pump-primed into heal thy growth.403 
403 Gambling Facilirie.s Transformed into EducariOlw/ Facilities, supra note 158. 
See also Gambling's Destabilizing of Economies. supra f1 0te 155; Strategic Economic 
Base, supra note 329. 
